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Reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts : prelegislation opinion on select issues by state legislators, segmental boards of trustees, special commission staff, faculty and administrators compared with actual legislation.

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
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REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN MASSACHUSETTS:
PRELEGISLATION OPINION ON SELECT ISSUES BY STATE
LEGISLATORS, SEGMENTAL BOARDS OF TRUSTEES,
SPECIAL COMMISSION STAFF, FACULTY AND
ADMINISTRATORS COMPARED WITH
ACTUAL LEGISLATION

A Dissertation Presented

By

JAMES J. PASQUINI

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

February 1982

Education


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
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This study was undertaken in an effort to better understand the political and educational decision process involved in the reorganization of Massachusetts public higher education and to assist others to do the same. The opportunity to work with the State Legislature as an advisor to the Special Commission has been very rewarding to me both personally and professionally. The experiences gained in that position have given me as an educator a better understanding of the State political structure.

Thanks for this venture must go to many, especially those who served as Committee Members. I want to express my deepest gratitude to the Chairman of my Committee, Dr. G. Ernest Anderson, Jr., who provided suggestions and worked closely with me through the writing of this dissertation. My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. John W. Lederle whose wise counsel provided a valuable insight to the state politics involved in education. A special thanks must go to Dr. Charlotte Rahaim who urged me to undertake the doctoral work and was always available when I required support and assistance.

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responsibilities and mine over the months it has taken to complete this dissertation.

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ABSTRACT

REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN MASSACHUSETTS:
PRELEGISLATION OPINION ON SELECT ISSUES BY STATE LEGISLATORS,
SEGMENTAL BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, SPECIAL COMMISSION STAFF,
FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATORS COMPARED WITH ACTUAL LEGISLATION

(February, 1982)

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This study examines the problems and possible solutions in Massachusetts Public Higher Education prior to and during the 1980 reorganization. The opinions and attitudes of state legislators, segmental boards of trustees, public college faculty and administrators were used as a data source. Then, it was necessary to assess the enacted legislation to determine to what extent the expectations of the survey group regarding reorganization were met, and what possible legislative revisions could be recommended to make the system function better.

The procedures used to administer and analyze the data were two questionnaires. The prelegislative survey was forwarded to four hundred and forty-four people in the field of public higher education and legislators, to determine their input on select issues in public higher education. The post-legislative questionnaire was administered to one

hundred and fifty people who participated in the first survey. Sixty percent of the select population responded to the prelegislative survey and seventy-four percent responded to the post-legislative questionnaire.

The post-legislative survey attempted to determine the opinions on select issues of the same select group of people, now that reorganization is being implemented. It was also a tool to see whether the input and expectations of respondents were utilized in reorganizing the public higher education system in the Commonwealth.

The following summary statements represent the more significant areas uncovered in the prelegislative survey and the post-legislative survey:

1. The data revealed that the majority of the respondents do not believe that each institution should have its own local board of trustees.
2. A significant number of respondents disagreed that the five separate segmental boards of trustees should be structured under one single board.
3. The respondents indicated that public higher education should not be organized into geographic regions.
4. The study revealed that a majority of respondents are opposed to the appointment of board members who are employed by private higher education making decisions for public higher education.

5. A majority of the respondents agreed that there should be a screening and selection process similar to that utilized in the judicial system when appointing board members.
6. The data indicated that if the public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board, respondents feel that the institutions would lose their own individual identities.
7. The study revealed that the legislative and executive branches are perceived to have too much input in the operation of public higher education institutions.
8. The data revealed that the respondents did not see the Secretary of Education's department performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education.
9. An overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that one agency should coordinate all program development for public higher education.
10. The findings indicated that the respondents agreed that upon receipt of the annual appropriation, institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control.
11. The study indicated that the respondents disagreed with the statements that faculty and presidents at institutions of public higher education are overpaid.

12. In analyzing all occupational categories, the majority of the respondents indicated that there should be no institutional representation with voting privileges, on the Board of Regents or the local boards of trustees. However, the statistics did show that the category "Legislator" and "Faculty" did support institutional representation.
13. The study revealed that the Board of Regents should have approval over all institutional budgets, but not be involved in the daily management of institutions.
14. The findings indicate that the Regents' authority with respect to personnel should only be to coordinate, and to leave personnel management to the various institutions.
15. The data showed that students should have a member on the local Board of Trustees at each institution.

There are additional opinions, attitudes and expectations that were reviewed and presented in this study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study

In the early 1960's with the post-war baby boom population entering college, the demand for higher education exceeded the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' educational capacity. The political leadership realized that public higher education is a key to socio-economic mobility and that higher education is one of the Commonwealth's most valuable assets. The annual appropriations for institutions were expanding so rapidly that they would double in less than five years, and funds for new public higher educational facilities were more than half of the Commonwealth's capital outlay budget. Public higher education then, after being dominated by Massachusetts' private sector, was about to come of age.

In 1962, the Massachusetts General Court created a Special Commission, popularly known as the Willis-Harrington Commission, to restructure its higher education system to meet future challenges. More specifically, the Special Commission was charged with the task of examining higher education thoroughly and developing a governance structure that would improve the state's ability to plan, coordinate, and manage the rapid growth of Massachusetts' public institutions. Educators strongly lobbied in the General Court, and this pressure did take its toll by weakening the Commission's power and lessening the

strength of the proposed state-wide coordinating board. Although the Commission's authority was reduced, it still recommended the creation of a state-wide coordinating agency. In 1965 the General Court accepted the Commission's report and established the Board of Higher Education (BHE) to oversee the development of the Commonwealth's five public segments: University of Massachusetts, Southeastern Massachusetts University, Lowell Technical Institute, State College System and the Community College System.

During the 1960's and early 1970's, the Commission's recommendation was perceived to serve the state's needs, but some political and educational leaders were very much concerned about public higher education's ability to respond to the challenge of the 1980's. These leaders wanted to develop a more efficient management system that would reduce waste, coordinate institutional missions and increase public confidence and accountability. Responsible leaders realized there would be difficulties in preserving academic quality within a context of greater fiscal stringency and that there would be increased competition among the public and private sectors. In addition the leadership must also address the public's diminishing belief in the value of higher education. Political leaders, in general, were convinced that the existing governance structure had too many vested interests to adapt to change. The Board of Higher Education was also seen by many people as too weak to deal with overstuffed institutional administration and duplication of programs.

With these problems in mind, a reorganization effort began in the mid-1970's. Former President of the University of Massachusetts,

Robert C. Wood, and former Senate President, Kevin Harrington, called for the creation of a super-board to govern the Commonwealth's public segments of higher education. This proposal represented the first major reorganization effort and stimulated a series of other proposals, including one by the Governor to abolish the Board of Higher Education, one by the BHE to increase its powers and autonomy, and one by the Secretary of Educational Affairs to establish a regional governance structure. With many proposals suggesting different directions, the General Court created a special commission to analyze the issues and to recommend a reorganization plan.

The mounting pressure for reorganization clearly pushed the issue further into the political arena, with the Governor attempting to bring education under more executive control, the Secretary of Educational Affairs and the Board of Higher Education lobbying for their own control over the State's public system. During 1978, attention turned from reorganization to the state election, and the special commission, created by the General Court, expired without action.

The underlying demographic, economic and political forces that converged in the mid-1970's to call for the reorganization now prevailed. The Massachusetts Governor, the new Secretary of Educational Affairs, and the new Chancellor for the Board of Higher Education each wanted some form of reorganization, but could not agree on a common proposal. The Legislature and Governor demonstrated their continuing concern by establishing a new special commission to examine public higher education. The new commission received substantial funding, hired a

staff and started working in November 1979. The University of Massachusetts, the State College System, the Community College System, former Governor Foster Furcolo, The Board of Higher Education and most recently, the House Ways and Means Committee, all submitted written plans. Other plans were anticipated in light of the action of the House of Representatives to reorganize public higher education in the outside section of the fiscal 1981 budget.

From this, widespread activity a form of reorganization did emerge. The major question remains: Was this reorganization responsive to expectations of the membership of the State Legislature, the five segmental Boards of Trustees, the faculty and administration in the five public segments and the membership of the special commission to reorganize public higher education? What factors contributed significantly to the way reorganization occurred? What factors generated the expectations?

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to assess the problems designated by people in the field of higher education and legislators prior to the reorganization legislation and determine whether the expectations regarding reorganization were met in the actual legislation recently enacted. This problem is approached through an analysis of prelegislative opinion as expressed in a survey of state legislators, members of the segmental boards of trustees, selected college administrators and selected faculty members and the persons sitting on the special commission studying reorganization. This body of opinion is then

compared with the actual legislative mandates as voted and signed into law. This study will attempt to determine whether the resulting legislation was based on the communication transmitted by the sub-groups surveyed at least in selected topic areas or whether there was no relationship to the prelegislative opinion. Significant discrepancies between expected and actual outcomes are delineated, and various hypotheses accounting for these differences are formulated and examined. Post legislative opinions are obtained by follow-up questions to key individuals in the Commonwealth. The data are then used to recommend amendments to the legislation that will hopefully smooth the transition and improve the system.

Significance of the Study

Although reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts is occurring, there is a greater interest among the constituencies now than when the dynamics of the reorganizational efforts were in process.

In retrospect, many of the college and university faculty, administrators, segmental board members, legislators, and educational agencies seem to be discontented with the flow of reorganizational events leading up to the legislative action, and unhappy with the outcome. The action referred to is how the Massachusetts House and Senate passed and the Governor signed into law the fiscal 1981 budget which included an outside section dictating the reorganization of public higher education. While a student of government cannot approve of the

process which preempted the Joint Committee on Education, the Special Commission on Reorganization of Higher Education, and public participation, the value of the plan will be determined by its implementation. It is imperative that during the transitional period a carefully coordinated effort be made to inform and educate thoroughly both the public and institutions involved. It is important that reorganization be implemented properly so that the general lessening of public confidence in the state's college and university structure is minimized.

People in the field of public higher education in Massachusetts must work within the recently-enacted legislative structure. Working through the impending changes may present some obstacles, but to execute these changes in an arbitrary manner would be chaotic and nonproductive. It is also paramount to continue to focus on the problem for possible legislative revision.

Overview of Methodology and Terminology

The methodology of this study is to analyze and explore the attitudes and expectation towards reorganization of Public Higher Education in Massachusetts. The analysis was accomplished through the following methods:

1. Special Advisor: This researcher worked as a Special Advisor for the Commission to Reorganize Public Higher Education from January 1, 1980 to June 30, 1980. As a first-hand observer of the reorganization process, an understanding was gained as to the way data were collected, decisions were made and plans for reorganization were formulated.

2. In-depth Interview: This primary interview obtained the opinion of twenty-five people, twenty in the field of public higher education and five state legislators, personally and thoroughly on their expectation, attitudes and the issues toward public higher education in Massachusetts. These in-depth interviews helped this researcher to obtain the information necessary to compose a primary questionnaire.
3. Prelegislation Questionnaire: This primary questionnaire consisted of fifty-three questions and was an impersonal survey administered to four hundred and forty-four people, divided into five occupational categories: state legislators, segmental board of trustees members, special commission members, faculty and administrators. The results appear in chapter three.
4. Post-Legislative Questionnaire: This follow-up questionnaire consisted of fourteen questions developed through a cross matrix of the actual signed legislation compared to the prelegislative survey and philosophical, humanistic, perception. The questions were administered to one hundred and fifty key individuals in the following occupational categories: State legislators, segmental board of trustees members, faculty and administrators. The results appear in chapter four.

The terms in this study include:

1. Legislators (State Representatives and Senators): These individuals are elected by the people to represent the public

in the decision-making process. This is only appropriate since public money is being spent and must be publicly accounted for.

2. Boards of Trustees: These include the membership of the Boards of Trustees for the five public Higher Education segments. Specifically, this includes trustees from the University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell, Southeastern Massachusetts University, the ten state colleges, and the fifteen community colleges.
3. Special Commission Members: This specifically includes the members appointed by the Governor: five senators and ten representatives for the Joint Committee on Education, Cabinet members of the Executive Branch and the Special Commission staff.
4. Segmental Personnel: Included are Chancellor/President, selected administrators and selected faculty from the universities, state colleges, and community colleges.
5. Governance Models: There are essentially three basic governance structures of public higher education. One is the single governing board approach, exemplified by the New York Board of Regents. The second is a two- or three-tiered system with an overall coordinating board; this was the Massachusetts model. The third is a regional approach in which institutions are organized on the basis of geographical distribution. The various models are explained in detail in succeeding chapters.

Limitations

There are, of course, limitations to this study. Perhaps the most important is the absence of data from other affected constituencies which might have been studied. These include, among others, the independent sector, the Board of Higher Education, the Secretariate of Education, the student population and the general public.

The special, but by no means arbitrary, nature of the population sample precludes making exact distributive statements about the attitudes prevalent in Massachusetts. It should also be remembered that the respondents chosen were more knowledgeable about Massachusetts public higher education than the average resident in the Commonwealth, and probably more critical of, or sympathetic to, its needs. Thus, their views may not represent the population of Massachusetts as a whole.

Since the General Court voted the legislation reorganizing public higher education in June 1980, with an implementation date of March 1981, it is too early to determine the long range effect or the positive or negative results of the enacted legislation.

The position of this researcher, working for the Co-chairman of the Special Commission and advisor to that Commission, may have had an effect on the respondents. This relationship may have caused the respondents to sense an obligation to respond. Conversely, it may have led to no response by some. The responses themselves may be a reflection of attitudes toward the Special Commission. In an effort to see that this limitation has as little effect on the data as possible, anonymity was employed and confidentiality assured.

Study Procedures

This report is descriptive in nature. Descriptive research, as referred to in this study, is concerned with describing the nature and degree of existing conditions prior to the recent legislation affecting the reorganization and the consequences of reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts. An analysis will center on the factors that contributed to the way reorganization occurred. A review of why reorganization happened the way it did and how the resulting legislation could or could not meet the perceived needs of reorganization, will be undertaken in this study.

Reorganization is in its initial phases, and it must be noted that it may be several years before the actual effect of the legislation is realized by all concerned parties.

The prelegislative questionnaire survey were cross-tabulated with the actual legislation. Problem and solution areas were identified. From this data new questions will be formulated to be used in a post-legislative questionnaire. The questions were administered to key individuals throughout the segments of higher education, legislators and members of the Special Commission.

The prelegislative questionnaire on attitudes and issues was administered to various groups in the Spring of 1980 to obtain their opinions on issues in public higher education. The questionnaire was reviewed by the dissertation committee and pretested on a college president and members of the Special Commission Staff. The time frame to compile data for the reorganization committee and the limit of personal

resources, precluded a more exhaustive study. The questionnaire was designed from knowledge of educational issues and intensive interviews with select individuals throughout the Commonwealth.

The survey group included State legislators, segmental boards of trustees, members of the commission staff, college presidents, faculty and administrators.

Both the questionnaires used in this study were structured so that they contained formal lists of questions which were written out on the questionnaire, and the questionnaires were constructed in a manner which made the objectives of the survey clear to the respondent.

After the data were compiled, the results of the prelegislative questionnaire were cross-tabulated with components of the actual legislation. This matrix was examined to determine whether the prelegislative expectations were addressed, and if so, whether it was being solved by the enacted legislation or exacerbated by the legislation. There was a cluster analysis of the data to determine if responses had patterns in the data.

Upon an examination of the impact matrix it was evident that problem and solution areas do exist, either created from the legislation or due to the oversight of the enactors of the legislation.

Questions were created from this examination and the answers were obtained from a post-legislation questionnaire. The follow-up questions were administered in the Spring of 1981 to select members of the group who took part in the pre-legislative survey. The purpose of this follow-up questionnaire was to obtain post-legislative opinions to

substantiate or negate pre-legislative findings on reorganization expectations. As a result of this study, the data were used to develop conclusions, recommendations for future reference, questions for further study and legislation.

CHAPTER II

A Review of the Literature

THE EVOLUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

To have a clear picture of the development of public higher education, its present organizational structure and its future needs, it is essential to start with a brief history.

The history of higher education falls into three stages. The first was the eleventh century to the middle of the seventeenth. Its main purpose was to service the clergy. The second was the seventeenth to the twentieth century, in which it provided for the needs of the very rich as well as religious groups. The final cycle of development during the twentieth century provided service to the general public.¹

Private institutions served the first two stages because they catered to those who had the ability to pay. By popular demand for higher education, the tax-supported institutions began to unfold by necessity, allowing all to participate. It's ironic that the growth of the private sector created a new child--the tax-supported institution. Due to the hiring of more qualified faculty, improved curricula and the building of new and larger facilities, costs climbed in the private sector resulting in lower enrollments. To summarize, the private institution was creating a product that only a few could afford to buy. This is the main reason why public higher education was conceived.

¹Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History, (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 10.

The land-grant college was the first force changing the intent of higher education from serving the rich to serving the masses, created by the Morrill Federal Land Grant, October of 1862.² Congressman Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont introduced his bill in 1857 "to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life."³ The Morrill Act passed in July 1862. The Act provided public lands to establish agricultural schools. Each state was given public lands equal to 30,000 acres. Massachusetts founded its agricultural college at Amherst in 1863. There was a second Morrill Act passed in 1890 giving a regular appropriation to the land grant institution providing that the state did not violate the separate but equal doctrine with regard to race.⁴ Massachusetts was one of eighteen states that complied with the doctrine. State tax-supported institutions had become a major factor in higher education by the late nineteenth century, though the National University that George Washington had advocated was not created.⁵

What was unique about state institutions was their easy ability to commit themselves to the John Hopkins concept of the never-ending search for truth. Where a private institution frequently catered to the ideals or political, social, religious and/or economic views of its founders or

²Earl Dudley Ross, Democracy's College, (New York: Arno, 1969) p. 46.

³Ibid., p. 47.

⁴Ibid., p. 179.

⁵Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, American Higher Education: A Documentary History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), Vol. I, p. 157.

board of trustees, the new public institution, supported by the demands of liberal state constitutions and a federal Bill of Rights that the United States Supreme Court was gradually applying to the states, was dedicated to a search for scientific truth, viz., the realities of life.

There was opposition to public higher education--the same sort of opposition that had been heard earlier with regard to public elementary schools, and later to public secondary schools:

- (1) increased burdens on the taxpayers
- (2) payment by noncollege-attending segments
- (3) the destruction of local control over education
- (4) fears of government domination
- (5) the destruction of private institutions, and with it the ultimate destruction of those independent elements in our democracy that depend upon education
- (6) the elimination of government by an aristocracy of wealth and birth
- (7) the production of ball-bearing uniformity
- (8) the creation of a huge, powerful monolithic educational structure, much like the Bank of the United States that Jackson had gone through so much trouble to destroy, that, like the Bank, had not been provided for in the federal constitution and was a threat to the people
- (9) creation of a public educational system that would tend to be not only large but impersonal--something contrary to the small, personal type of training that had been the origins of

the university idea in Europe during the eleventh and twelfth centuries

- (10) forcing higher education to become a plaything of politics and ultimately susceptible to political corruption
- (11) giving a type of education to large numbers of people who had no capacity to use it, and which would, in the long run, only make persons unfit for the menial tasks for which nature and their natural abilities intended them
- (12) violating the principle that it is not necessary for all persons, qualified or not, intelligent or not, to have access to higher education; higher education is for those who are qualified by education, intelligent by nature, desirous of such additional training, and wealthy enough to afford it
- (13) duplication by public institutions of plants and services of already existing private colleges and universities.

All of these arguments were to a greater or lesser extent valid, but even so, they did not solve the basic dilemma posed by the American experiment. Once the hypothesis is accepted that the greater one's education, the better democracy works (which is certainly the basis for the Massachusetts system), then we face the problem of ensuring access for higher education to anyone who wants it. Realistically, the entire history of American higher education from the close of the Civil War to the present time may be summed up in the struggle for acceptance and implementation of this theory. In 1980, with the tax dollar shrinking and the public crying for more accountability, the struggle that had

been previously won has to be fought again. It seems educators must reinforce the basic premise "from the point of view of individual and national welfare, higher education is one of the most important qualitative services in the United States."⁶ We must use our powers of persuasion. First, we must accept the view that everyone has a right to test his abilities at higher education. Second, we must establish a system that enables anyone to attend regardless of his or her financial circumstances.

Despite the growth of public higher education in conjunction with the private sector, only a small percentage of the population attended institutions of higher learning until the years following the Second World War, when under the sponsorship of the G.I. Bill of Rights, hundreds of thousands of veterans poured into colleges and universities throughout the nation. At the close of the nineteenth century, according to Hansen and Witmer, the National Association of Manufacturers and other business groups criticized the value of college education.⁷

"Children generally left school at age twelve. Fewer than 11 percent of the 14-17 year old population attended secondary school; only 4 percent of the 18-21 year old population attended college."⁸ In the years 1939-41, those in college equalled approximately 16 percent of the 18-21

⁶The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Who Should Pay?, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), p. 1.

⁷W. Lee Hansen and David R. Witmer, Economic Benefits of Universal Higher Education, in Logan Wilson, et al., (Washington, D. C., Universal Higher Education, 1972), p. 31.

⁸Ibid. p. 31.

year old group; and in the 1960's, roughly 43 percent of the 17-21 year old group. "In summary then, over the past three decades, a dramatic shift toward more universal higher education has been accomplished . . ."⁹ Whether this enormous increase in the population of institutions of higher learning took place because of depressions, the war-effort, federal assistance, or any other factor or combination of factors, the reality remains that a push was on to add four more years known as higher education to the kindergarten-elementary-secondary educational structure. Therefore, as college costs increased along with everything else in the 1970's -- food, gasoline, interest on loans, real estate -- the problem became primarily one of access. No one argues that the cost of education is enormous, but on the other hand few people today, believing in the democratic dream, would deny any citizen the right to attend college if he or she so desires, whether he or she has the funds or not. If the private -- or as they now like to be called, the independent -- institutions of higher learning were gradually in the 1970's pricing themselves out of the democratic market, then the public institutions by default had to shoulder the burden of low cost access.

The Development of Higher Education in Massachusetts

Massachusetts public higher education development was really due primarily to the existence of the many exceptional private colleges in the state, for instance, Harvard College, founded in the 1600's. Other states in the union did not have the private higher education resource,

⁹Ibid., p. 30.

so it was necessary for them to activate a public system earlier in history. Private institutions in Massachusetts, while providing excellent educational opportunities at a high cost, have limited enrollment capacity and restricted access to many citizens wanting a higher education. These reasons are why a state system was conceived with low tuition that would open access for those citizens that had not been able to attend the more expensive private institutions.

The first step in this direction took place in 1932 when the Normal Schools, begun by Horace Mann, became State teachers colleges. These colleges were designed to train the public with public funds to teach students in public elementary and secondary school education. The success of the teacher college concept and mounting public pressure for more diverse State institutions, brought about a new enterprise, the Massachusetts Agricultural College, which was transformed into the University of Massachusetts in Amherst. The Massachusetts State College as explained previously, was created by federal action under the Morrill Land Grant Act in 1863 developing the Massachusetts Agricultural School at Amherst. In 1953 Lowell Technological Institute was founded and in 1959 the State Teachers' Colleges were confederated into the state college system.

During the cold war period of the late fifties and early sixties, there was a tremendous growth in the Massachusetts public higher education system. In the sixties community colleges were founded, Southeastern Massachusetts University was created from two textile schools, and the University of Massachusetts began its new efforts with

campuses in Boston and Worcester. Also, during the early sixties, one of the most important freedoms was given to the public colleges in Massachusetts -- that of fiscal autonomy. Definitions of autonomy usually contend that the trustees, president and faculty should be free to make those decisions that determine the essential character of the educational institution.¹⁰ "Those responsible for an institution's performance should be free to decide:

1. Which students shall be admitted and to what discipline they shall be subjected.
2. Who shall teach, how much they shall be paid, when they shall be promoted and whether they shall have tenure.
3. The substance of the courses, the nature of the curricula and the standards for degrees.
4. The relative emphasis on instruction, research and public service.
5. How the institution's resources shall be allocated among departments, schools and activities."¹¹

This, and this alone, is one of the biggest unwritten factors why public education has prospered in Massachusetts in spite of current inadequate funding, lack of legislature support and substantial erosion of autonomy.

With the growth of facilities taking place in the sixties and enrollment going from 17,000 full-time students in 1960 to 165,120 in

¹⁰American Council on Education, Institutional Autonomy, In Shaping American Higher Education, (Washington: American Council on Education, 1972), pp. 232-242.

¹¹John J. Corson, The Governance of Colleges and Universities, Modernizing Structures and Processes, Revised Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), p. 52.

1978 in the Massachusetts public sector (Hegis data), coordination of the system was essential. A governance structure for public higher education was designed for the Commonwealth in the 1965 Willis-Harrington Act, which will be explained in further detail below. The Willis-Harrington Act sought to insure and to preserve quality in our public higher education endeavor through a balance of academic freedom with political accountability. The most important part of this legislation was the creation of a lay Board of Higher Education to assist the institutions and the General Court.

At present higher education in Massachusetts consists of eighty-six independent colleges, universities and specialized institutions and twenty-eight state-supported institutions.¹² The public-supported institutions received funding of \$315,396,905, excluding capital outlay appropriations for fiscal year 1980.

The Commonwealth Public Higher Education Profile

The Commonwealth's twenty eight public institutions were divided into five functional units, which were called segments. Each segment had a governing board composed of lay citizens with terms from three to seven years, depending on the general law governing that segment. The segments, with their lay citizen boards, were also created by the Willis-Harrington Act so that the scope of various types of institutions could be carried out in an objective manner with as little political

¹²Laura Clausen, Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, Report on Higher Education, Memo of November 8, 1979.

interference as possible in any public function. The ten State colleges are four-year schools that as stated previously, began as teacher training institutions, but which now have more of a multi-purpose role. The fifteen community colleges are two-year institutions with a focus on career education and transfer programs. The three universities, having five campuses (three for the University of Massachusetts) are providing a four-year liberal arts framework for the student with a significant effort in post-graduate studies.

The material organized was based on existing structure prior to the June 1980 reorganization of public higher education, including the five segments, the Board of Higher Education and the Office of the Secretary of Education Affairs. So that the entire picture is presented a section on the Willis-Harrington legislation is included. The following factual material has been taken from either the Massachusetts General Laws and/or the official college and university catalogs.

State Colleges.¹³ On April 20, 1837, the Massachusetts General Court passed a bill establishing the nation's first State Board of Education, with Horace Mann, President of the Senate, as the first Secretary. In accepting the position to the detriment of his law practice, he remarked, "The interests of a client are small compared with the interests of the next generation. Let the next generation, then, be my client."¹⁴ Then he proceeded about the Commonwealth trying to

¹³Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education, The Peoples' Colleges: The State Colleges of Massachusetts, (Boston, Trustees of the State College System 1971), p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1.

convince the general population of the need for free public school education. But, in so doing, he also recognized that free general schools could not exist without teachers, which gave rise to his drive for a normal school or teacher-training institute. If he needed a pattern, it was available because in 1833 the French had set up a national elementary school system based upon Prussian models that included about thirty normal schools for the training of teachers. On April 19, 1838, Governor Edward Everett signed a joint resolution of both houses of the General Court to match the \$10,000 offered by Edmund Dwight of Boston for the use of the State Board in this regard. On May 30, 1838, the Board voted to establish a normal school in Plymouth County, although, as a result of conflicts within the county, it was not until March 26, 1840, that a site was chosen at Bridgewater. In the meantime, on July 3, 1839, another site was chosen in Lexington, five years later being moved to West Newton, and in 1853, to Framingham. The first coeducational normal school in the country was established in Barre on September 5, 1839, moving to Westfield five years later. The fourth opened at Salem in 1854, the fifth in Worcester in 1874; and then in 1894, the General Court approved the opening of four more -- Hyannis in 1894, Fitchburg in 1895, North Adams in 1896, and Lowell in 1897. In 1964, the Massachusetts School of Art, which had been in existence in 1873 to prepare teachers and supervisors of art, was incorporated into the State College System, as well as the Massachusetts Maritime Academy for the training of officers of the Merchant Marines. In 1944, the Hyannis College was closed and in 1952, the Boston Teachers College,

which had been the training ground for so many of the educators in the Boston System since its founding in 1852, was transferred to the Commonwealth as the Boston State Teachers College.

Until 1909, the normal schools were each directed by strong principals who operated their individual schools on the basis of their own backgrounds, education, and goals, subject to the advice of so-called visitors from the Board of Education. But in that year, the normal schools were placed under the direct supervision of a Commissioner of Education, and in 1932, under Governor Joseph B. Ely, the normal schools became state teachers' colleges. With the end of the Second World War, however, and the tremendous influx of youth to higher education, it soon became apparent that the dominant role of these colleges could no longer be that of preparing teachers for the public schools, but had to take on a broader scope. Homer W. Anderson's 1954 Report on the Massachusetts State Teachers Colleges recommended toward this end the formation of a separate Board of Trustees to supervise and set policy for these institutions, while a Report of the Committee to Study General Education in the Massachusetts State Teachers Colleges in 1959, published by the Department of Education, demonstrated the growing need for non-professional education subjects in the curriculum. As a result, in 1960, the state teachers colleges became full-fledged four-year liberal arts institutions under a single Board of Trustees. This report placed public tax-supported education in a Board of Trustees consisting of 13 persons to run the state colleges, a Board of Higher Education, the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (MACE), and the Board of Education for the pre-college levels.

The University of Massachusetts. The multi-campus institution we know today as the University of Massachusetts was first incorporated in Amherst in 1863 under the provisions and impetus of the federal Morrill Land Grant Act. It was named the Massachusetts Agricultural College and its original mission of providing instruction, research, and information in the areas of agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, and natural resources is still very much alive.

By 1931 the College had considerably broadened its activities and was renamed Massachusetts State College. This name change, it will be noted, occurred thirty years prior to that of the teachers' colleges.

Sixteen years later, in 1947, the College was designated the University of Massachusetts and assigned the broad degree-granting authority appropriate to its new status as the state university.

In 1965, the Boston campus of the University opened its doors at Arlington Street, moving in 1973 to the Harbor Campus. The Arlington Street building continues to house the College of Public and Community Services as well as the offices of the President and Central administrative staff.

The University Medical School at Worcester admitted its first students in 1970 and moved to a new campus three years later. In 1976 the University Hospital, a teaching and research facility, was completed as the most recent addition to an expanding institution. At the time of this writing, the entire University was under a Board consisting of 26 members (as reorganized in 1973), 19 regular, and seven ex officio.

Southeastern Massachusetts University. The gradual emergence of a second university in southeastern Massachusetts demonstrates a long-

standing effort to meet the particular educational needs of a region. In 1895, it was the needs of the textile industry which dominated and to this end two institutions were established, the Bradford Durfee Textile School and the New Bedford Textile School. Over the next sixty years, two changes signaled an extension of institutional purpose. In 1946, one school became a "technical institute," the other a "textile institute." In 1957, a second name change produced the Bradford Durfee College of Technology and the New Bedford Institute of Technology with the authorization to offer the degree of Bachelor of Science.

In 1960, a third regional institution was created, Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute, mandated to provide diversified educational programs and to consolidate with the two existing colleges named above. This consolidation took place in 1964; one year later, baccalaureate programs in the humanities and social sciences were added to the curriculum.

A final name change, in 1969, created Southeastern Massachusetts University, which must be seen as the product of seventy-four years of evolution and growth.

University of Lowell. In 1975 a second regional university was created by legislative act merging two well-established and quite different colleges into an institution intended, as with Southeastern Massachusetts University, to meet the instructional and research needs of a particular area, in this instance, the Merrimack Valley.

Lowell State College, one of the two institutions in question, was chartered in 1894 as a normal school for the training of teachers.

Following the pattern described earlier, Lowell was designated a teachers' college in 1932 and a general-purpose four-year state college in 1960.

Lowell Textile Institute was founded in 1895 as an independent institution and came under state purview in 1918. The school achieved collegiate status in 1928 and in 1953 became a multi-purpose technical institution with a change of name to Lowell Technological Institute. The original textile programs were gradually phased out with the disappearance of the industry from the region, but in 1965 the Institute's degree authority was expanded to include the offering of doctoral programs in appropriate areas of study.

Ten years later, a merger of the two colleges brought the liberal arts, education, and music programs of Lowell State together with the science, business, and technology offerings of Lowell Tech to establish the University of Lowell, a broad-based regional university.

Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges. The decade of the fifties brought a new dimension to public higher education with the emergence of the two-year community college. Two-year institutions had long existed in the independent sector, but they were predominantly either liberal arts colleges for women or business and technical institutes. The non-residential community college would provide a broad spectrum of liberal arts and occupational degree programs, both transfer and terminal, non-credit lifelong learning opportunities, and would fulfill as well a mission of service to the immediate community.

In 1958, the General Court established the Community College System under a single board of trustees, the Massachusetts Board of

Regional Community Colleges, the purpose of which was to service students who (1) were not sure of their collegiate goals, (2) were not certain that they wanted four years of college training, (3) were not confident of their ability to perform college level work. The programs offered were both terminal programs (2-year complete) and transferral programs (at the end of two years, students could transfer their credits to a four-year college and continue as juniors). Since their establishment, the community college system proved itself to be an enormous success, and the Commonwealth now boasts fifteen of them spread over the State: Berkshire, Bristol, Cape Cod, Greenfield, Holyoke, Massachusetts Bay, Massasoit, Mount Wachusett, North Shore, Northern Essex, Quinsigamond, Springfield Technical, Middlesex, Roxbury and Bunker Hill. Despite substantial building programs, three of the colleges -- Roxbury, Middlesex and North Shore -- are not as yet housed on permanent campuses. The Board of Trustees consists of eleven persons appointed by the Governor for six-year terms, one student trustee, and unlike any of the other segments, five professional educators representing the other public higher education segments. These five educators were placed on the Board in the original legislation to ensure that the newest stepchild would not be killed at birth by its older siblings. The chairperson of the Board was specifically named by the Governor, not elected by fellow trustees; the vice-chairperson was elected by the trustees.

The Law --Governance and Power

Willis-Harrington Act, Chapter 572, GLMA, Acts of 1965. The Massachusetts Legislature passed, in 1965, an act to improve and extend educational facilities in the Commonwealth, known as the Willis-Harrington Act. This legislation represented the first effort of the Commonwealth to organize higher education into a coherent, coordinated system and to plan for an expansionary period which seemed then to have no boundaries.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education defines governance as the "structure and processes of decision-making."¹⁵ In Massachusetts, despite a major reorganization of public higher education in 1965, the process has remained the same: individual institutions dealing directly with the legislature for appropriations. The result was an absence of any systematic, coherent public policy.

Willis-Harrington rewrote and updated those statutes dealing with institutional purpose and the functions and responsibilities of the five existing boards of trustees, the University of Massachusetts, the State College System, Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute, University of Lowell, and the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.

Willis-Harrington also created a statewide coordinating agency, the Board of Higher Education, to replace the existing and very limited Board of Collegiate Authority. Expanded lay boards and advisory groups

¹⁵Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, The States and Private Higher Education, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1977), p. 19.

were mandated for all segments to insure that the public interest and public needs would be met.

The need for a strong, overall coordinating agency comprised of lay membership was detailed in the Willis-Harrington Commission report as follows: "Organization for coordination, for leadership, and for action within a master plan is the key to improvement in the program of all education in the Commonwealth. Without central coordination and a relationship established between standards and financial support, neither efficiency nor effectiveness can be assured."

Board of Higher Education. The Board of Higher Education was created "to provide primarily a structure for assuring coordination, quality, and expansion through a continuous process of planning." The Board consists of 12 members, including five college trustees -- one each from the University, the state colleges, SMU, University of Lowell, and the community colleges -- appointed by their fellow trustees, while the other seven members were appointed by the Governor for five-year terms. In creating the Board of Higher Education, the General Court gave a broad grant of power so that it could play a powerful role in the development of educational programs maintained by the state, including, but not exclusively reserved to, the following: Under Massachusetts General Law, Chapter 15, Section 10, the purposes, powers and duties of the Board of Higher Education are: "to support facilitate, and delineate functions and programs for public institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth segments of such institutions, to allocate to them the responsibility and autonomy to discharge such functions and

programs and to plan and develop efficient and effective coordination among them; provided, however, that the determination of individual courses within a general program of study shall be the sole responsibility of each public institution of higher education." From its inception, however, the Board of Higher Education suffered from "structural weaknesses, limited power, inadequate funding and less than robust political leadership." (Sloan Commission Report, Fall 1978).

In addition, the statutory authority assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Educational Affairs and to segmental boards of trustees competed in a number of areas with Board responsibilities.

However, despite the broad authority of the Board of Higher Education, considerable autonomy resided in the various college segmental boards of trustees. The Board of Higher Education by statute was not afforded the flexibility of fiscal autonomy which is hard to understand.

The Secretary of Educational Affairs. The Office of the Secretary of Educational Affairs was established in 1969, four years after the Willis-Harrington, as part of a reorganization of the executive branch under Governor Sargent. The Secretary also had the responsibility of providing "educational leadership statewide consistent with legal authority," of conducting planning and research activities, and of reviewing and acting upon the budget requests and hiring practices of the state agencies for education.

All of the departments explained thus far were responsible to the Legislature and to the Office of Administration and Finance on a post-

audit basis so that academic freedom may be preserved. While academic freedom, depending on whether it is supported by a student, faculty member, administrator, or legislator, has taken on many different definitions -- it means lack of political control over what is learned and how it is taught. Fiscal autonomy and the post audit budgetary system is a budgeting procedure designed to enhance financial flexibility, but at the same time ensure accountability of the taxpayer's dollars. The government can review what has happened after the fact and pursue the appropriate course of action in the next fiscal year. This procedure, combined with the system of lay governing boards, has minimized political interference and preserved academic freedom in the public sector. However, there is an external as well as an internal political structure in public higher education. The Willis-Harrington Act has prevented the external political structure of government from interfering with the educational process. The interference begins when law makers try to make difficult financial decisions in a vacuum concerning the growth of the public sector. Public higher education has been effective in presenting its case to the state government even in this very difficult economic time. Even when educators felt they did not win the fiscal support they deserved, public higher education, the second largest portion of the state budget, has been dealt one of the least debilitating blows.

The present structure of higher education was really created on a trial and error basis. Until 1965, public colleges were instituted to fulfill a specific public need of the time, without an overall plan of development for the system as a whole. In the early 1960's the

Commonwealth found itself financing over 20 institutions without the benefit of having a plan for the whole system. Then in 1965, the Willis- Harrington Act was passed as an effort to organize and direct the growth of these varied institutions. The Board of Higher Education was created by this act as the body that would coordinate the effort. The creation of a coordinating body and not a governing board would hopefully balance the academic freedom of the institutions with a need for general accountability to the public purpose.

This attempt to achieve a balance of freedom with accountability resulted in an internal struggle for a balance of power or authority between the segments and the Board of Higher Education. The status quo of this balance of power struggle has been the unimpeded growth and freedom of the public institutions. The Board of Higher Education challenged that status quo and thus threatened the balance of power. The result is a battle between those intending to protect the status quo and those who wish to challenge it. Battles to maintain or revise the balance have taken place over questions of budget and capital outlay, program approval, and recent efforts such as the Board's equal opportunity in employment regulations.

This friction may very well have been intended. As a result of these internal political struggles, the questions of enrollment growth, capital growth, public and private college cooperation, new program efforts for disenfranchised students and the general trends of the public system are more carefully thrashed out. The difficult first steps that have been taken towards the sharing of educational resources

between public and private colleges took place without legislative instigation and amidst quite a lot of internal friction. For example, the five college concept in Amherst and the creation of the Public/Private Forum was the outcome of a Board of Higher Education study on master planning for higher education in the Commonwealth.

This is certainly not to say that the present system does not need to change along with the changing societal requirements on higher education. It is evident that both the programs offered by Massachusetts educational system and the governing structure of that system need amendment to meet these needs.

The Cry for Reorganization

A 1973 plan for reorganizing the entire structure of public tax-supported higher education in the Commonwealth was constructed by former Secretary of Educational Affairs Joseph M. Cronin for the Sargent administration, but failed in passage through the General Court. Under this plan, the whole state was to be divided into five regions for post-secondary education and five regions for elementary and secondary education, with a council for each region. Over each group of councils was to be a board of post-secondary education and a board of elementary and secondary education, and these two boards would report directly to the Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, who would in turn report to the Governor. In this way, unity over the entire public educational system from kindergarten through college would be achieved through centralization in the executive office. But the General Court refused to see a need for centralization, at least at the time that it

was proposed. In 1976, Kevin Harrington, President of the Massachusetts State Senate, proposed placing all of the state colleges under the University of Massachusetts in something of the vein of the California or New York system, but Governor Dukakis opposed this, preferring that the state colleges maintain their own identity, and the Harrington proposal was set aside. In 1976, the Governor and Secretary of Educational Affairs Paul Parks went from institution to institution meeting with students, faculty, and administrators asking for input as to the ultimate organization of the tax-supported system of public higher education. They did not indicate that they had any definite ideas other than that they did not want to see the whole structure placed under the University of Massachusetts. Senator Harrington had now shifted his line of thinking, and now favored the abolition of all boards of trustees and the Board of Higher Education. Senator Harrington's new proposal was to establish a single board of trustees for the entire public higher education system that would work with the primary-secondary levels to create a coordinated system for the Commonwealth. In 1977 the Commission was again established to resolve the Massachusetts public higher education system. This commission did not have a full staff or adequate funding, so the process stagnated until October 1979. The cry for reorganization got strong and a Special Commission to study public higher education and recommend a new direction was activated. The members of this special commission consisted of ten state representatives and five state senators. Governor Edward J. King swore in the ten gubernatorial appointees and three ex-officio members. Senator Walter J. Boverini was elected

Chairman of the Commission, and Representative Frank J. Matrango was elected Co-chairman.

The Commission held its first meeting on November 14, 1979, at which time members agreed to begin their study by examining the system of public higher education as it presently functions. Testimony was requested from each of the five public segments, the Board of Higher Education, and the Office of the Secretary of Educational Affairs. The testimony of the segments detailed the structure, goals and policies for managing their institutions and planning for future needs.

Between November 14, 1979 and May 17, 1980, the Commission held twenty-nine meetings, including full commission, governance, and Boston subcommittee meetings. During that time, testimony was also received from representatives of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the American Federation of Teachers, student organizations, the State College Building Authority, as well as from Governor Edward J. King, Professor Francis Keppel, Senior Lecturer at Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Rev. Michael Walsh, S. J., former President of Boston College and Fordham University. Discussion and debate on the wide range of issues encompassing the study followed each session of testimony. To provide backup and background material to the special commission resource people from various institutions of public higher education participated in the meeting, answering questions and sharing insights from their own experiences.

The Special Commission also reviewed various reorganizational plans to provide a basis of comparison between the present system and governance structures that were being proposed.

In the restructuring, the majority of the Committee was leaning in the direction of establishing a strong central board for coordination. They also felt that the central board should recommend a single unified budget and have the authority to selectively shift funds between institutions. The current system as it presently operates, requires duplicative hearings, encourages competitive institutional lobbying, and produces conflicting and fragmented information to the Legislature as well as to the Governor.

The Commission also considered another top priority, which was the need to establish within a central board the authority to terminate programs in the public sector. It was determined that in order for the system to respond to current and future needs and to shift resources, termination power would be necessary.

The reorganization plans studied by the Committee recommended the abolition of segmental representation on a central board. Representation of vested interests was viewed as detrimental to the board's effectiveness.

On January 24, 1980, the Commission approved formation of subcommittees to study the possible need to restructure Boston area institutions and to realign the governance structure of public higher education.

The Boston Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Gerard D'Amico, Chairman of the Joint Education Committee, visited Boston area public colleges, at which time faculty, administration and students articulated their views. Extensive data, compiled by the staff, and recommendations

of the Chairman were presented to and approved by the Subcommittee.

These recommendations included:

1. Establishing a team to pursue implementation of a merger of Boston State College with University of Massachusetts/Boston
2. Creation of a core city consortium
3. Expansion of community services
4. Construction of a 2,000 student Roxbury Community College in the Southwest Corridor
5. While construction is underway, move Roxbury Community College temporarily to Boston Trade High School.

A construction measure was included in the capital outlay budget signed by Governor King in June 1980.

The Boston Subcommittee also recommended the incorporation of Roxbury Community College, Bunker Hill Community College, Massachusetts Bay Community College, and a new College without walls into one Boston Community College.

In an effort to assure reorganization of higher education during this fiscal year, Representative John Finnegan, chairman of House Ways and Means, proposed his own reorganization bill, submitted by the House Committee on Ways and Means as an outside section of the budget. The reorganization proposal established a Board of Regents with governing powers over the ten state colleges and fifteen community colleges. The bill also abolished the Secretary of Education and eliminated the state and community college boards, leaving intact only three segments: University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell, and Southeastern Massachusetts University.

The Finnegan proposal, after intense debate on the floor of the House, was approved as an "outside section to the fiscal 1981 budget." There was no similar plan in the Senate's version of the fiscal year '81 budget, which then requires the item taken up by the Conference Committee, which receives the budget after initial House and Senate versions are approved in order to iron out differences between the two branches.

Spurred on by attempts of the House of Representatives to re-organize public higher education through the budget process, and with strong encouragement from the Governor, the Special Commission held a weekend marathon session to finalize its recommendations on governance. This pressure proved fruitful due to the fact that the Committee agreed on a governance structure.

The Majority Report, filed by Senator Walter Boverini, Chairman of the Special Commission, as legislation in the waning days of the session, established a twenty-one member Board of Governors to be appointed by the Governor. Choices of candidates for the Board were to be screened by a nominating commission. Segmental representation on the Central Board was abolished. While the Commission recognized a need for segmental boards, the number and their makeup was deferred for further study. A strong theme of the deliberations was recognizing the need for a stronger central board while fearing an overly centralized governing structure.

Reflecting the unanimous opinion of the Commission that the central board should be vested with increased authority, the Board of

Governors was granted greater power than the present Board of Higher Education. The Board of Governors was empowered to submit to the Legislature one consolidated budget for the entire public higher education system. Funds throughout the thirty institutions could be transferred with the approval of the Senate and House Ways and Means Committee and the approval of the Director of Administration and Finance. The Board of Governors would have the authority to terminate programs as well as to approve new programs. Tuition would be set by the Board of Governors instead of by the segmental boards.

The Commission thought that the position of Secretary of Educational Affairs should continue, but in a limited capacity, serving as advisor to the Governor. The function of budget and program review were transferred from the Secretary's authority to that of the Board of Governors.

The Senate Ways and Means Chairman Chester Atkins, who had felt that the budget "was not a proper vehicle" for such significant and far-reaching public policy, eventually was convinced to address the reorganization issue in the Conference Committee. In this context, he proposed a reorganization plan based on the minority report, submitted by two members of the Special Commission, former Mayor of Boston John Collins, and former President of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Dr. George Hazzard.

The Collins-Hazzard proposal reflected the view that a stronger central board was necessary, and that the majority report did not sufficiently centralize power. Collins and Hazzard felt that the

majority report had the same problems as the present system, the lack of coordination and accountability. Their plan was patterned very closely to Senator Harrington's 1977 proposal.

The legislation, which Senator Boverini also filed, created a fifteen member Board of Regents with tremendous power. Some of the key responsibilities of the Board were:

- to allocate funds to the individual institutions
- to bargain collectively
- to determine personnel, fiscal and program policies throughout the system.

The proposal abolished the office of the Secretary of Education, the Board of Higher Education and the Universities, State College and Community College segmental boards. The minority report made no provisions for nominating a council to screen candidates for the Board of Regents, and thus vested enormous power and authority with the Governor.

The minority plan also established councils at each of the institutions, composed of nine members to be appointed to the Governor. While a great many of the powers of the Council were defined by the Board of Regents, the institutional councils were created to give representation and participation at the institution. This was an important selling point to keep both the general public and the politicians happy by addressing the fundamental and philosophical policy issue which is the balance between a centralized and decentralized system.

The final outcome of the Conference Committee was a reorganizational plan based mainly on the minority report. The proposal set up

a strongly centralized and very powerful Board of Regents. The Governor would have the authority to appoint all fifteen members. The plan does eliminate the Board of Higher Education, the Secretary of Education, and the five segmental boards of trustees. The plan also abolishes central offices of the five segments.

On July 2, 1980, the Governor appointed James R. Martin, a Springfield insurance executive, Chairman of the Board of Regents.

Named to the Board were:

- ✓ - George Hazzard, past President of Worcester Polytechnic Institute and member of the Reorganization Commission
- Dr. Charles Sanders, General Director of Massachusetts General Hospital
- ⊙ - Elizabeth Rawlins, Associate Dean at Simmons College
- David Beaubien, Vice President of E.G. and G., Inc.
- Arnold Friedman, Editor of the Springfield Morning Union and member of the Reorganization Commission
- ⊙ - Reverend Francis Nicholson, Professor at Boston College Law School
- An Wang, President of Wang Laboratories, Inc. and member of the Board of Higher Education.

On July 31, Governor King and Chairman Martin announced the final seven appointees to the Board of Regents. Those named were:

- Foster Fucolo, former Governor of Massachusetts and a member of the Reorganization Commission
- ⊙ - Sister Janet Eisner, President of Emmanuel College and member of the Board of Community Colleges

- David Paresky, President of Crimson Travel Service, recent appointee to the Massport board of directors and member of the Board of Higher Education
- George Ellison, founder of a Boston insurance firm and chairman of the State Collge Board of Trustees
- Robert Cushman, chairman of the board of the Norton Company
- ✓ - Norman Zalkind, chairman of the Board of Trustees for Southeastern Massachusetts University
- Ray Stata, President and Chairman of the Board of Analog Devices, first President of the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and member of the New England Board of Higher Education Commission.

Paul Guzzi, Secretary of State, was appointed acting Chancellor while the search process was being conducted for a permanent chancellor.

The budget authority and how funds are to be appropriated are the major changes and concerns under the new system. Under the budget plan, the Board of Regents will submit one consolidated budget to the Governor and House and Senate Ways and Means. The Legislature will then appropriate all higher education funds in a single-line item to the Regents, which in turn will allocate funds to the individual institutions.

The exception to the Regent's allocation is in the personnel accounts where the Legislature will set the specific amount of funds for each institution. The Board of Regents cannot appropriate funds below the level set by the Legislature without approval of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees, and the Administration and Finance Division of the Executive Branch. In actuality, this means the

politicians still control approximately eighty-five percent of each institution's budget. The local boards of trustees can transfer funds allocated by the Regents, but in the case of the 01 account (salaries), must have the approval of the House Ways and Means and Administration and Finance.

The Board of Regents will have authority over personnel policies, collective bargaining, tuition policy, and admission standards. The budget plan gives the Regents power to establish, review, approve, amend and discontinue programs. However, in order for the Board to consolidate, discontinue, or transfer divisions, schools, stations, colleges, branches, or institutions, it must submit a written report to the Clerks of the House and Senate, have a public hearing, and have the approval of two thirds of the full membership of the Regents.

Under the reorganization plan, each institution will have one local board of trustees, composed of eight members. The University of Massachusetts will have one board for the three campuses. The local boards will have general advisory powers in the areas of mission statements, budget and transferability of funds, collective bargaining, labor relations affairs, and admissions standards. The trustees will have the authority to establish fees, to appoint, transfer, dismiss, promote and award tenure to personnel in accordance with the Board of Regents' policies; to implement and evaluate affirmative action policies; and to administer property of the Commonwealth.

On June 10, 1980, the Legislature, in a much heated debate, approved a plan, in the outside section, of the state budget to

reorganize public higher education. The few legislators who opposed the plan voiced several major concerns which included using the budgetary process to reorganize higher education, criticizing the highly centralized power of the Board of Regents. They also felt that the Governor would have too much control over higher education. Also, there was a great deal of concern regarding the viability of the institutional boards and the lack of representation under the new system.

The majority of the legislators spoke on the positive features of the plan which they claim includes a more cohesive operation of higher education. The Board of Regents, they feel, will have the ability to tie overall planning with good fiscal management, due to the newly-vested power of the Board to allocate funds.

The legislation signed into law called for the Secretary of Education's office to be abolished on July 1, 1980. Governor King met with strong reaction from Charles Memusi Johnson, former Secretary of Education, relative to the reorganization plan which eliminated his department. Johnson accused the Governor of planning to use his new control for patronage and political payoffs, and also called for Governor King's impeachment.

On December 1, 1980, the permanent Chancellor of the Board and the individual boards of trustees were supposed to be named according to statute, but there has been a "political" delay. In March of 1981, the new Board of Regents was sworn in, and all outgoing segmental employees were officially dismissed.

On June 11, 1980, following passage of the reorganization plan attached to the budget (ch. 329), the Special Commission on

reorganization questioned its continuing role and function. It was voted that a delegation of Commission members meet with the Governor and legislative leadership to "discuss the future role of the Commission." The membership of the Special Commission wanted to continue working in one of three possible directions. These included: continuing work on a Boston plan, serving as a springboard for gradual implementation, or assisting the new chancellor as he/she establishes an administrative team.

Future development will determine the ultimate success and credibility of the newly created sytem. Prompt oversight and audit procedures will probably be necessary to revamp and reform the new system as it begins operation. At this point, assurance that the members of the Board of Regents make themselves accessible, responsive, and accountable to the people and institutions which their decisions will affect is imperative.

In the final analysis, the reorganization plan gives a tremendous amount of power to the Board, but it does not specifically describe how this authority is to be used in all instances. "It is an oversimplification to speak of the Commonwealth's policy for higher education, for there is no closely integrated or well articulated body of policy."¹⁶ This comment made by Chase years before reorganization is still very appropriate today for the new direction or lack of direction for public higher education in Massachusetts.

¹⁶Francis S. Chase, Some Comments of Higher Education Policy in Massachusetts, (Washington, D.C.: Academy for Educational Development, Inc., Feb. 1973), p. 1.

There are strengths and weaknesses in the new system. Massachusetts is still a newcomer to public higher education compared to other states. It will be to the system's advantage to take a careful look at other states' higher educational organizations so change can be made without re-inventing the entire structure. It is also appropriate to state the fact that higher education in Massachusetts is very simply unique. Massachusetts is the only state in the nation with near even resident enrollment in the public and private sector. It should be noted that the enrollment in the private sector consists of many out-of-state residents. In addition we have a paradox in our state system: Massachusetts is considered by many as the hub of the higher education universe, because of our historical higher education resources. Yet the public system is rated 48th in the United States in terms of per capita funding of higher educational institutions.

The data in Appendix A are offered as an indication of the dimensions and scope of higher education in Massachusetts and nationally. The statistics show an ever-increasing proportion of the Commonwealth students in public supported institutions of higher learning.

An Emerging Field for Change

While conducting an extensive literature review on the issue of reorganization and the changing relationship between the state and higher education, this researcher has determined that the field is relatively new, emerging mainly in the last two decades. The main concerns were chiefly with the aspects, circumstances and implications of the trend towards increasing state regulations and control over higher

education, and that very little attention has been given to the dynamics of reorganization. This can be seen in the way reorganization was included and passed in an outside section of the fiscal 1981 Massachusetts budget.

Despite early work by Bordy (1935) to analyze the historical and legal background establishing academic independence for the American academy, interest in the field began largely as a result of the rapid growth of public higher education in the 1960's. During those years, states rushed to create boards of higher education or similar statewide coordinating agencies to assist in a rational development of the institution. Mirroring these concerns, authors such as Berdahl (1971), Glenny et al. (1971), and Millard (1976) analyzed the development and operation of state-wide coordinating agencies. Concurrently, the Educational Commissions of the States (1971, 1973), and Usdan et al. (1969) supported the concept of such a structure as more desirable than the direct intervention by state governors and legislatures.

With this in mind, individuals in the field of higher education quickly turned their attention to a broader set of issues concerned with state-wide governance and the politics of state regulation in an era of limited financial resources and changing governmental expectations. Cheit (1971) sounded early the alarm of a "new depression in higher education" with his examination of the financial difficulties beginning to appear in many colleges and universities. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education affirmed the central role of state support for public higher education, but quickly voiced its concern about the erosion of institutional autonomy (1971, 1973, 1976).

Still others, to determine the changing role of the state in education, examined the attitudes and actions of key state decision-makers. Eulau and Quinley (1970), for example, surveyed state officials to find that legislators were generally supportive of higher education and reluctant to intervene in academic matters. More recently, however, Berdahl (1978), and Glenny and Bowen (1977), have found state legislators and their staffs now feel they are both more capable and willing to act independently on matters affecting traditional academic values and concerns. In the area of budgeting for higher education, Bowen and Glenny (1976), Glenny (1977), and Millard (1977), have noted a substantial shift in decision-making power away from institutions and statewide coordinating agencies toward the budget staffs of governors and state legislatures.

Unfortunately, the work of the Special Commission regarding reorganization seems to have gone to waste. Despite the perceived needs, concerns and expectations of many people for higher education to reallocate its resources, reduce its scale of operations and respond to the centralizing forces of state politics, relatively little is still known about what caused the political undermining of the democratic reorganization process by the Legislative and Executive branch. Several assumptions can be made from my observations while working at the State House. First, politicians give great lip service regarding public participation, but when it comes down to it they refuse to relinquish their powers. Secondly, the political leadership really feels it has more knowledge and management experience than the "pie in the sky" educators.

The History and Development of Educational Governance

Coordinating boards are not a new phenomenon. In 1784, the first one was established by the first regular session of the New York legislature as "the Regents of the University of the State of New York" to serve as the trustees or governing board for the reconstituted King's College as Columbia University, but it was also empowered to serve as trustees for "such schools or colleges as might be established in any other part of the state."¹⁷ The law was revised in 1787 giving Columbia its own board of trustees; but giving supervisory power to the regents for academies, schools and colleges "to enable them to mold the several institutions into a unity that would serve the best interests of the people of the state as a whole."¹⁸

The first state educational board in the country was a higher education board; a consolidated governing board for a short period and then, for almost two centuries, a coordinating board. From the beginning, this board had the explicit responsibility and power to make plans and policies for higher education without regard to distinctions in public and private control. It should be noted that the first board only had responsibility for higher education until the twentieth century; then, they also were charged with the governance of elementary and secondary education.

¹⁷ Frank Abbott, Government Policy and Higher Education, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1938), p. 14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 14.

Before the end of the nineteenth century, four states had established consolidated governing boards for their public institutions, and Florida had developed its unique board of education consisting of the governor and his cabinet, which still has the responsibility for coordinating all levels of education in the state.

By the end of World War II, seventeen states had established central higher education agencies. The fourteen of these states with consolidated governing boards recognized early, as Robert Berdahl has pointed out, that in periods of expansion the assumption that individual institutional lay boards would protect the public interest is only partially true because of the legitimate ambitions of such boards for their own institutions.¹⁹

Essentially, these states decided to control premature expansion and proliferation and financial commitments going beyond the states' resources or needs. The Georgia consolidated governing board, established during the 1931 Depression, in the name of financial exigency, actually eliminated ten institutions.

The real pressures for statewide coordination began in the fifties and accelerated in the sixties and early seventies. Six more coordinating boards, three of which later changed to consolidated governing boards (North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Utah), appeared during the fifties. The fifties were also the period of the flowering of voluntary coordinating arrangements.

¹⁹Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971), p. 27.

Such voluntary coordination, however, had two major weaknesses. First, since the success of such arrangements depended entirely on the willingness of the presidents and institutions to cooperate, they tended only to survive so long as the institutions were not of a competing nature. Second, when voluntary coordination did work, as Lyman Glenny has pointed out, it tended to preserve the status quo and be dominated by the major or largest institutions.²⁰

As other institutions grew stronger, they tended to challenge the dominant institutions and the need for more formal coordination and regulation became evident. During the sixties and early seventies, virtually all of the voluntary structures for statewide coordination disappeared.

It was not by chance that the major period of acceleration in the development of state higher education agencies and boards occurred during the most rapid period of expansion of higher education in the history of the country--1960 to 1975. While all types of institutions increased in size, by far the major growth was in public institutions. In 1950 about half the students in the country were in private institutions. Today, only twenty-one percent of the students are in private institutions. Total higher education enrollments in 1960 were about 3.7 million students. In the fall of 1976 enrollments had reached 11.2 million. Total higher education expenditures in 1960 amounted to \$5.6 billion. Today it is over \$42 billion. In the 1960's community

²⁰Lyman Glenny, Campus and Capital, (Boulder, Colorado, Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1966), p. 38.

and junior colleges were only a small segment of higher education. Now they account for over one third of all students in post secondary education.

In the 1960's, as stated previously, the immediate problem was to expand the higher education establishment to accommodate an enormous influx of students. New institutions were established; existing campuses expanded and added new programs; institutions grew horizontally and vertically. This was period of rapid expansion. "Because of the commitment of the states to the values of competitive excellence, the leaders and citizens wanted the system to grow; because of great demographic and economic pressures, it had to grow; because of the availability of substantial financial resources from many quarters, it could grow."²¹

The rapid expansion of the 1960's created pressing organizational problems, characterized as follows: "When new structural units appear --whether by differentiation, structural addition, or segmentation-- they pose new integrative problems for the system. First, by which principles and mechanisms will resources be allocated to the new units? Second, what effect will the presence of new units have on the process of adjudication of demands for allocation of resources? Third, how will the activities of the new units be coordinated?"²²

²¹J. H. Smelser and G. Almond, eds., Public Higher Education in California, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974), p. 33.

²²Ibid., p. 38.

Most institutions responded to large increases in enrollment by requesting much more state support, often without examining the character, quality, and differential costs of institutional and systemwide missions and related programs of education and research. Progressive deceleration of growth, associated with little or no increase (and perhaps a decrease) in financial support measured in constant dollars, is now forcing institutions and systems to make hard decisions. For example, the University of California, responding to reduced enrollment projection and the need to husband its declining financial resources, revised its growth estimates downward, set lower enrollment ceilings for some campuses, and distributed some specialized curricula among them instead of trying to make each campus into a comprehensive institution. At one point, resources were transferred from Berkeley and University of Southern California to some of its new campuses.

The 1970's was a period of harsh realities. Expansion of higher education facilities led to substantial increases in costs; the kind of education produced came to be questioned more and more critically by students, the general public, and educators themselves. Recipients of advanced professional and graduate degrees--and in some occupational fields, even baccalaureate degrees--began to glut the job market and to compete desperately for scarce or non-existent jobs. There developed widespread concern over the extent to which there had been overexpansion and needless duplication of higher education programs.

Contributing to these difficulties, there has been a general lessening of public confidence in American colleges and universities.

This has resulted partially from a reaction to the role of the university campus as the place of political dissent, injustices in society's and government's treatment of minority racial and ethnic groups, and failure of the institutions to direct their resources to domestic problems. Also instrumental in producing a devaluation of higher education in the eyes of individuals has been the public's distaste for some of the radical methods of political dissent employed by students, ranging from mass demonstrations to occasional acts of violence and destruction of property.

Nationally, there began a wholesale reassessment of the priorities to be assigned various public problems. Matters of health, welfare, and environmental quality came to assume a status equal to or perhaps even greater than that customarily accorded higher education. Simultaneously the federal government began to reduce or eliminate many types of financial support it had been giving to higher education. At the state level, there was increasing public resistance to the constantly rising tax burden, with the consequence that many state and local governments found themselves hard pressed to meet normal incremental increases in costs of established programs, much less the costs associated with new programs. For the first time in many years, institutions of higher education had to compete on nearly equal terms with a wide and growing range of agencies for relatively scarce tax dollars.

Finally, there developed widespread concern both within and outside higher education. Was higher education sufficiently responsive to new or emerging societal needs? Besides questioning the "relevance"

of higher education, many of those having influence in state politics and government began to question the extent to which the colleges and universities were truly accountable to the people of the state for the effective use of public resources allocated to higher education. Both in the legislature and executive offices of state government, there developed a concern for the establishment of means for ensuring orderly and rational distribution of these resources so as to meet statewide educational needs.

In almost all states, three major issues have by now become paramount in the field of higher education: (1) how to orient programs so as to meet the needs of the state's whole system of higher education, rather than have policy defined by competitive institutions that are largely attempting to advance their own separate, parochial interests; (2) how to create a system responsive to new needs, having capacity for change and innovation, without producing a reduction in quality that will preclude desirable differentiation in institutional missions and programs; and (3) how to insure that the public colleges and universities efficiently utilize the resources made available to them. These concerns have led state policymakers to seek greater centralization of decision-making authority in higher education, in the hopes that further concentration of power will lead to greater responsiveness and accountability.

By 1970, reliance on voluntary coordination among institutions of higher education disappeared. The states turned to advisory or regulatory coordinating agencies. Still, other states achieved coordination

through utilization of a single governing board for all of public higher education.

Overall, there has been a trend toward even stronger forms of coordination. Changes in coordinating structures invariably have been from "weaker" to "stronger" coordinating mechanisms. However, until very recently, the strongest form, (consolidated governing board), was utilized almost entirely in the smaller states, in those having few public colleges and universities, and in those with less complex systems of higher education.

Facing financial exigencies, state governments have forced coordinating boards and systemwide governing boards to curtail or streamline their post secondary education systems. For example, on January 8, 1975, the governor asked the board of regents of the University of Wisconsin system to submit to him and the legislature "a plan for phasing out, phasing down, or consolidating institutions and programs, including a statement of language to be inserted into the 1975-77 biennial budget which would authorize implementation of the plan." The governor's proposal was later withdrawn. In New York the State Education Department evaluated doctoral programs at SUNY and recommended that certain doctoral programs be discontinued. This appraisal by the department created controversy--not only over criteria of evaluation, but also over the "invasion" of institutional autonomy by a government agency. In February 1976, the trustees of SUNY, in an effort to clarify the jurisdictions of the University and the department, voted to challenge in court the authority of the department to terminate doctoral

programs. The state supreme court upheld the department's action and the SUNY trustees voted to appeal the decision.²³

Financial austerity has had other significant effects on higher education. One of these is the movement of the decision process up the hierarchy, both within institutions and in state-wide systems. Increasing complexity and size also lead to an augmentation of authority at various levels both in institutions and in systems.

With continuing financial austerity, the focus of coordination changes. The allocation of rapidly expanding resources among institutions and programs is supplanted by trade-offs in the distribution of scarce resources. Some programs must be funded at the expense of others, and old programs will be eliminated to free resources for new ones. Loosely defined priorities must therefore be superseded by explicit missions and objectives incorporated in periodically revised master plans. Governing and coordinating boards that fail to deal forthrightly with educational and institutional priorities will find governors and legislatures making decisions for them. To make better decisions, boards will be forced to evaluate existing programs and proposals for new ones much more rigorously. To do so, they will have to establish more effective information systems, adopt practical methods of program budgeting to replace conventional line-item arrays, develop procedures for estimating quality, and devise means of measuring more

²³Chronicle of Higher Education, 31 January, 1977, p. 4.

complete programs or the number of student credit hours produced per full-time faculty member.²⁴

Not only institutions but whole educational systems will be required to measure their results against their designated missions and their more specific objectives. They will be expected to show that outcomes have been attained with reasonable economy of expenditure. In these regards, institutions and systems will be accountable not only to their governing and/or coordinating boards, but also to the legislature who appropriates their funds, and finally, to the general public. The mention of accountability immediately raises questions of institutional autonomy, even of academic freedom.

The major responsibility for meeting this phenomenal demand has rested with the states. With such major expansion it was not at all surprising that governors and state legislatures created state coordinating and governing boards to deal with the problems of expansion. In fact, in most of the state laws establishing such agencies during this period the stated purpose was "to provide for the orderly growth of public higher education in the state."²⁵

Between 1960 and 1975, twenty-four new boards were established. In contrast to pre-1960, most of the boards established since 1960 have been coordinating rather than governing boards. The two exceptions are

²⁴R. O. Berdahl, ed., New Directions for Institutional Research: Evaluating State Boards, (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1975), No. 5. p. 36.

²⁵Glenny, Campus and Capital, p. 38.

West Virginia and Maine, plus the changes noted in North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Utah from coordinating to governing boards. Today, if one includes the two states with executively appointed planning agencies only, all fifty states have some form of state higher or post-secondary board and agency. As a footnote, the Higher Education Council of Wyoming was abolished by statute on March 3, 1978. Nineteen of these are consolidated governing boards, eleven of which include all public higher education institutions and eight of which include only senior public institutions. Twenty-nine are coordinating agencies. Two are executively appointed planning commissions only.

The tasks that face those responsible for planning comprehensive systems and patterns of higher education are tremendous and sometimes contradictory. One group of students of coordination proposed that coordinating agencies--whether coordinating or consolidated governing boards--should take leadership in promoting diversity in educational programs and types of institutions; in encouraging higher education to respond to a wide spectrum of students' interests, aptitudes, and abilities; in encouraging educational innovations; in stimulating the improvement of under-graduate education; in making proposals to ensure ease of student transfer between institutions and programs; in encouraging lifelong education; in pressing for the establishment or discontinuation of graduate and professional programs in order to meet manpower and students' personal needs without oversupplying or undersupplying the market; in promoting the funding of research and public service; in devising methods for determining the kinds of physical facilities required for all types of students and programs;

in encouraging the optimal use of new instructional technology; in determining procedures for terminating unproductive obsolete, or duplicative programs; and in recommending the appropriate division of financial contributions between the student and the state and the part that grants, scholarships, and loans should play in helping students meet their obligations. Consolidated governing boards should accept comparable responsibilities.²⁶

It is impossible for coordinating and consolidated governing boards to accomplish these purposes without assistance. The boards will need to mobilize the full resources of all the institutions involved; solicit the assistance and collaboration of individual citizens; secure the cooperation of a wide range of social and cultural organizations; and keep the legislature, the governor, and the people of the state continually informed of the outcomes.

What kinds of agencies have been organized for statewide and systemwide planning and coordination? And what changes have occurred in their membership and in their powers?

The types of boards that serve the purpose of coordination, as ordinarily classified, are as follows:

- A. No Formal Coordination. Each institution has a governing board which has either a constitutional or statutory base, but has broad responsibility for the institution it serves. There is no formal state-level coordinating agency for higher education, but there may be arrangements among the several institutions, perhaps recognized by statutes, for voluntary coordination.
- B. Advisory Coordinating Board. Each institution has a governing board with responsibility for the institution or is one of several similar institutions governed by a common board. In addition, a state-level coordinating agency with staff

²⁶Glenny, Campus and Capital, p. 27.

assistance collects information, makes studies, and provides advice and recommendations to state government and to the institutions and their governing boards on matters related to higher education and its coordination and governance. The coordinating agency includes public members and may include institutional or governing board representatives, typically, but not always, as a minority of the body.

C.

Regulatory Coordinating Board. The coordinating agency has policy, regulatory, administrative, or governing authority in specified areas of higher education and employs a professional staff to assist it in the discharge of its responsibilities. Powers not given the coordinating agency (and not held by state government) are left to institutional governing boards which have less than complete responsibility for the institutions they serve. The specific powers granted coordinating agencies of this type vary so widely that, at one extreme, its "final authority" powers are so limited that it comes very close to being in the "advisory" category; at the other extreme, its powers are so broad that it approaches serving as a consolidated governing board.

D.

Governing Board. A single board of control has responsibility for all public institutions of higher education in the state, except that public junior or community colleges may or may not come within its purview. A few states fit this pattern because there is only one public institution or one public four-year institution in the state. Where there is more than one college or university in the system, lay boards are sometimes retained for individual institutions, but their functions are solely advisory in nature. The pattern usually includes a strong central executive officer (President or Chancellor) reporting to the consolidated board.

The situation is more complicated than the fourfold classification suggests, particularly when the private sector is involved in the coordinating process. Several patterns of campus governance exist among the states, including individual campus boards; multi-campus boards for certain sectors, such as university and state college systems; a single consolidated governing board; and a mixed pattern. Coordinating boards may be superimposed on some of these governing boards.²⁷

²⁷Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future, (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1976), p. 37.

The following table shows the incidence of the four types of coordinating agencies and changes in their distribution between 1940 and 1976:

Number of States Classified by Type of Statewide Structure for
Coordination in Higher Education, 1940-1976²⁸

Type of Coordinating Structure	1940	1950	1960	1965	1970	1974	Aug. 1976
None	33	28	17	7	2	2	2
Voluntary Association	0	3	6	3	2	1	0
Advisory Coordinating Board	1	1	5	11	13	11	9
Coordinating Board with Regulatory Powers	1	2	6	12	14	17	20
Consolidated Governing Board	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	48	48	50	50	50	50	50

The structures, functions and power of these boards vary considerably from state to state. In fact, there are no two that are exactly alike. The boards vary in the number of institutions under their purview and their responsibilities. Even among governing board states, some boards govern most or all public postsecondary institutions and some senior or four-year institutions only. In most governing board states, governance is wholly centralized; however, in two states, North

²⁸Berdahl, New Directions for Institutional Research, p. 37.

Carolina and Utah, governance is to some extent decentralized through institutional boards of trustees or institutional councils with restricted but delegated power from the central board.

Coordinating boards vary even more widely than governing boards. They range from states like Oklahoma where the state regents submit a consolidated budget and appropriations are made to the regents who allocate funds among institutions, review and approve all programs and are responsible for planning for all postsecondary education, to states like Wyoming where the Higher Education Council sought no program review or budgetary function and became primarily a legislatively authorized planning and advisory agency.

Some seventeen states fall into the group that Robert Berdahl would call strong or regulatory coordinating boards in that according to their authorizing legislation they have the power to approve programs and submit consolidated or aggregated budgets to the governor and legislature. In addition, there are two states in which the board approves programs, but has no statutory role in the budgeting process and one state with program approval that sets formulas rather than budgets. In two other states the boards submit an aggregated or consolidated budget and review but do not have approval power over programs.

This leaves eight states where the board is technically an advisory board only charged with given advice both to institutions and state government. But among these eight are three states where in practice the board's advice on programs is equivalent to approval. Just

to complicate the picture further, in eight of the states the board or agency responsible for postsecondary education is also responsible for elementary-secondary education and in four of these, the same person is the chief state school officer and the state higher education executive officer. In six states the board or its executive officer has cabinet status.

It should be noted that to date, no state that has established a coordinating or consolidated governing board has abandoned it for a return to no coordination or voluntary coordination. Where coordinating boards have been given up--as in North Carolina, Wisconsin and Utah--they have been replaced by consolidated boards. If there is a trend, it has been toward increasing the role or power of such boards, including governing boards. Between 1970 and 1975, twenty-three states modified their state higher education agencies and with two possible exceptions, the modifications were in the direction of strengthening them. In 1976 alone, seventeen states at least considered modification primarily in the direction of strengthening board power and functions.

Ironically, boards across the country are in trouble, but the trouble is not that they are too strong, but that they are perceived as not having sufficient power to do what legislators and governors expect. The unanswered question is that even if boards had and exercised more power, do they really have the ability to protect institutions from outside political pressures. The Board of Regents in California, which used its power, was criticized for not being responsive enough to public opinion, and to the executive and legislative branches. At any rate,

powerful boards should not be seen as the panacea to solve future confrontations.

Governance Today

With fifty different boards across the country--fifty-three, to be exact, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands--no two are exactly alike. They have been created in individual states to meet indigenous problems, many of which are analogous among groups of states or even across the states but which are not identical. This is important to keep in mind, for otherwise generalizations come easily and are likely to be either mistaken or seriously misleading.

The fact that forty-eight states have legislatively, and in some cases constitutionally, authorized coordinating or governing boards is rather strong evidence that they were created to meet real needs that were not or could not be met by institutions separately. Perhaps the fundamental need is best expressed in the 1787 New York legislation creating the Board of Regents, "to enable them to mold the several institutions into a unity that would serve the best interests of the people of the state as a whole."²⁹

The fact that other boards did not appear until toward the end of the nineteenth century and the major movement of states to create boards is a phenomenon of the last twenty-five years is an index of the increased importance of higher education as a public policy issue in the light of the number of people concerned and involved. When, as in 1900,

²⁹Abbott, Government Policy and Higher Education, p. 14.

only 4 percent of the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old population was in higher educational institutions, higher education was hardly a matter of major state or federal concern. Beginning with the returning veterans and continuing to today, the situation is very different.

Many state legislators and governors desire not to have to deal with interinstitutional rivalries directly in executive chambers, in legislative committees, and on the legislative floors, but to find a means of improving them beforehand. Admittedly, there was and still is more than a little legislative ambivalence on this, particularly in relation to any institutions in a legislator's home district.

Given the charges and the concerns, how well have statewide coordinating and governing boards performed? Here the answer almost has to be: with varying degrees of success. I have no intention of offering a report card on the state agencies as the Carnegie Council attempted to offer on the states.³⁰

State agencies have made mistakes. Some have not involved institutions as fully as might be desired in the planning process. Usually when this has occurred the plan itself has gathered dust on the shelf. Some have found themselves, or let themselves, be caught between legislative and gubernatorial clashes, or even in a few cases political conflicts within the state in which they could not win.

Some have so identified themselves or been identified with their institutions as to lose credibility with the legislature or the governor. Others have been so identified with their legislature or

³⁰Carnegie Foundation, The States and Higher Education, p. 28.

governor as to lose even minimal institutional confidence and to encourage end runs. Some have not clearly distinguished the role of the board from that of the institutional or segmental governing boards and have moved into areas best left to institutions. Some, as noted, have disappeared and been replaced by stronger agencies.

On the other side of the ledger, and recognizing as is obviously the case, that other factors in addition to the existence and activities of statewide agencies contributed to the results, the very fact that states were able to respond to the onslaught of students, suggests that these boards have played a critically important role. As Clark Kerr has pointed out elsewhere, during the period of expansion, while not every student necessarily got into the particular institution he or she wanted to, no student was turned away for lack of space.³¹

It should be pointed out that during this period even the so-called "flagship" institutions could not have, and had no intention of, including all students. If anything, their concerns were with greater selectivity, developing research potential, and becoming "great institutions."

Without the statewide concerns with diversification to meet needs--development of community colleges, strengthening the role of teachers' colleges as state colleges or regional universities, creation of specialized institutions, concern with equity--in other words, without the balance state-wide boards were established to try to facilitate,

³¹Clark Kerr, The Changing Face of Higher Education, (Atlanta, Georgia: Southern Regional Educational Board, 1973), p. 33.

the picture might look far more chaotic and public distrust might be considerably greater than it is today.

One of the lessons that has been rather clearly learned by most states in the process is that "representative" boards tend not to work very effectively. They have some of the same shortcomings that the older voluntary coordinating arrangements did. While boards need as much advice as possible from presidents and institutional representatives, to include such representatives as voting members on the board will only cause problems because they have the tendency to overreact or take no action on any issue that involves conflict of the vested interests of institutions.

Profile of the State's Higher Education Governance and Coordinating Structures

An analysis of the fifty states, and their governance/coordination structure is necessary to draw a reasonable conclusion for the Massachusetts system. Most of the data in this section were abstracted from either the State Postsecondary Profile Handbook or from The States and Higher Education.

Geography and size are both factors in predicting the form of governance/coordination a state may adopt. Twelve of the eighteen with governing boards are west of the Mississippi River. Four are in the South, and only Maine and Rhode Island in the Northeast have chosen this governance form.

It cannot be explained why states with fewer institutions seem to find the governing board structure more suitable to their needs than do

states with larger systems of higher education. Appendix B shows that fourteen states with the smallest total number of institutions (each with less than twenty institutions) have eleven governing board structures, one coordinating board structure, and two "other." This is in contrast to the nine states with the largest number of institutions, including Massachusetts. One, North Carolina, has the governing board structure. Maine (with eighteen institutions) and Rhode Island (with nine institutions), the two Northeastern states using the governing board model, rank toward the bottom in the nation in terms of numbers of institutions.

Among the twenty-eight states with coordinating boards, there is a variety of governance models. In sixteen states the senior institutions are organized into one or more multi-campus governing boards and one or more single campus governing boards. Eleven states have one or more multi-campus boards and no single campus boards. (Among these, New Hampshire and Oregon have only one multi-campus board each, with a single community college board each. New York has only two multi-campus boards, CUNY and SUNY, which include the community colleges.) One state has no multi-campus boards, with every institution governed by its own board.

Thirteen of the coordinating board states have a single statewide board for community colleges, or they are governed by the Board of Education, ten have local boards, and four states include community colleges in multi-campus boards. One state has a mixed pattern, with some

community colleges included in multi-campus boards, and some having local boards.

Massachusetts governance structure was in the norm among coordinating boards states, having two multi-campus boards for senior institutions, two single campus boards, and a single statewide board for community colleges.

The predominant pattern for selection and appointment of members of the Coordinating Board, found in sixteen of the twenty-eight coordinating board states is appointment by the governor with the consent or confirmation by either the House of Representatives or Senate. In seven states the governor appears to have the sole appointment power, and in three states, some members are appointed by the governor and some members are appointed by one or more houses of the legislature and/or others. In Michigan, the board members are elected, and in New York, they are elected by the legislature.

Institutional or segmental participation is not the norm, with only nine of the twenty-eight coordinating board states featuring such participation. In one of those states, Kentucky, the institutional representatives are nonvoting members. In all but one of the coordinating board states, Massachusetts, the coordinating board was the 1202 Commission.

Eight of the states with a coordinating board structure have a system whereby the board recommends a consolidated budget. In five of these eight states, the boards have the power to approve programs, while Connecticut has fairly strong explicit powers of program review. This

tendency to have relatively strong program approval/review powers in concert with the consolidated budget, reinforces the image of these boards with consolidated budget powers, as being generally stronger overall. Size of state in terms of total number of institutions, also seems to affect the governance/coordination structures selected. Earlier, it was pointed out that among the fourteen states with the smallest total number of institutions, there was a tendency to adopt the consolidated governing board model. The next eighteen states, those which rank 15th-32nd in terms of smallest to largest in total number of institutions show a tendency to adopt a coordinating board structure with a consolidated budget. Of the eight states with this structure, six of them fall within this group. Only two (Illinois and Ohio) of the states larger than this group (over 53 total institutions have adopted a consolidated budget [see Appendix B]). It appears that a less centralized structure, such as a coordinating board, without consolidated budget power, is most successful at managing large numbers of institutions.

The twenty-eight coordinating board states show a broad spectrum of program evaluation powers. These powers are difficult to analyze without a great deal of additional study, describing in detail the criteria used and the operating procedures adopted. According to the data, six state boards have program review power, and fourteen have program approval power. One board in Nebraska has no program evaluation responsibilities, and the remaining seven have responsibilities which are not clearly stated in the available data.

All of the six boards limited to program review are classified as advisory. However, even among advisory boards, the scope of power is not easily known. One board is listed as responsible for reviewing new and existing programs, yet due to its advisory nature, it must be assumed that it has no powers to develop or implement policy as a result of these evaluations. The New Hampshire board, also advisory, operates under the statement that, "no postsecondary institution in the state may award a degree without approval by the commission." Much additional research would be required to ascertain whether this power is interpreted in a sweeping manner to withhold approval of programs, or whether it is merely meant to signify a general institutional accreditation function. Since it includes private institutions, as well as the public sector, there is some reason to believe that it is a relatively weak power.

In those states with regulatory coordinating boards, the pattern of program approval powers is even less clear. Two boards have the power to approve programs and to recommend termination, while one board has the power to approve new programs and review existing programs. While neither of these states appear ready to grant the coordinating boards explicit termination powers, they do recognize that programmatic decisions must be addressed from two sides, contraction as well as expansion. Six boards, all of which are classified as regulatory, have responsibilities which are either unusual, difficult to classify, or unclear from the available data. Two of these have powers which clearly are weaker than those generally associated with a regulatory board. In New Mexico, the board has the responsibility to review and approve

graduate programs only, while in Texas, the board has only an advisory role in program evaluation.

Table 1 lists those nine states which have been identified as comparable to Massachusetts prior to June 1980 reorganization. Their selection was based on the strength of the private sector in the state. An initial pool of states was identified by selecting all states which had at least 25% of their FTE enrollments in the private sector. (See Appendix D.)

TABLE 1
NINE STATES COMPARABLE TO MASSACHUSETTS

Name	% of Total FTE Enrollment in Independent Institutions	Number of 4 Year Independent Institutions	Number of 4 Year Public Institutions
Massachusetts	57%	63	15
Illinois	28%	82	13
Indiana	26%	36	13
Minnesota	25%	31	10
Missouri	30%	51	13
New Jersey	26%	27	14
New York	43%	165	40
Ohio	25%	64	14
Pennsylvania	41%	107	23
Tennessee	26%	38	11

The list was further refined by eliminating those states which were significantly smaller in terms of total number of four-year institutions.

All of the states have Coordinating Board structures. This is in contrast to those states which are least like Massachusetts. Of the fourteen states, with the lowest percentage of FTE students in the private sector (see Appendix D), five (36%) have Coordinating Boards, eight (57%) have Governing Boards, and one (7%) has another type of structure. Among all fifty states, 56% have Coordinating Boards, 36% have Governing Boards, and 8% have another type of structure. This could indicate that states which are most like Massachusetts are most likely to have a coordinating structure. Of the nine coordinating boards, eight, like Massachusetts, are regulatory, with only Minnesota having an advisory board.

The most striking thing about the nine states most like Massachusetts is the extent to which their governance structures are similar to Massachusetts. In the governance structures, five have a combination of multi-campus and single-campus boards and four have multi-campus boards only. In four of the states, the community colleges are governed by local boards, in three by statewide boards, and in two, they are part of the multi-campus boards.

Overall, of the nine states which have been selected for further analysis because of their similarity to Massachusetts, the coordinating boards have the powers, which one would normally associate with a coordinating board. Although Illinois, New Jersey and Ohio appear to have additional power in the budget area, there is no evidence that they have parallel types of power in the area of planning or program approval. Indiana, on the other hand, has review power over ongoing

programs. There is no evidence that this power is supported by strong power in the areas of planning or budget.

In summary, the states with the least number of institutions tend to have a governing board structure. As the number of institutions use the governing structure changes to a coordinating board with a consolidated budget and the states with the most institutions have a coordinating board without a consolidated budget.

States that were comparable to Massachusetts are likely to have a coordinating rather than a governing structure.

Most coordinating boards in states like Massachusetts have powers and resources which are fairly traditional for coordinating boards, and quite similar to those formerly held by the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education.

The governance structure of Massachusetts public higher education conforms closely with the norm of the twenty-eight states with coordinating boards and the nine most like Massachusetts.

An assumption must be made that the structure in each state evolved over a period of time through a process of analyzing the particular circumstances that make the system work best for higher education. If this assumption is accepted, then the conclusions stated previously provide a benchmark as to whether and how to change the governance/coordination structure within Massachusetts.

These particular conclusions offer no overwhelming reasons for drastic change. Since nine of the large states most like Massachusetts,

by virtue of the total number of institutions in the state, tend to have coordinating rather than governing structures, there is little evidence for supporting a move to a governing structure. The obvious question would be whether evidence can be gathered that a highly centralized system can work with a large number of diverse constituent units.

The evidence regarding the nature of the coordinating board is not as conclusive as that pointing toward continuation of a coordinating board structure. In the nine states most like Massachusetts, the coordinating boards have powers, on the whole not much different from those held by the Board of Higher Education. However, this is rather cautionary, due to the lack of specificity of the data, particularly in the area of planning and program evaluation.

As in the area of the type of governance/coordination structure, and then the nature of the board, the preceding analysis presents no overwhelming evidence suggesting the need to change the governance structure in Massachusetts, since the existing is the norm, both within the twenty-eight coordinating board states, and within that subgroup which represent the nine states most like Massachusetts.

Finally, the funding (see Appendix E) for states with coordinating board structures obtain the highest proportion of state general revenues, states with governing boards fare next, and states with coordinating boards with consolidated budget powers fare least well (see Appendix F).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Given these facts, this researcher will explain why he assumes there is a disillusionment with coordination. A single state governing board (Regents) for Massachusetts public higher education institutions appears to establish a system which can be directly controlled by a single group of lay citizens, and with its staff, has primary responsibility for all of the institutions in the system. This is a very simple structure. For management purposes and for a governor and legislators, this structure appears ideal. Power is ostensibly centralized, accountability fixed, and sanctions are available to control the uncooperative. The former five segmental board structure, often in competition with each other for new programs, funding and prestige, is gone. Under the structure prior to the 1980 reorganization, each segment and each individual institution used whatever political clout it could muster to defend its own budget.

While many related problems might be cited, this researcher believes that collective bargaining contracts and the increasingly high financial demands of public colleges and universities led to the conditions demanded by taxpayers, the governors, and legislators for greater and more certain accountability. The seeking of simplistic solutions for complex problems, in turn led to the resurrection of the idea that a single, all powerful governing board could also be charged with full responsibility for all that happened in the Commonwealth's Higher Education System. Secondly, the leadership of the public institutions, rather than opposing vociferously as they did during the 1965 Willis

Harrington Commission proposal, seemed indifferent or in outright favor of the shift. Such reaction may have resulted from a lack of leadership, the inability of the Colleges and Universities to get a consolidated picture of public higher education, the flexibility being drawn back from the institutions by the segmental boards, the loss of confidence in the Board of Higher Education and the expectation that under a single board there might be a new beginning.

It seems ironic that higher education, which has usually adopted the governance model of industry, should now take another approach at the very time it calls for decentralization into major, and at times competing segments, especially of corporate conglomerates.

The complexities of big business is easily matched by higher education in most states. The vastly increased numbers of decisions which must be made in both spheres call for use of myriad professional specialists as staff advisors and consultants and a variety of levels and places for long-range and operational decision-making. In both industry and higher education coordinating type structures have proven more flexible, more adaptive, and more effective in planning than pyramidal hierarchies. Glenny found this to be true after a study of all states then having coordinating boards and a sample of those with statewide governing boards. Berdahl, in his study of twenty-seven states after the Glenny study, came to the same conclusion. The coordinating boards have been superior in developing and in implementing master plans and have been just as effective in meeting new educational needs and also in limiting competition among institutions for money and

programs as the statewide governing boards. Thus, no evidence acquired shows that single boards will in fact meet the expectations of the Massachusetts politicians.

On the contrary, this researcher believes that the shift away from the coordinating board is a major policy error based on outmoded assumptions about organization and decision process and on the nostalgic desire to return to the relatively simple life. The exceptions, as the data show, would be the states which have few institutions, little population growth, and modest industrialization. It is significant indeed that the majority of states which have opted for the single board are the least educationally complex in the nation.

A coordinating board must provide a vehicle by which both the public interests of the state and those of the educational community can be objectively and dispassionately considered and acted upon. The board operates in a kind of no-man's land between higher education and the state government. Its effectiveness depends on maintaining the confidence of both. This was one of the problems with the Board of Higher Education, that has been eliminated due to reorganization. If the board is consistently dominated by, or is thought to be dominated by, educators, it loses credibility at the the State House. Conversely, if the board consistently acts merely, or is thought to act merely, as an arm of the governor or legislators, the institutions lose their cooperative spirit. (This seems to be already happening with the Board of Regents.) Even though a board may find it virtually impossible to maintain a perfect equilibrium between these two forces, balance should be the

goal. The board membership, the staff, the powers and the advisory networks, should all reflect this dual obligation.

The danger of creating a board too weak is that the public interest will not be adequately protected; in creating a board too strong, that the necessary autonomy and initiative of the institutions will be threatened. A model of coordination should attempt to strike an appropriate balance between strength and weakness and between the interests of the state and of institutions. This researcher will outline a model proposed by Glenny from his encounters with coordinating and governing boards.

Glenny felt that besides the intermediary role between state and public institutions, the coordinating board has one great paramount advantage over other existing structures for the public systems; that is, its ability to act as an umbrella under which a variety of other institutions, agencies, commissions and councils relating to higher education may be placed for state coordination. The following items indicate why these additional agencies must be considered in a systems approach to public higher education.

1. Private colleges in the Commonwealth and nationally are demanding more attention from the states. They want scholarship and also direct grant programs that will funnel state money into their institutions. Massachusetts has already agreed to some of the informational requests and controls already applicable to the public system. It becomes increasingly apparent that these

institutions must become an integral part of the state's concern for the beneficent development of higher education.

2. The newly-important role of the proprietary vocational and technical schools force the state to recognize and to involve in its master planning their potential contributions. The Commonwealth must invite their cooperation (this was in the Special Commission's proposed plans) for the quid pro quo of allowing the use of state scholarship and grant funds for students attending such institutions.
3. The federal planning, grant, and categorical programs which require a state administrative commission "representative of all segments of postsecondary education" for control and disbursement of funds can also be absorbed by or come under the umbrella of the coordinating board.
4. The state's own scholarship and loan commission, building authority, merit system commission, central purchasing agency and other offices which deal primarily with higher education, can and should become a part of the coordinating complex.
5. New demands that public and private colleges and universities, along with public service agencies, business and citizen groups, create cooperative and flexible arrangements for entirely new kinds of educational experiences and modes of planning and control.

Beyond these existing and potential agencies, coordination needs to reflect the impact of new high technologies for education and their

potential for much of education to be offered in the home, offices, churches and cultural centers as easily as on college campuses. In addition, if management information systems and functional budgeting are to lead to a more rational planning process, they must comprehend far more of higher education in order to promote the efficient management and effective use of state resources.³²

The establishment in June 1980 of a single governing board for only the public institutions does not meet the principal needs cited, nor in most cases would it be legally possible. Because of its identification as the one board which represents both governors and public institutional interests, the private institutions cannot be confident that the board will impartially plan for them. Nor will the private look with favor on the state scholarship and grant programs for students or direct grants to the nonpublic colleges being administered through the Board of Regents. Federal requirements that state agencies which administer their plans must be broadly representative of higher education, prevent the Board of Regents from exercising this responsibility. Relationships with other state and private agencies relating to higher education present similar obstacles.

On the other hand, the coordinating board (BHE) was a participatory agency relying on widespread consensus for its decisions and cooperation rather than an order issued by legal authority to implement policy.

³²Lyman A. Glenny, State Government and Control of Higher Education, (New York: American Educational Research Association, February 4, 1971), pp. 3-7.

The coordinating board should be composed of a majority of lay citizens unconnected with any higher education institutions or agency, and, if at all possible within desirable size limits, representatives from the lay boards of institutions and agencies under coordination should also sit on the coordinating board. The staff of the board should be relatively small but exceptionally competent. Most of the actual planning and policy suggestions should come from the widespread use of ad hoc advisory committees, task forces, and study groups composed of experts from both education and the society as well as interested citizens at large. The reasons for the strong advocacy of these recommendations derive from the operating conceptual model seen as most successful for today's needs as well as those of the future.

While the organization and mode of operation are thus described, certain legal powers must exist for a coordinating board to be successful and create a comprehensive system. The following are some of the minimum powers:

1. Fiscal autonomy.
2. To have the authority to acquire planning data and information from all higher education institutions and agencies.
3. To develop, both long-range and short-range planning.
4. To review and approve or disapprove new and existing degree programs, new campuses, extension centers, departments and centers of all public institutions, and also have this power where state aid is given to private institutions.

5. To review and make recommendations on operating and capital outlay budgets of public institutions.
6. To administer directly or have under its coordinative powers all state scholarship and grant programs to students, grant programs to nonpublic institutions, and all state-administered federal grant and aid program for post secondary education.³³

There were many in Massachusetts both in higher education and in the legislature opposed to giving the Board of Higher Education this much power. But the choice this researcher feels was not between strengthening the coordinating board or retaining the existing *modus operandi*. Rather it is between having an effective coordinating board with at least these powers or seeing public higher education taken over and controlled by the executive branch of state government as it happened. The latter emerges from a combination of trends: A steady increase in the power of the legislature and governor's office to provide closer supervision and control of all state programs; a response to the increasing costs and complexity of higher education by tightening of controls over spending and program duplication; a need for a state management information system and requiring functional budgeting; and a reaction against the governing power of students and faculty collective bargaining by drawing higher education closer to state governmental control.

³³Glenny, State Government and Control of Higher Education, p. 9.

This researcher believes that strengthening the Board of Higher Education would have been the best way to protect the public interest in higher education with minimum impairment of institutional autonomy. While the clear tendency was to put power in the hands of the governor, he, as well as the legislature, needs an agency to coordinate all the matters relating to public higher education. The Commonwealth would have been more effectively served by the instrument of coordination. At the same time, the institutions would avoid being weakened by strong political intervention and pressures.

"Finally, and perhaps more ultimately damaging, state boards have a leveling effect on quality. State board budget analysts often try to impose the same salaries, teaching loads and other instructional costs throughout the system with little regard for differences among institutions. This artificially strengthens the weak college and weakens the strong institutions, particularly the comprehensive research universities. Even more serious, state boards, along with Federal Government agencies, increasingly are dictating curriculum content and direction."

"So, more than two decades and billions of tax dollars later, statewide boards of higher education have not met their promises."

"Like so many examples of Government control, it appears that higher education would have been better off, taxpayers spared and students better educated if the institutions had been left on their own to deal with governors' budget officers and state legislatures."³⁴

³⁴James L. Fisher, New York Times, 14 March 1980, p. 26, col. 2.

C H A P T E R I I I

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Procedures

This dissertation is descriptive in nature. Descriptive research as referred to in this study is concerned with determining the nature and degree of attitudes and expectations of legislators, segmental boards of trustees, faculty and administrators regarding the re-organization of public higher education. Procedures for this chapter can be divided into four categories:

- A) Primary data findings - interview procedure
- B) Prelegislative Questionnaire Development
- C) Response to the survey
- D) Observations.

A. Primary Data Findings - Interview Procedure

In order to develop questions to be used in a survey of attitudes towards public higher education issues in Massachusetts primary interviews were conducted with selected individuals in the field of public higher education and state legislators.

An appointment was made with twenty-five people, five of whom were legislators, four were segmental board of trustees members, six faculty, six administrators and four were members of the staffs of the segmental boards. Each person was told the purpose of the interview and that his answers would be confidential. The entire interview consisted of their

perception of the positive and negative aspects in Massachusetts public higher education and their expectation for the future of public higher education. The entire interview was done on a tape recorder so that the small talk could be analyzed to develop an indepth questionnaire survey.

At the end of the interview, each person was asked to fill out a classification data form, so that statistics could be compiled on the people being interviewed as to age, occupation, education, parental background, etc. Each interview lasted approximately an hour.

At the close of the interviews the tapes were replayed and similar perceptions and expectations were grouped. There was such a variety of issues and opinions that only similar responses were selected to narrow down the primary survey questionnaire to fifty-three questions.

It was extremely difficult to isolate the issues, perceptions or expectations of the people in the field of higher education and legislators; so, for the most part, the statements developed were not conceived from any particular group.

B. Prelegislative Questionnaire Development

The prelegislative questionnaire, Appendix H, used in this study was structured so that it contained formal lists of questions which were written out on the questionnaire, and the questionnaire was constructed in a manner which made the objectives of the survey clear to the respondents.

There were four drafts of the questionnaire developed. The first draft was reviewed by colleagues; the second and third drafts were

reviewed by the dissertation committee from the University of Massachusetts (Dr. Anderson, Dr. Lederle, and Dr. Rahaim), and the final draft was tested on a college president and members of the Special Commission Staff.

All questions on this survey called for the respondents' checking one of the five responses which most closely corresponded to the respondent's attitude or opinion. There was space provided after each question for the respondent to make appropriate comments.

The questionnaire was administered in February, 1980 by mail, to four hundred and forty-four (444 people: one hundred (100) legislators, seventy-six (76) trustees, fifteen (15) executive branch members and two hundred and fifty-three (253) college administrators and faculty. Of the four hundred forty-four questionnaires distributed two hundred sixty-four were returned. To this researcher this return rate (Appendix K, responses by occupation) indicates that there was a significant level of interest on the issue of reorganization of Higher Education.

The independent variables studied here are the responses to the questions on the survey instrument regarding the prelegislative attitudes and expectation of legislators, trustees, faculty and administrators on the reorganization of public higher education. The original survey contained fifty-three questions.

The dependent variables are the responses to the personal characteristics section of the questionnaire (Appendix I). These include:

1. Age
2. Sex
3. Current employment
4. Occupation
5. College attendance
6. Family income
7. Father's education
8. Mother's education.

All the respondents were assured of complete anonymity, as stated in the cover letter (Appendix G) attached to the questionnaire form. Though each return self-addressed, stamped envelope, was prenumbered for follow up on the respondents the envelopes have since been destroyed to protect each respondent's privacy in this report. The questions for the survey were selected by a process of in-depth interviews with key individuals throughout the segments of higher education, legislators and members of the Special Commission to Reorganize Public Higher Education. These questions represented the concerns about issues in public higher education. Once a comprehensive set of questions was compiled, the survey questions were formatted so that the responses could be processed by a computer.

The actual results of the survey responses were then prepared for computer processing by entering data into a punched card format. This data was then processed through the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The methods for analysis were:

1. Cross-tabulations for classifications data by question. This cross-tabulation grouped the responses into five categories where 1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree. The data was collected in a report format which was easily read to determine the areas of significant variance for each specific question.
2. Frequencies were used to represent responses to each question in a percentage form.
3. Statistics were used to present the data using standard deviation, mean, mode and median.
4. Chi-square model was used to determine if there was any statistically significant (.05 level) differences in responses among the groups sampled.

The time needed to complete the questionnaire averaged thirty minutes although several must have taken longer due to the length of comments made. The data collected will now be presented.

C. Response to the Survey

A prelegislative survey was administered shortly after the Special Commission to Reorganize Massachusetts Public Higher Education was given the assignment to determine and correct problems in the State post-secondary education system. The results of the survey will be presented in narrative form summarizing the responses to show whether the respondents either agree or disagree with the statement. For select statements, especially pertinent for reorgnaization, there will also be a table showing a statistical analysis by the dependent variable job occupation. The remaining statistics for the dependent variable job

occupation may be viewed in Appendix J. The overall data analysis for the survey may be seen in Appendix K. The following lists the results of the survey:

The Data

Statement: 1. Each of the thirty institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should have its own local board of trustees with full governing authority.

Narrative: 1. The majority of the respondents indicated that they do not believe that each institution should have its own local board of trustees. When analyzing the data by occupational categories, there was no significant difference. Lack of coordination among the public higher education segments and duplication of programs and resources were noted as inevitable results of local governing boards.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT	LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW
	RCH PCT	FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			TOTAL
VAR001	TOT PCT	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	26	7.7	26.9	46.2	19.2	0	3.8
		5.7	16.0	12.4	7.5	0	
		.8	2.7	4.5	1.9	0	
2. GENERALLY AGREE	63	2.3	23.3	46.5	25.6	2.3	16.3
		2.9	20.0	20.6	16.4	6.7	
		.4	3.8	7.6	4.2	.6	
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	13	6	15.4	23.1	30.8	0	6.9
		11.4	6.0	3.1	6.0	0	
		1.5	.8	1.1	1.5	0	
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	68	9	10	27	19	3	25.8
		13.2	16.7	39.7	27.9	4.4	
		25.7	22.0	27.8	28.4	20.0	
		3.4	3.8	10.2	7.2	1.1	
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	114	19	21	35	28	11	43.2
		16.7	18.4	30.7	24.6	9.6	
		54.3	42.0	36.1	41.8	73.3	
		7.2	9.0	13.3	10.6	4.2	
COLUMN TOTAL	264	38	58	97	67	15	100.0
		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	

RAW CHI_SQUARE = 21.39562 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1638

Statement: 2. The University of Massachusetts, the University of Lowell, Southeastern Massachusetts University, the fifteen community colleges and the ten state colleges are currently governed by five separate boards of trustees. Public higher education should be structured under one single board of trustees.

Narrative: 2. However, the majority of the respondents also disagree that the five separate segmental boards of trustees should be structured under one single board of trustees. Comments were that the unique goals and missions of the Universities, State Colleges and Community Colleges would be lost under the one board concept. Secondly, under a highly structured state system, the academically strong and fiscally stable institutions would be hurt by the weaker institutions. Budgetarily, institutions would be competing for increased appropriations and not working together for the betterment of public higher education. Analyzing the responses by occupation, legislators lean towards agreement; board members and administrators lean towards disagreement; and faculty and others are generally split on this issue.

Occupational Statistics:

VAR002	COUNT		LEGISLATIVE BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW	PCT	TRUSTEE		ADMINISTRATIVE		OTHER	
	COL	PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.		
	1	7	18.4	7.9	44.7	21.1	7.9	38
STRONGLY AGREE		20.0	5.0	17.7	11.9	20.0		14.4
		2.7	1.1	6.5	3.0	1.1		
	2	13	22.0	5.0	28.0	33.9	5	59
GENERALLY AGREE		37.1	8.0	17.7	29.9	33.3		22.4
		4.9	1.5	6.5	29.6	1.3		
	3	4	33.3	8.3	33.3	16.7	8.3	12
NEITHER AGREE NO		11.4	2.8	4.2	3.0	6.7		4.6
		1.5	.4	1.5	.8	.4		
	4	3	5.8	15.7	44.7	31.9	5.3	60
GENERALLY DISAGRE		8.6	28.0	26.0	28.4	28.0		22.8
		1.1	3.8	9.5	7.2	1.1		
	5	8	8.5	36.0	35.1	19.1	3.2	94
STRONGLY DISAGRE		22.9	64.0	34.4	26.9	20.0		35.7
		3.0	12.2	12.5	6.8	1.1		
	COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	96	67	15		263
		13.3	19.0	36.5	25.5	5.7		100.0

CHI SQUARE = 40.86826 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0006

Statement: 3. All members of the boards of trustees at public institutions of higher education should be appointed by the Governor.

Narrative: 3. Responses were about evenly divided on the question of members of the boards of trustees at public institutions of higher education being appointed by the Governor. The data show that legislators and trustees tend to agree with the statement probably due to their political affiliations. The respondents who fell into occupation category of "other" were split on their response. It must be noted that on this issue some legislators are split; board members agree; and administrators, faculty and others disagree. Faculty and administrators, comment that politics and education do not make good bed partners.

Occupational Statistics:

VAR003	COUNT		LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW
	R3W	PCT						
	C3L	PCT	FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			TOTAL
	TOT	PCT						
1.			1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	11	8	17.9	37.5	20.8	8.2	0	24
	22.9	13.0	5.2	3.0	0			3.1
	3.0	3.4	1.9	.8	0			
2.			11	20	20	9	6	66
GENERALLY AGREE	17.2	31.3	31.3	14.1	6.3			24.3
	31.4	48.0	20.8	13.4	26.7			
	4.2	7.6	7.6	3.4	1.5			
3.			3	6	14	6	0	27
NEITHER AGREE NO	11.1	14.8	51.9	22.2	0			10.3
	8.6	9.0	14.6	9.0	0			
	1.1	1.5	5.3	2.3	0			
4.			9	10	23	20	3	65
GENERALLY DISAGR	13.8	15.4	35.4	30.8	4.6			24.7
	25.7	21.0	24.0	29.9	20.0			
	3.4	3.8	8.7	7.6	1.1			
5.			4	7	34	30	8	83
STRONGLY DISAGRE	4.4	9.4	41.0	16.1	9.6			31.6
	11.4	14.0	35.4	44.8	53.3			
	1.5	2.7	12.9	11.4	3.0			
COLUMN	35	50	96	67	15			263
TOTAL	13.3	13.0	36.5	25.5	5.7			100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 47.72703 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0001

Statement: 4. Public higher education should be organized into geographic regions, not into segments such as the University of Massachusetts as one segment, the University of Lowell as another segment, Southeastern University as another segment, the ten state colleges as another and the fifteen community colleges as a final segment.

Narrative: 4. The respondents leaned toward the disagreement side on the statement that public higher education should be organized into geographic regions. This is an indication that the respondents support segmental organization. The major comment on this point was that if institutions are grouped together by region, the three specific types of institutions would lose their identities. Legislators and faculty were split on this issue, while board members, administrators and other disagreed.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT ROW COL	PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR004	1ST	PCT	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1.0	4.5	9.1	10	36.8	4.3	22
		2.9	1.8	13.5	11.9	6.7		
		.4	.8	3.8	3.1	.4		
GENERALLY AGREE	2	13	20.3	12.8	23	18	2	64
		37.1	16.0	15.9	28.1	3.1		24.4
		5.0	3.1	8.8	6.9	.8		
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	9	30.0	16.7	30.0	13.3	10.0	30
		25.7	10.0	9.5	6.2	20.0		11.5
		3.4	1.9	3.4	1.5	1.1		
GENERALLY DISAGR	4	8	12.3	23.1	19	18	5	65
		22.9	30.0	29.2	27.7	7.7		24.8
		1.1	5.7	7.3	6.9	1.9		
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	4	4.9	24.7	34	19	4	81
		11.4	40.0	42.0	23.5	4.9		30.9
		1.5	7.6	13.0	7.3	1.5		
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	95	67	15		262
		13.4	13.1	36.3	25.6	5.7		100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 26.6664 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0453

Statement: 5. Currently some members of the various public higher education boards of trustees are employed by private colleges and universities. They should be allowed to make policy for institutions of public higher education.

Narrative: 5. Sixty-four percent of respondents were opposed to board members employed by private higher education. The comments stress that there is a definite conflict of interest in this type of policy maker. The respondents indicated that no matter how well meaning this concept may be in theory, and how sincere the trustees' motives may be, numbers are still the name of the game, and people take care of their own security first. Legislators lean towards disagreement on this matter and administrators, faculty and others also disagree. Approximately 60% of the Board members agree that appointments should come from the private sector.

Statement: 6. There should be a screening and selection process similar to the judicial system when appointing members of the boards of trustees for institutions of public higher education.

Narrative: 6. Seventy-four percent of the respondents agree that there should be a screening and selection process similar to the judicial system when appointing members of the boards of trustees for institutions. Comments varied. Some respondents said this would prevent political favors from being given; other respondents said that this would contribute to a better caliber of trustees being selected. Even though respondents overwhelmingly agree in the occupation category legislator approximately 30% felt that a screening and selection process is unnecessary.

Occupational Statistics:

	30M COL	PCT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR006	1	2	3	4	5			
STRONGLY AGREE	8.5	13	46.8	26.6	4.3			94
	22.9	28.0	46.8	37.1	28.6			35.9
	3.1	5.0	16.8	9.5	1.5			
GENERALLY AGREE	13	23	29	32	5			102
	12.7	23.5	38.5	31.8	4.0			38.9
	37.1	45.0	30.2	47.8	35.7			
	5.0	8.8	11.1	12.2	1.9			
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	3	12	8	3			29
	10.3	10.3	41.4	27.6	10.3			11.1
	8.6	5.0	12.5	11.9	21.4			
	1.1	1.1	4.6	3.1	1.1			
GENERALLY DISAGR	10	6	6	1	0			23
	43.5	25.1	26.1	4.3	0			8.8
	28.6	12.0	8.3	1.5	0			
	3.8	2.3	2.3	0	0			
STRONGLY DISAGRE	1	5	5	1	2			14
	7.1	35.7	35.7	7.1	14.3			5.3
	2.9	13.0	5.2	1.5	14.3			
	.4	1.9	1.9	.4	.8			
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	96	67	14			262
	13.4	12.1	36.6	25.6	5.3			100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 41.35885 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0005

Statement: 7. Members of the boards of trustees should be nominated by the Governor, but confirmed by the Legislative branch.

Narrative: 7. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents disagree that members of the boards of trustees once nominated by the Governor should then be confirmed by the legislators. The comments on this question dealt with the concerns that the decisions affecting the institutions would be made through political pressures and not through a group process with the support of professional management techniques. All occupation categories lean towards disagreement on the question but it should be noted that there is a significant number of administrators and faculty who agree.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	LEGISLAT	BOARD OF COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR007	1. I TRUSTEE	2. I ADMINISTR.	3. I	4. I	5. I	
STRONGLY AGREE ^{1.}	4 14.8 11.4 1.5	0 0 0 0	15 55.6 15.5 5.7	7 25.9 10.4 2.7	1 3.7 6.7 .4	27 10.2
GENERALLY AGREE ^{2.}	4 8.7 11.4 1.5	5 18.9 10.0 1.9	20 43.5 20.6 7.6	15 32.6 22.4 5.7	2 4.3 13.1 .8	46 17.4
NEITHER AGREE NO ^{3.}	4 10.3 11.4 1.5	2 5.1 4.0 .8	15 38.5 15.5 5.7	16 35.9 20.9 5.3	4 10.1 26.7 1.5	39 14.8
GENERALLY DISAGR ^{4.}	13 19.4 37.1 4.9	11 16.4 22.0 6.2	21 31.3 21.6 3.0	18 26.9 26.9 6.8	6 6.0 26.7 1.5	67 25.4
STRONGLY DISAGRE ^{5.}	10 11.8 28.6 3.8	32 37.6 64.0 12.1	26 30.6 26.8 3.8	13 15.3 19.4 4.3	4 4.7 26.7 1.5	85 32.2
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	50 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 42.28520 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0004						

RAW CHI SQUARE = 42.28520 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0004

Statement: 8. The University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University should be coordinated under one board of trustees.

Narrative: 8. The respondents leaned towards agreement that the University of Massachusetts, the University of Lowell, and Southeastern Massachusetts University should be coordinated under one board of trustees. The respondents indicated that it is only good management practice to coordinate similar units. Legislators are split on this statement, while board members disagree, and the other three groups agree.

Statement: 9. If the public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board of trustees, the various institutions would lose their own individual identities.

Narrative: 9. The majority of the respondents (62%) agree that if the public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board of trustees the institutions would lose their own individual identities. The comments on this point stress the wide differences in institutional missions. Comments were also made about how community colleges have to relate to the area served or they will be out of business. By occupation categories, legislators and others lean towards disagreement; while board members, administrators and faculty lean towards agreement.

Statement: 10. Unions have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.

Narrative: 10. The respondents were split on the statement that unions have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education. Some comments were that unions are made up of faculty members, and they are citizens and, like every citizen, have the right to participate in the decisions and direction of a public institution. At issue is a better definition of "daily management." It was quite apparent by looking at the respondents' occupation to see that faculty members are highly prejudiced by their own position and that their views are in conflict with the prevailing opinion of administrators who agree; and the "other" occupation category are split.

Statement: 11. Students have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.

Narrative: 11. Sixty-five percent of the respondents disagree that students have too much say in the daily management of public higher education. A common note among the respondents was that students should be given an opportunity to provide input, but not be allowed to get involved with daily management. Administrators felt that since they are paid for their expertise, they could best make daily management decisions. It was the respondents' opinions that to allow students who are not mature enough to assume the responsibility, and who are not accountable to anyone, would destroy our higher education institutions.

Statement: 12. The Legislative Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.

Narrative: 12. The majority of the respondents also disagree that the Legislative Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions. The comments on this point varied from "politics" should be kept out of higher education, to a real concern about the loss of academic freedom. Legislators emphasized that they were not qualified to make decisions on curriculum, admission policy and other academic matters; and that this could be better handled by college administrators and boards of trustees. If administrators were not running the system properly, then the course to take would be to change the management and not legislate educational policy. Legislators also feel there is sufficient control of higher education through the budgetary review and decisions on appropriations. They realize that as long as the General Court controls the purse strings they can direct higher education at any time. An editorial comment on Legislature's control is that it is not only sufficient in running the operation, but excessive; but whether it is good or bad, it is a political reality. All categories except legislators disagree, but legislators tend to agree with this concept.

Occupational
Statistics:

COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					FOW TOTAL
ROW PCT	PCT FOR	TRUSTEE ADMINIST					
VAR012	TOT PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	30.0	10.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	10
		8.6	2.0	2.1	3.0	13.3	3.0
		1.1	.4	.8	.3	.8	
		1.0	0	5	3	0	10
GENERALLY AGREE	2.	55.6	0	27.0	16.7	0	10
		20.6	0	5.2	4.5	0	5.0
		3.0	0	1.9	1.1	0	
		1.1	2	6	4	2	25
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.	44.0	8.0	24.0	16.0	8.0	9.5
		31.4	4.0	6.2	6.0	13.3	
		4.2	.8	2.3	1.5	.8	
		9	15	33	25	4	86
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.	10.5	17.4	38.4	29.1	4.7	32.6
		29.7	30.8	34.0	37.3	26.7	
		3.4	5.7	12.5	9.5	1.5	
		2	32	51	33	7	125
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.	1.6	25.6	40.8	26.4	5.6	47.3
		8.7	64.0	52.8	40.3	68.7	
		.8	12.1	19.3	12.5	2.7	
		35	50	97	67	15	264
COLUMN TOTAL		13.3	18.9	16.7	25.4	5.7	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 75.93288 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

Statement: 13. The Executive Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.

Narrative: 13. The Executive Branch should not have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions, according to a majority of the respondents. The respondents' comments on this statement centered around having a Governor who is not a strong supporter of public higher education. If there were a different philosophy within the executive branch in favor of higher education, the respondents felt that the executive branch would assist in the operation by helping improve communications and coordination within the segments. All groups lean towards disagreement, but it should be noted that there are a significant number of legislators who agree.

Occupational Statistics:

VAR013	COUNT		LEGISLAT		BOARD OF COLLEGE		FACULTY		OTHER		ROW TOTAL
	ROW COL	PCT TOT	FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST						
1.			1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1				
STRONGLY AGREE	1	25.0	0	0	50.0	25.0	0				1.5
		2.9	0	0	2.1	1.5	0				
		.4			.8	.4					
2.											
GENERALLY AGREE	2	11	2	6	25.0	12.3	2				24
		45.8	8.3	25.0	6.2	4.5	8.3				9.1
		31.4	6.0	6.2	2.2	1.1	13.3				
		.2	0	2.2	1.1	.8					
3.											
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	10	2	9	5	1					27
		37.0	7.6	33.3	18.5	3.7					10.2
		28.6	6.0	3.3	7.5	6.7					
		.8	0	1.4	1.9	.4					
4.											
GENERALLY DISAGR	4	12	19	34	24	4					93
		12.9	23.6	36.6	25.4	4.3					35.2
		34.7	38.0	35.1	35.4	26.7					
		.5	7.2	12.9	9.1	1.5					
5.											
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	1	27	46	34	8					116
		.9	23.1	33.7	29.1	6.9					43.9
		2.9	54.8	47.4	50.7	53.3					
		.4	18.2	17.4	12.3	3.0					
COLUMN TOTAL		38	58	97	67	15					264
		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7					100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 55.48710 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

Statement: 14. All of the Massachusetts State Colleges should have Masters Degree granting authority.

Narrative: 14. The respondents were about evenly divided that all of the Massachusetts State Colleges should have Masters Degree granting authority. The only comments on this point stress the high cost for the taxpayers and unnecessary duplication.

Statement: 15. The University of Massachusetts should have sole authority on awarding Doctoral Degrees in public institutions in Massachusetts.

Narrative: 15. The respondents were also about evenly split on whether the University of Massachusetts should be given sole authority in awarding Doctoral Degrees in public institutions in Massachusetts. The comments expressed were mainly on the size of the state and need for reasonable commuting distance to the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Boston or Worcester. Another comment was that there are large numbers of private institutions that offer doctoral degrees. Legislators, board members, faculty and the "other" group category leaned toward disagreement, while administrators tended to agree.

Statement: 16. The Secretary of Education's office is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.

Narrative: 16. The respondents disagree that the Secretary of Education's department is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts. However, lack of knowledge of the real function performed by the Secretary of Education's Office was mentioned. Other comments centered around the budget review process and the lack of power on behalf of the Secretary's Office. Legislators, administrators and "other" leaned towards disagreement with the statement while board members and faculty agreed.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT		LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW
	ROW	PCT						
	TOT	PCT	TOT	TOT	TOT	TOT	TOT	TOTAL
VAR016			1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	10.0	2.9	2.0	5.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
	2.4	0.8	0.8	1.9	0.8	0.0	0.0	
2. GENERALLY AGREE	16.2	4.6	4.0	21.6	21.6	0.0	0.0	14.2
	17.1	5.0	3.0	8.5	11.9	0.0	0.0	
	2.3	0.7	0.7	3.1	3.1	0.0	0.0	
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	18.0	5.0	22.2	22.2	39.7	0.0	0.0	63
	15.9	4.4	29.0	14.9	37.3	0.0	0.0	24.1
	28.6	8.0	3.4	5.4	9.6	0.0	0.0	
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	12.0	3.4	11.0	36.1	27.7	10.8	0.0	83
	28.6	8.0	22.0	31.9	34.3	60.0	0.0	31.8
	3.0	0.8	6.2	11.5	9.8	3.0	0.0	
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	11.8	3.3	11.8	54.4	13.2	8.8	0.0	68
	22.9	6.5	16.0	39.4	11.4	40.0	0.0	26.1
	3.1	0.8	3.1	14.2	3.4	2.3	0.0	
COLUMN	35		50	94	67	15		261
TOTAL	12.4		13.2	36.6	25.7	5.7		100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 46.42882 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0001

Statement: 17. The Board of Higher Education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.

Narrative: 17. The respondents did not agree or disagree decisively as to whether the Board of Higher Education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts. Lack of knowledge about the Board of Higher Education's function was also noted on this point. The respondents considered it yet another level of bureaucracy, and there are too many administrators in this department who have little knowledge of what the institutions are doing.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT ROW COL	PCT PCT TOT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR017			1	2	3	4	5	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	7.7	7.7	53.8	30.8	3	7.7	13	5.0
	2.9	2.9	14.0	4.3	0	6.7		
	.4	.4	2.7	1.5	0	.4		
2. GENERALLY AGREE	11	11	23.7	31.7	21.7	5.3	68	23.0
	31.4	31.4	28.0	21.2	19.4	20.0		
	4.2	4.2	5.4	7.3	5.3	1.1		
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	16.0	16.0	15.0	22.0	42.0	4.0	50	13.2
	22.9	22.9	16.0	11.7	31.3	13.3		
	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.2	8.0	.8		
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	10	10	17.3	38.7	25.3	5.3	75	23.7
	13.3	13.3	26.0	33.9	28.4	26.7		
	3.8	3.8	5.0	11.1	7.3	1.5		
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	5	12.7	49.2	22.2	7.9	63	24.1
	7.9	7.9	15.0	33.0	20.9	33.3		
	1.9	1.9	1.1	11.9	5.4	1.9		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	35	50	94	67	15	261	100.0
	13.4	13.4	19.2	36.0	25.7	5.7		

RAW CHI SQUARE = 30.02315 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0179

Statement: 18. The central office staff of the state college system is important to the coordination of the ten state colleges.

Narrative: 18. Most of the respondents either agreed to or had no opinion on the statement that the Central Office staff of the State College system is important to the coordination of the ten State Colleges. The respondents did feel they lacked knowledge on what the Central Office does, but there is an opinion that the Central Office has too many highly paid executives who do not have the field experience to make decisions for the institutions. It was also stated that the Central Office creates a heavy flow of paperwork to justify its own employment. It should be noted that the occupations that leaned toward disagreement with this statement were faculty and administrators.

Occupational
Statistics:

	COUNT	ROW COL TOT	PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VARIABLE	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.				
STRONGLY AGREE ^{1.}	8.0 5.7	18 29.0	9 14.6	2 3.3	2 3.3				25 3.6
GENERALLY AGREE ^{2.}	18.4 14.6 6.9	24 48.0 3.2	36 72.0 13.8	16 33.3 6.1	4 8.0 1.5				98 37.5
NEITHER AGREE NO ^{3.}	9 10.5 25.7 3.4	12 24.0 4.6	27 54.0 10.3	34 68.0 13.0	4 8.0 1.5				86 33.0
GENERALLY DISAGR ^{4.}	14.3 10.3 1.9	29 58.0 2.0	40 80.0 14.9	18 36.0 6.1	5 10.0 1.9				35 13.4
STRONGLY DISAGR ^{5.}	5.9 2.9 .4	17.6 6.8 1.1	8 16.0 3.2	5 10.0 1.9	0 0.0 0.0				17 6.5
TOTAL	35 13.4	58 19.2	94 36.0	67 25.7	15 5.7				261 100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 37.41561 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0010

Statement: 20. Public higher education has good representation or lobbying at the State House.

Narrative: 20. Responses indicated disagreement that public higher education has good representation or lobbying at the State House. Legislators agreed with this idea, however, while board members, faculty and administrators disagreed, and the "other" category is split.

Statement: 21. Public institutions within forty miles of one another should not offer the same technical and professional programs.

Narrative: 21. The respondents were divided in their opinions that public institutions within forty miles of one another should not offer the same technical and professional programs. Legislators, board members and "other" agree, while administrators and faculty lean towards disagreement.

...

Statement: 23. College administrators should be held more accountable to the board of trustees for their management decisions.

Narrative: 23. The majority of the respondents agree that college administrators should be held more accountable to the board of trustees for their management decisions. The comments on this question stressed that if the managers' decisions are poor, then it is up to the trustees to replace them. Managers should be "professional administrators," not faculty promoted for convenience or to get them out of the way. Another point was that administrators should be better trained in educational administration so that they see the big picture and not merely a narrow perspective. It should be noted here that 33% of the administrators disagreed with this statement.

Statement: 24. Catering to local needs or localism is an important aspect to Massachusetts public higher education.

Narrative: 24. The overwhelming majority of respondents agree that catering to local needs, or localism, is an important aspect of Massachusetts public higher education. The only comment on this statement was that this is the mission of community colleges, and they must understand what is needed by the community they serve and meet that specific need. All occupation groups tend to agree on this point, but there is a significant number of faculty who disagree.

Occupational Statistics:

	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLATIVE BOARD OF COLLEGE TRUSTEES ADMINIST					FACULTY OTHER	ROW TOTAL
		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.		
VAR024		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.		
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	10.2 29.4 3.8	12.2 24.0 4.6	40.8 42.8 15.4	30.6 44.8 11.5	6.1 40.0 2.3		98
GENERALLY AGREE	2.	16.1 58.8 7.7	22.6 58.0 10.8	36.3 47.9 17.3	19.4 35.8 9.2	5.6 46.7 2.7		124
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.	20.0 11.8 1.5	13.0 6.0 1.2	35.0 7.4 2.7	20.0 6.0 1.5	10.0 13.3 .8		20
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.	0 0 0	15.3 12.0 2.3	11.8 2.1 .8	53.9 13.4 3.5	0 0 0		17
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.	0 0 0	100.0 2.8 .4	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0		1
COLUMN TOTAL		14	50	94	67	15		260
		13.1	13.2	36.2	25.8	5.8		100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 27.35646 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0377

Statement: 25. Students who attend either the state colleges or the community colleges suffer from the fact that their institutions do not carry the prestige of the state university.

Narrative: 25. The respondents were about evenly divided on the statement that students who attend either the state colleges or the community colleges suffer from the fact that their institutions do not carry the prestige of the state university. In the respondents' opinion the quality of education is not different.

Statement: 26. As enrollments decline, we should reduce the size and offerings at the institutions of public higher education and not close any institutions.

Narrative: 26. A majority of respondents disagree that, as enrollments decline, we should reduce the size and offerings at the institutions of public higher education rather than close any institutions. It was very clear from the data that hard decisions must be made to cut weaker institutions so that the good ones will not be hurt. Another comment made was that institutions should be closed and merged so that one administrative unit manages several campuses which would then reduce duplication and costs.

Statement: 27. There are eight institutions of public higher education within Route 128; this is too many for the region.

Narrative: 27. The respondents were divided on the statement that there are too many institutions of public higher education within Route 128.

Statement: 28. All thirty of the institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should be given university status.

Narrative: 28. Eighty-nine percent disagree that all thirty of the institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should be given university status. Universities, state colleges and community colleges have three distinct missions and goals, and it is very important for institutions to retain their own identities. Catering to local geographic needs would also be lost under a university structure and status. All groups lean towards disagreement, but ten percent of the administrators agreed.

Statement: 29. We should develop all five public segments into one university system.

Narrative: 29. As in the previous question, the majority of respondents disagreed that we should develop all five public segments into one university system. The comments were similar to those in question 28. Again, the number of administrators agreeing with this statement was high.

Statement: 30. Institutions of public higher education are functioning satisfactorily and no major changes are warranted at the present time.

Narrative: 30. A large majority (75%) of the respondents disagree that institutions of public higher education are functioning satisfactorily and no major changes are warranted at the present time. But the respondents comments on this point were that there is too much political interference in higher education. Also, there is a lack of sufficient appropriation to run the institution properly. Additional comments indicated that the Board of Higher Education and the Secretary of Educational Affairs are too weak and unsupportive. There is unnecessary duplication of programs and there is a lack of planning, both short and long range. The respondents' comment that trustees are not working for the best interest of the institutions, and information and data are hard to retrieve.

Statement: 31. Given the fine graduate programs offered by private colleges and universities in Massachusetts, the public colleges and universities should not offer graduate programs.

Narrative: 31. Of all the questions, the largest percentage of the respondents disagree that given the fine graduate programs offered by private colleges and universities in Massachusetts, the public colleges and universities should not offer graduate programs. There were no comments on this question, but it should be noted that the only significant variance by occupation was from legislators, agreeing that the public sector should not duplicate the private sector in graduate programs.

Statement: 32. There should be free tuition for Massachusetts residents at all institutions of public higher education.

Narrative: 32. The respondents do not believe that there should be free tuition for Massachusetts residents at all institutions of public higher education. Only a few respondents endorsed a concept of free tuition. Their comments were that society would benefit from everyone receiving an education, and that everyone who desires an education should be given the opportunity, regardless of finances. On the other hand, there were comments that not everyone is entitled to a college education at public expense. If students do not pay some of the costs, there will not be a value placed on what is received, and when students lose the desire to do well, they will drop out. Many respondents were of the opinion that students would get more out of their education if they helped pay for it.

Statement: 33. Non-residents of the commonwealth attending institutions of public higher education should be charged the full cost of tuition.

Narrative: 33. There were more respondents agreeing that non-residents of the Commonwealth attending institutions of public higher education should be charged the full cost of tuition. It was noted that if students want to come from another state, they should be required to pay, but not so high a cost that they would be seriously discouraged. It was emphasized that out-of-state students gave an atmosphere of cosmopolitanism, and give our students an opportunity to meet people with different backgrounds and experiences. Another comment that appeared several times was that there should be a balance between in-state and out-of-state students, except for programs of high demand by Massachusetts residents.

Statement: 34: There could be a graduate tuition charge; that is, a system such as the graduated income tax, where students pay that percentage of the tuition that their family income warrants.

Narrative: 34: There was no significant percentage of agreement or disagreement that there should be a graduated tuition charge; that is, a system such as the graduated income tax, where students pay that percentage of tuition that their family income warrants. It should be noted that reviewing the responses by occupation that the legislators agree with this type of charge, boards of trustees were split, and college administrators, faculty and "other" disagree.

Statement: 35. Every resident in Massachusetts graduating from high school should receive a voucher to cover the cost of four years of either public or private higher education in Massachusetts, which would allow the student freedom of choice.

Narrative: 35. A majority of the respondents disagree that every resident in Massachusetts graduating from high school should receive a voucher to cover the cost of four years of either public or private higher education in Massachusetts. Respondents felt that students who were not qualified would be using their voucher at the taxpayers' expense. The respondents indicated that the plan seems great in theory, but that the taxpayers in Massachusetts would revolt against higher education.

Statement: 36. Given the current tuition charges in Massachusetts institutions of public higher education, additional public funds should not be used for scholarships.

Narrative: 36. In spite of the current low tuition charge in Massachusetts institutions of public higher education, additional public funds should still be used for scholarships, according to a majority of the respondents. Comments centered around giving more aid for the very poor and developing a loan program with a low annual interest rate, an excellent method to help students. It can be noted that there is a significant number of legislators and administrators who disagree with this point.

Statement: 37. Upon receipt of the annual appropriation, and in the framework of accountability, individual institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control.

Narrative: 37. Relatively few respondents disagree that upon receipt of the annual appropriation and in the framework of accountability, individual institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control. In the opinion of the respondents, as long as records are audited and fiscal officers are held responsible, it is important to allow the institution the flexibility to use the resources without being controlled by outside forces. Legislators lean towards disagreement while all other groups agree.

Occupational Statistics:

VAR037	COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW	PCT	1. LEGISLAT	2. BOARD OF TRUSTEE	3. COLLEGE ADMINIST	4. FACULTY	5. OTHER	
	COL	TOT	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	3	2.5	24	23.3	62	26	3	118
	8.6	8.6	48.0	63.9	39.4	28.0	2.5	44.9
	1.1	1.1	9.1	23.6	9.3	1.1		
2. GENERALLY AGREE	9	9.7	21	22.6	27	31	5	93
	28.7	28.7	42.8	27.8	47.0	33.3	5.4	35.4
	3.4	3.4	8.0	10.3	11.8	1.9		
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	2	4.0	0	0	2	1	0	5
	5.7	5.7	0	2.1	1.5	0		1.9
	.8	.8	0	.8	.4	0		
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	18	35.7	7	7.1	14.3	28.6	16.3	28
	28.6	28.6	6.0	4.1	12.1	26.7	16.3	10.6
	3.4	3.4	.8	1.5	3.0	1.5		
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	11	57.9	3	15.8	2	0	3	19
	31.4	31.4	5.0	2.1	0	15.8	20.0	7.2
	1.2	1.2	1.1	0	0	1.1		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	13.3	58	13.0	97	66	15	263
								100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 98.83490 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

Statement: 38. Each institution of public higher education should have the authority and the autonomy to solicit private funds to be used at the discretion of the institutions.

Narrative: 38. The respondents agree that institutions of public higher education should have the authority and the autonomy to solicit private funds to be used at the discretion of the institutions. Respondents commented that since public institutions do not receive discretionary funds, the use of private resources would be of great use for research and development, and faculty and staff development.

Statement: 39. College faculty at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.

Narrative: 39. Overwhelmingly, the respondents disagree that college faculty at institutions of public higher education are paid too much. Very few respondents thought that the current salaries were sufficient. Some commented that the salaries are starting to improve now that unions have forced the issue. Another comment that came up several times was that if the Commonwealth wants to attract and retain the type of faculty required to make the institutions outstanding, the Commonwealth had better start paying accordingly. There were negative comments from legislators saying that faculty are paid adequately or even too much for the amount of time and

effort they put into teaching. All occupation groups disagree with this statement, but it should be noted that there is a significant number who neither agree nor disagree.

Statement: 40. College presidents at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.

Narrative: 40. The majority of the respondents disagree that college presidents at institutions of public higher education are over-paid. The respondents commented on the competitiveness of the position and that paying top dollar to retain the caliber of manager for the state institutions is costly, but worth the investment. Thirty percent of the legislators, administrators and faculty, and "other" agree with this statement.

Statement: 41. Administration and faculty at all thirty institutions of public higher education that perform comparable work should be at the same respective pay level.

Narrative: 41. The respondents agree that administration and faculty at all thirty institutions of public higher education who perform comparable work should be at the same respective pay level. The comments centered on equal pay for equal work. There were comments from university faculty who felt personnel at the University

should be paid more because they are required to do research and publish.

Statement: 42. The high cost of private college or university education is concurrent with the quality.

Narrative: 42. Respondents disagree that the high cost of private college or university education is concurrent with quality. Some respondents commented that they had thought this until taking courses at Boston University and Harvard. All occupation groups tended to disagree, but there was a significant number of respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed.

Statement: 43. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a public university than it is at a community college.

44. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a state college than it is at a community college.

Narrative: 43. The respondents generally disagree that the quality of & teaching during the first two years is better at a
44. public university or state college than it is at a community college. All occupation groups leaned towards disagreement, but there was a high number in each occupation who neither agreed nor disagreed.

Statement: 45. The quality of teaching is better at a public university than it is at a state college.

Narrative: 45. They also disagree that education at a public university is better than at a state college.

Statement: 46. Public higher education should put less emphasis on administrators and more emphasis on faculty and student service personnel.

Narrative: 46. The respondents were about evenly divided on the statement that public higher education should put less emphasis on administrators and more emphasis on faculty and student service personnel. There were comments about institutions being too top heavy and that priorities are in the wrong areas. But also commented on was that with the increase in Federal and State requirements, the large number of administrators is needed. All occupational groups agreed with this statement. The administrators were significantly higher when it came to disagreeing with this statement.

Statement: 47. Collective bargaining contracts have facilitated faculty responsiveness to student needs.

Narrative: 47. The majority of the respondents disagree that collective bargaining contracts have facilitated faculty responsiveness to student needs. The comments stress

that the contracts have not diminished the responsiveness. Other comments were the only ones who get hurt because of a contract are the students. The example used was "work to rule." All occupation groups leaned towards disagreement, but all occupations contained a significant number who neither agreed nor disagreed. There was a significant number of faculty who agreed.

Statement: 48. Faculty tenure should be maintained even though collective bargaining contracts exist in public higher education.

Narrative: 48. Responses were about evenly divided on the statement that faculty tenure should be maintained even though collective bargaining contracts exist in public higher education. The comments were that once faculty voted to unionize, they gave up the privilege of tenure. Other comments were that tenure is a device to protect poor quality faculty. On this point, legislators are split; board members, administrators and "other" disagree, while faculty agree.

Statement: 49. Access to an institution of public higher education should be available to all residents of Massachusetts seeking admission, regardless of their qualifications.

Narrative: 49. The majority of the respondents disagree that access to an institution of public higher education should be available to all residents of Massachusetts seeking admission, regardless of their qualifications. The comments on this point were that institutions must set standards, and to allow unqualified students into the Universities and State Colleges would reduce the worth of the degree. It was noted that the mission of the community college is to allow all students access, regardless of qualifications.

Statement: 50. There should be very strict admission standards established for the three public universities.

Narrative: 50. Although not a majority, the respondents leaned toward agreement on whether there should be very strict admission standards established for the three public universities. The comments on this point stated that quality standards of students are essential at the university level, and the universities must maintain a high reputation. Legislators, administrators and faculty agree, while board members are split, and "other" disagree.

Statement: 51. There should be very strict admission standards established for the ten state colleges.

Narrative: 51. The respondents were about evenly split on the statement that there should be very strict admission standards established for the ten state colleges. The comments indicated that there should be standards, but not as strict as the universities' and not as open as community colleges'.

Statement: 52. The University of Massachusetts should provide the research to solve social problems.

Narrative: 52. Tending to agree that the University of Massachusetts should provide the research to solve social problems, the perspective on this question was that the university is one of the only state agencies that has the facilities and manpower to improve the quality of life for the residents of the Commonwealth.

Statement: 53. Competition for students between public and private institutions is good.

Narrative: 53. The majority of the respondents agree that competition for students between public and private institutions is healthy. The only comments on this point were that real competition does not exist, but eventually would; the other was that competition is healthy for both the private and public sector.

D. Observations

Public higher education in Massachusetts is expected to fulfill diverse and sometimes conflicting functions. To provide an education in the arts and humanities is foremost. Providing the opportunity for low income and minority groups to obtain training in vocational skills and scientific competence is also a top priority. The emphasis placed upon these goals varies accordingly, due to the composite makeup of each state university--public or private.

Massachusetts, with its state legislature offering little support politically or financially, finds many of its educational needs and wants difficult to achieve. A centralized coordinating body must be established that utilizes its resources effectively. A state with a politically controlled governing board may not be able to shield its universities from partisan conflict.

Should each institution have its own governing board? Most respondents answered negatively. The majority did not favor a single governing board (law-making body) or boards organized into geographic regions. The majority of respondents also did not support the Board of Higher Education and the Secretary of Educational Affairs.

With the exception of the legislators, a two tier three segmental structure is the proposal endorsed by most survey participants. The top tier would be a coordinating body and the next level would be the universities, the state colleges and the community colleges. Under this arrangement, the identities of each segment would still be maintained.

Again, most respondents, except the lawmakers, were in favor of a judicial process to screen and select members to the board of governors.

The majority of the respondents indicated there was too much political interference in the daily management of the institutions. Many participants also revealed that the students should be allowed more input into decisions that will affect them.

Judging from comments received on the importance of the state and community college central offices, it appears that the perception of the offices' actual function was grossly misunderstood.

Faculty and administrators were held in high esteem by their colleagues, and the argument rendered by the survey that all personnel are overpaid seems superfluous. The universities are credited with fulfilling their missions as high quality academic and research institutions. The community colleges are economical and provide an opportunity for the nontraditional student.

According to the survey, the state college system seems to lack direction and support from the legislature.

Opinion is unanimous on the universities' role of being a high quality academic and research institution. There is, however, disagreement and confusion as to the role of the state colleges. The community colleges represent the state's ingenuity in providing educational advantages to low income students, and opportunities for students who would find the transition to college difficult.

There was division, however, on whether the Commonwealth should promote social equality by providing free education for all and by

making a special effort to assist individuals from minority groups, poor families or urban areas.

The respondents were in complete consensus as to the University of Massachusetts' role in solving the state's social problems.

The survey has confirmed and uncovered some fundamental issues such as an overwhelming concern for the lack of financing for public higher education and the lack of planning and coordination within the system.

The research indicates that differences in opinion will be as numerous as the problems. Higher education public policy-making has to be a team effort with all concerned parties participating towards a reconcilable solution.

When comparing actual legislation with the pre-legislative survey, one finds a peculiar trait emanating from this supposed democratic process--a system rife with patronage and some self-serving politicians voting in their own interests instead of for the benefit of public higher education in Massachusetts.

The legislature set up a process of allowing public access into the decision-making process. What could be more democratic? Meanwhile, as the prelegislative survey reveals when compared to the actual legislation the decision had already been finalized. Made in the smoke-filled rooms, behind closed doors, or wherever these kinds of decisions are made.

Speaking as an observer it seems the legislature provided only token lip service to the proposals being debated and a series of meaningless reorganization hearings to render a decision they were

already set to implement. Public higher education in Massachusetts had become a pawn in a political chess game.

Throughout the survey, a majority of the respondents and the legislature had different opinions regarding the direction higher education has taken in Massachusetts. This is seen when analyzing the following statements:

On the statement of structuring public higher education under one single board of trustees (No. 2 on the survey), the majority of respondents were opposed, while the legislature favored the idea. Several months after the prelegislative survey, one board to govern all of public higher education was established.

As to whether all board members should be appointed by the governor (statement 3), most respondents were against the idea. Once again, disagreement from the legislature. Once again, the legislative opinion is enacted.

Seventy-four percent of the respondents agreed that a screening process similar to that used by the judicial system should be instituted in appointing board members (statement 6). A group of legislators indicated just the opposite. When the board appointments were tendered, most appointees were via the patronage system (still alive and strong as ever), short-circuiting any potential conflicts with a screening and selection committee.

The merger of all institutions of public higher education under one board would lead to a loss of individual identity. That is what

statement nine proposed, and most respondents agreed. However, the legislature disagreed, and passed into law a single board of Regents.

The respondents wanted a hands-off approach by the legislature in the management of public colleges and universities (statement 12). But the legislature wanted a voice and got it, arguing that since it controls the pursestrings, it maintains, in essence, a stranglehold over policy-making.

A majority of the respondents were against more power being administered by the executive branch (statement 13). But the legislature increased the governor's power, since he is the one who appoints all board members.

On statement 16 of the questionnaire we finally find the respondents and the legislature in agreement on an issue. Both agree that the Secretary of Education's department is virtually meaningless, although the respondents conceded in their comments that they had limited knowledge of the secretary's actual function. The legislature was in favor of eliminating its function, and did.

The respondents answering statement 17 also gave mixed reviews to the Board of Higher Education's duties, but the legislature was not as adamant about their functional responsibilities.

The results of the legislation is that the Secretary of Education and all his staff were eliminated entirely, while many of the Board of Higher Education personnel have just been transferred to another physical location and given a new name, the Board of Regents.

Localism was the topic addressed in statement 24, and most of the respondents agreed it was important, as did the legislators. When the actual legislation was signed into law, a local Board of Trustees was created for each institution.

Institutions should have the autonomy to allocate some of their funds without legislative or executive control. Most of the survey participants, in answer to statement 37, were in favor of this approach. However, this was hardly the case when legislation was enacted. The legislative branch actually controls the personnel and utility accounts (approximately 92% of the budget) giving the institutions control of only 8% of their own budgets to manage.

As enrollments decline, we should reduce the size and offerings at the institutions of public higher education and not close any institutions, as stated in statement 26.

Prediction: Using pre-legislative opinion as a barometer, consolidations and closings may become a reality, simply because the legislators indicated that these measures are necessary for the future well-being of public higher education in Massachusetts. The opinions of experts in the education fields and the general public seem to be of little value.

CHAPTER IV

SECONDARY DATA FINDINGS

Procedures

This chapter will present the information gained as a result of analyzing the follow up study. The follow up research referred to in this chapter is concerned with the opinions of legislators, members of segmental boards of trustees, faculty and administrators now that reorganization of public higher education legislation is being implemented. Procedure for this chapter is divided into three categories:

- A) Crossmatrix--results of prelegislative survey compared with actual legislation
- B) Post-legislative questionnaire development
- C) Response to the post legislative survey
 - a. statistical analysis
 - b. narrative analysis

A. Cross Matrix--Results of Prelegislative Survey Compared with Actual Legislation

In order to develop questions to be used in the follow up survey on reorganization attitudes, opinions, and expectations a comparison was made between the actual legislation and the results from the prelegislative survey. A crossmatrix was developed by a process that indicated whether the legislation as compared to the prelegislative survey either solved the problem, had no effect, or exacerbated the problem. An

analysis of the comparison data was conducted and this researcher developed fourteen post legislative survey questions. Table 2 is the crossmatrix of the prelegislative survey compared to the actual legislation.

B. Post Legislative Questionnaire Development

The post legislative questionnaire, Appendix L, used in this follow up study was structured so that it contained a formal list of questions, and the questionnaire was constructed in a manner which made the objectives of the survey clear to the respondents.

There were three drafts of the questionnaire developed. The first draft was reviewed by colleagues and several legislators. The second draft was reviewed by two members of the dissertation committee, and the final draft was reviewed and approved by the chairman of the committee.

All questions on this survey called for the respondents checking one of several responses which most closely corresponded to their opinion or attitude. There was space provided after each question so that the respondents were able to make comments.

The post legislative questionnaire was administered in March 1981 by mail to one hundred and fifty (150) people: twenty (20) legislators, thirty (30) trustees from the old segmental boards, and one hundred (100) faculty and college administrators. It should be noted that the individuals selected for the follow up survey participated in the prelegislative survey. Of the one hundred and fifty questionnaires distributed one hundred and eleven were returned by the following

occupational categories: fourteen (14) legislators, nineteen (19) trustees, seventeen (17) faculty and sixty one (61) college administrators. The return rate of 74% indicates that there is still a high level of interest in what has taken place and what will happen regarding reorganization, and also a concern about contributing input for possible legislative revisions.

The follow up survey contained fourteen questions on the reorganization of public higher education. A dependent variable, occupation, was included so that data and responses could be compared to the original survey. All respondents were assured of complete anonymity, as stated in the cover letter (Appendix M) attached to the questionnaire form.

The results of the survey were manually tabulated. The statistical data have been divided into the occupational categories so that the reader will have a better understanding of how the respondents now perceive the results of reorganization of public higher education.

C. Response to the Post Legislative Survey

The results of the survey have been organized to first present the question. Secondly, there will be a table showing a statistical analysis of the data by the dependent variable job occupation. Due to the high number of responses by college administrators, this researcher included an average percent in the analysis of data so that the percent would not be misleading. The last portion will be a narrative analysis. The results of the survey will now be presented.

Question 1:

What should be the geographic distribution of the Board of Regents?

- ☐ a. a representative from each county
- ☐ b. a representative from the city or town in which the institution is located
- ☐ c. a regional geographic distribution which will result in a board that is smaller than is currently legislated
- ☐ d. should remain as currently legislated
- ☐ e. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	5/26%	11/18%	4/24%	21	18.8%
B	1/7%	1/5%	8/13%	3/18%	13	10.8%
C	1/7%	2/11%	14/23%	6/4%	23	11.3%
D	10/72%	7/39%	19/31%	3/2%	39	36.0%
E	1/7%	4/21%	9/15%	1/1%	15	11.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

In analyzing the responses to this statement it was clear that no response category had strong support. The category containing the most responses (mode) was the one which keeps the membership as legislated. This category is skewed due to the fact that 72% of the legislators responding indicated the membership should remain as currently legislated. In accordance with the enabling act 329 of the acts of 1980, the fifteen board of Regents members are all appointed by the Governor without consideration of geographic distribution. The majority of the

members also seem to represent special constituencies such as big business or the high technology industries. Representation from the general public is noticeably absent from the membership. There is also no institutional representation in accordance with the statute. The members are also generally from the Boston region with only one individual living in western Massachusetts.

The comments reveal that the geographic distribution of the membership is not a contributing force necessary to improve the effectiveness of the Board of Regents. The qualification of the member is the most important, not his place of residence. Other comments point out that more representation from the general public would improve the semblance of the Regents by allowing a broader base of input.

Question 2:

Should the membership of the Board of Regents have institutional representation (i.e. president, faculty member, etc.) with voting privileges?

- () Yes
- () No
- () No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	10/71%	2/11%	14/23%	10/59%	36	41.0%
N	4/29%	17/89%	45/74%	5/29%	71	55.3%
NO	0/0%	0/0%	2/3%	2/12%	4	3.8%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

The majority of the responses on this statement indicated that institutional employee representation should not have voting privileges. It is interesting to note that while 71% of the legislators expressed that employees should have voting rights, they did not write this provision into legislation. The statute states in section two that "no member of said board of regents shall be principally employed by any public educational institution or by the Commonwealth." This is very short sighted if individuals employed by private institutions are allowed to be voting members on the Regents. As the prelegislative survey reveals, it is unlikely that a board member from a private institution will establish policy that in the long run affects private institutions. This type of member would find it difficult to follow the principle that members serve the interest of all as objectively as possible.

Question 3:

What should be the responsibility or authority of the Board of Regents with respect to the budget?

- () a. full authority and absolute control
- () b. prior approval over all budgets but no involvement in daily management
- () c. coordinating of all budgets and making institutional recommendations
- () d. no authority over budget process
- () e. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	2/11%	3/5%	1/6%	7	7.3%
B	5/35%	12/63%	42/69%	7/41%	66	52.0%
C	8/57%	5/26%	14/23%	8/47%	35	38.3%
D	0/0%	0/0%	2/3%	0/0%	2	.8%
E	0/0%	0/0%	0/0%	1/6%	1	1.5%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

Fifty-two percent of the respondents express the view that the Board of Regents should have approval over all budgets but not involved in the daily management of institutions. The statute chapter 15A section six as amended in summary states that the Regents will prepare a consolidated operating budget for all of public higher education and also periodically prepare institutional capital outlay requests. Funds appropriated by the legislature to the Board of Regents shall be disbursed by the Regents to each institutional board of trustees. The process described in the statute is what the individuals responding to this statement indicated would be in the best interest of public higher education--to return fiscal flexibility to the institutions. A dichotomy occurs between the expected and the actual legislation in the closing paragraph of section six which takes approximately 92% of the flexibility from the Regents, local board and institutions and returns it to the legislature. The statute summarized gives control of personnel and utility accounts to the general court and the Commissioner of

Administration and Finance. The literature on governing structures showed that without fiscal autonomy or flexibility for at least the Board of Regents, that Board will not be effective and will be unable to uphold its prescribed responsibilities. The most appropriate comments that supported the response of the majority centered around the idea that the success of the Regents will depend on their fiscal authority to carry out the functions in an accountable manner.

Question 4:

What should the authority of the Board of Regents be with respect to program approval or discontinuation?

- () a. full authority and absolute control
- () b. prior approval for program planning or discontinuation
- () c. coordinating all programs and making recommendations to institutions
- () d. no authority over program planning or discontinuation
- () e. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	2/11%	13/21%	1/6%	17	11.3%
B	8/57%	6/31%	23/38%	5/29%	42	38.8%
C	5/35%	11/58%	20/33%	8/47%	44	43.3%
D	0/0%	0/0%	5/8%	3/18%	8	6.5%
E	0/0%	0/0%	0/0%	0/0%	0	0 %
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

There were two sentiments that had about an equal number of responses: that the Regents have prior approval for program planning or discontinuation; and 2, that the Board of Regents coordinate all programs and make recommendations to the institutions. Both of these expectations are in conflict with the enacted legislation, section five, which in summary states the Regents have full power to authorize new functions or programs; or consolidate, discontinue or transfer existing functions or programs. The opinions of the respondents indicate that the Board of Regents should be a coordinating board and not a governing board. It is quite obvious that coordination of post secondary programs in the Commonwealth is extremely important. The question is how will one board with so many responsibilities perform this monumental task? The solution is to have the Regents coordinate post secondary education and give the authority of program development to the local boards of trustees who will evaluate institutional needs within the framework of accountability and budget. The prelegislative survey has been confirmed by the post legislative opinion that one agency must "coordinate" program development in Massachusetts public higher education.

Question 5:

What should the authority of the Board of Regents be with respect to state-authorized personnel?

- ☐ a. full authority and absolute control
- ☐ b. prior approval over all personnel changes
- ☐ c. coordinating personnel procedures
- ☐ d. no authority over personnel
- ☐ e. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	0/0%	1/5%	3/5%	0/0%	4	2.5%
B	3/21%	2/11%	5/8%	6/35%	16	18.8%
C	8/58%	16/84%	31/51%	8/47%	63	60.0%
D	3/21%	0/0%	22/36%	1/6%	26	15.8%
E	0/0%	0/0%	0/0%	2/12%	2	3.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

The respondents indicated that the Regents' responsibility should only be to coordinate institutional personnel and leave personnel management to the various institutions. The respondents' opinion is in contrast with the legislation chapter 15A, section five, which in summary grants full authority and control of institutional personnel to the Regents.

During fiscal year 1981 unforeseen circumstances and the lack of sufficient staff at the Regents' central office forced the Regents to delegate personnel responsibilities to the local board of trustees, contradicting the fundamental purpose of centralization, cost effectiveness. It would seem that as the Commonwealth tightens its belt and appropriate staff are appointed at the Regents' office, the personnel authority will in all likelihood become the possession of the all powerful Regents who will attempt to bring some order and cohesion to the twenty-eight colleges and universities. The local board now and the

Regents in the future may presume that they have personnel authority but in reality institutional personnel are controlled by the legislature through the budget vehicle and secondly by collective bargaining agreements.

Question 6:

What should the responsibility or authority of the local Board of Trustees be with respect to the budget?

- () a. full authority and absolute control
- () b. prior approval over all budgets but no involvement in daily management
- () c. coordinating all budgets and making institutional recommendations
- () d. no authority over budget process
- () e. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	0/0%	5/8%	0/0%	6	3.8%
B	2/14%	11/58%	40/66%	6/35%	59	43.3%
C	10/71%	7/37%	12/20%	6/35%	35	40.8%
D	1/7%	1/5%	2/3%	4/24%	8	9.8%
E	0/0%	0/0%	2/3%	1/6%	3	2.3%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

On this statement the respondents expressed their opinion that local boards should have institutional budget approval but no involvement in the daily operations. According to the opinion the same authority is afforded to the Regents. It is quite evident from the response that the role of the local trustees is seen as not important to the institution

or supportive for its system. This post legislative opinion confirms the prelegislative survey which indicated the majority of respondents did not desire to have a local board at each institution. Now that the legislation is in place respondents still indicate one agency is necessary to coordinate budgets for public higher education. As was established in the prelegislative survey each institution should not have its own local board of trustees.

Question 7:

What should be the geographic distribution of membership of the local Board of Trustees?

- () a. a representative from each city or town in the county in which the institution is located
- () b. a regional geographic distribution which will result in a Board that is smaller than that currently legislated
- () c. it should remain as currently legislated
- () d. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	5/26%	10/16%	3/18%	19	16.8%
B	1/7%	4/21%	12/20%	4/24%	21	18.0%
C	11/79%	8/42%	32/52%	7/41%	58	53.5%
D	1/7%	2/11%	7/12%	3/18%	13	12.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

Fifty-four percent of the respondents indicated that the membership of the local board of trustees should remain as legislated. The statute, chapter 15A, section nine, in summary establishes a board of

trustees consisting of eight members at each institution. Seven of the members are appointed by the governor and one member is elected by the alumni association.

The comments reveal that the city or town from where the member comes is not the important criterion for the selection of a board member. Like the selection of a Regent, qualification and interest in the institution is the major factor.

Unlike statement one where the respondents had no strong opinion on the distribution of the Regents, in this statement over half did have a preference. The data indicate either the respondents are satisfied with the current legislation or they do not have much interest in the local board.

Question 8:

Should the membership on the local Board of Trustees have institutional employee representation?

- () Yes
 () No
 () No opinion -

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	10/71%	4/21%	17/28%	9/53%	40	43.3%
B	4/29%	15/79%	43/70%	7/41%	69	54.8%
C	0/0%	0/0%	1/2%	1/6%	2	2.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

On this statement fifty five percent of the respondents indicated that there should not be institutional employee representation on the local board. This opinion is in agreement with the enacted legislation which states that "no member of a board of trustees shall be principally employed by any public educational institution or school system, or by the Commonwealth." There is some irony in the opinions on this statement because, of the group of legislators surveyed, 71% felt that employees should have the right to be members but they did not vote the legislation according to this past legislative opinion.

The main comment supporting the negative response cited conflict of interest and interference with policy decisions.

Question 9:

Should the membership of the local Board of Trustees have institutional student representation?

- () Yes
- () No
- () No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	14/100%	16/84%	23/38%	9/53%	62	68.8%
N	0/0%	3/16%	35/57%	7/41%	45	28.5%
NO	0/0%	0/0%	3/5%	1/6%	4	2.8%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

The respondents agreed that there should be student representation on the local board. Their opinion is in conflict with the current enacted statute. In analyzing the data further there is a strong likelihood that there will be some changes to the legislation due to the opinion of legislators supporting student representation 100%. Shortly after this survey, House bill 4201 was filed which allows students to serve one year terms on the local board.

The majority of the comments on this statement were not supportive of the respondents opinion that a student constituency have voting rights. The comments state that employees are not afforded voting privileges so why should students have this privilege.

Question 10:

One Board with decision-making power for all of public higher education in Massachusetts is a good concept.

- () Yes
- () No
- () No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	9/64%	3/16%	45/74%	13/76%	70	57.5%
N	2/14%	16/84%	12/20%	3/18%	33	34.0%
NO	3/22%	0/0%	4/6%	1/6%	8	8.5%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

On this statement the majority of all occupational groups excluding old segmental trustees are of the opinion that one board should have all the power for decisions in Massachusetts public higher education. This supports the current legislation which gives ultimate power to the Regents. This also coincides with the prelegislative survey in which an overwhelming majority agree that one board should coordinate post secondary education.

The comments were that this should eliminate duplication and over the long run be a cost savings for the Commonwealth.

Question 11:

The current legislation calls for a salary of \$54,000 for the chancellor. This should attract a candidate of:

- () a. very high caliber
- () b. superior caliber
- () c. adequate quality
- () d. inadequate quality
- () e. unqualified
- () f. no opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
A	1/7%	1/5%	5/8%	2/12%	9	8.0%
B	2/14%	4/21%	8/13%	1/6%	15	13.5%
C	7/50%	6/32%	16/26%	11/65%	40	43.3%
D	2/14%	8/42	24/39%	3/18%	37	28.3%
E	1/7%	0/0%	5/8%	0/0%	6	3.8%
F	1/7%	0/0%	3/5%	0/0%	4	3.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

On this statement there were no strong opinions regarding the quality of the person that will be attracted by the \$54,000 annual salary. The current legislation provides for an annual salary of only \$54,000. The legislature is in the process of changing the legislation on House bill 4201 to read as follows: "the Chancellor shall receive such annual compensation as the board of Regents shall determine" Prior to the appointment of Chancellor Duff a private "political deal" was made by the legislature to increase the salary to what he would be receiving as President of Lowell University.

Questions 12:

Massachusetts public higher education will be better coordinated, more accountable, and generally a better system due to reorganization.

- () Yes
- () No
- () No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	7/50%	4/21%	35/57%	7/41%	53	42.3%
N	0/0%	14/74%	11/18%	2/12%	27	26.0%
NO	7/50%	1/5%	15/25%	8/47%	31	31.8%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

There was no strong opinion supporting Massachusetts as a better system due to reorganization. There were as many respondents saying no or no opinion as there were agreeing with this statement. It is difficult to assess whether individuals are taking a wait and see position, whether there is a lack of confidence or there is a general dissatisfaction.

On the prelegislative survey a question was asked if the system was functioning satisfactorily. Seventy five percent of the respondents were not of the opinion that it was and that major changes were warranted. Now that the legislature has drastically changed the system to improve coordination and accountability the respondents to the survey still are questioning whether the system is functioning to its maximum economic advantage for the Commonwealth and whether this reorganization was the wisest choice.

Question 13:

Do the legislative branches still have too much influence in the governance and control of public higher education?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	1/7%	17/89%	45/74%	15/88%	78	64.5%
N	11/79%	2/11%	13/21%	0/0%	26	27.8%
NO	2/14%	0/0%	3/5%	2/12%	7	7.8%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

Sixty-five percent of the respondents are of the opinion that the legislative branches still have too much control over public higher education. Seventy-nine percent of the legislators did not feel they have that influence.

On the prelegislative survey a question was asked whether the legislature should have more to say about public higher education. Almost eighty percent of the respondents expressed the opinion that the legislature should stay out of higher education and let boards of trustees and administrators run the institutions. A second question on the prelegislative survey centered around funding and autonomy to allocate funds without legislative control. Again over eighty percent of the respondents indicated that the legislature should stay out of institutional affairs.

Now with public higher education completely restructured the legislature is still deeply involved by controlling the budget not only before appropriation but after funds have been appropriated to

institutions. It is interesting to note that the legislative respondents still do not feel they are controlling higher education.

Question 14:

Does the executive branch still have too much influence in the governance and control of public higher education?

- () Yes
- () No
- () No opinion

Statistical Analysis:

	Legislators	Trustees	College Administrators	Faculty	Total	Average Percent
Y	3/21%	16/84%	42/69%	15/88%	76	65.5%
N	9/64%	2/11%	14/23%	0/0%	25	24.5%
NO	2/15%	1/5%	5/8%	2/12%	10	10.0%
Total	14	19	61	17	111	

Narrative Analysis:

Sixty-six percent of the respondents are of the opinion that the executive branch still has too much influence and control of public higher education. The responses to this question were skewed in that sixty-four of the legislative responses indicated that the executive branch does not have too much influence.

The follow up survey corresponds to the results from the pre-legislative survey opinion which indicated prior to reorganization the executive branch had too much influence and control.

Similar to the comments made in question thirteen it is ironic now that the Commonwealth is completely restructured for supposedly the betterment of higher education but is still being hamstrung by the bureaucrats who control the finances and appoint all the policy makers.

This concludes the chapter on the response to the post legislative survey. It is worthy of note that the comments made on each question of this survey by the respondents were interesting and contributed significantly to the study. The comments on each statement separated into job occupational categories are included in appendix N.

C H A P T E R V

SUMMARY, FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, DISCUSSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

A. Summary

This study was designed to determine the problems delineated by people in the field of public higher education and legislators prior to, and during the 1980 reorganization. The study was approached through an analysis of prelegislation and postlegislation opinions, as administered and analyzed on surveys of select state legislators, members of the former segmental boards of trustees, public college faculty and administrators. The respondents' opinions were compared to the enacted legislation to determine whether the legislation was based on the opinions and expectations of the group surveyed, at least in the specific areas, or whether there was no relationship. The study has revealed possible problems and solution areas. The use of the data may be helpful in developing amendments to the current legislation, and the lesson learned will be valuable for any future restructuring of public higher education. Although fifty-three questions were administered on the prelegislation questionnaire and fourteen on the postlegislation questionnaire, only the questions that are relevant to the 1980 reorganization and the enacted legislation are summarized in this chapter.

B. Findings

Sixty-nine percent of the respondents indicated that institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should not have their own local board of trustees. This researcher performed a chi-square analysis, and there was no significant difference of opinion when analyzing the responses by occupation. Eighty percent of the legislators, 62% of the trustees, 63.9% of the administrators and 70.2% of the faculty were not in favor of a separate local board of trustees for each institution.

Fifty-nine percent of all respondents surveyed were opposed to the concept that the five separate segmental boards of trustees should be structured under one board. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was found. When analyzing the responses by occupational categories, however, an interesting trend appeared: 57.1% of the legislators indicated a preference for a one board structure, 84% of the trustees, 60.4% of the administrators and 53.3% of the faculty are opposed to structuring all public higher education under one board.

Fifty-six percent of the respondents were not in favor of having all members of the boards of trustees at public institutions of higher education be appointed by the governor. Thirty-three percent of the respondents agreed that board members should be appointed by the governor, and 10.3% had no preference. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was determined. However, in

the analysis of the responses by occupation, the following trend emerged: The legislators favored the governor making appointments, 54.3%; opposed, 37.1% no opinion, 8.6%; the trustees were in favor 58%; opposed, 28%; no preference, 14%; the administrators do not support the governor making appointments, 59.4%; in favor, 41.6%; had no opinion, 14.6%. The faculty disagreed on the issue of having the governor make appointments 74.7%, agreed on his appointment authority 16.4%, and neither agreed nor disagreed, 9%. In the category of other, 73.3% disagreed on having the governor make appointments and 26.7% agreed.

Fifty-six percent of the respondents disagreed, 32.8% agreed, and 11.5% had no opinion, when surveyed on the statement that public higher education should be organized into geographic regions and not structured by segments such as the University of Massachusetts as one segment, the University of Lowell as another segment, Southeastern Massachusetts University as another segment, the ten state colleges as another, and the fifteen community colleges as a final segment. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was noted. When analyzing the responses by occupational category, the following pattern developed: 40% of the legislators agreed on being organized in geographic regions, 34.3% disagreed, and 25.7% had no opinion. Twenty percent of the trustees supported geographic organization, 70% disagreed, and 10% did not have a preference. Thirty-five percent of the administrators were in favor of a geographic

structure, 55.8% were opposed, and 9.5% had no opinion. Thirty-nine percent of the faculty agreed with the geographical regional structure, 55.3% disagreed, and 6% had no preference. Twenty percent of the category "other" agreed with geographic regions, 60% were opposed, and 20% had no opinion.

Sixty-three percent of all respondents were opposed to, 29.9% were in favor of, and 7.2% had no preference on having members of the board of trustees that are employed by private colleges and universities being allowed to make policy for public higher education. Again, no significant difference appeared when applying the chi-square test. There are some interesting differences observed by occupational categories: 40% of the legislators, 56% of the trustees, 18.5% of the administrators, 22.4% of the faculty, and 26.7% of the category "other" were in favor of trustees being employed by the private sector and making policy for public higher education.

On the statement that there should be a screening and selection process similar to the judicial system when appointing members of the boards of trustees for institutions of public higher education, 74.8% of the respondents were in favor, 13.8% were opposed, and 4.1% neither agreed nor disagreed. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was noticed. However, the occupational response revealed that 60% of the legislators agreed, 31.5% disagreed, and 8.5% had no opinion regarding the appointment of board members via the judicial process. Seventy-two percent of the trustees were in

favor, 22% were opposed, and 6% had no preference on the selection process. Eighty-five percent of the faculty supported the judicial process for selection of board members, 3% were opposed, and 11.9% did not indicate a preference. In the last category, "other," 64.3% of the respondents supported the judicial process for selecting board members, 14.3% opposed the process, and 21.4% rendered no opinion.

Fifty-two percent of the respondents agreed, 36.3% disagreed, and 11.8% had no preference that the University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University should be coordinated under one board of trustees. When conducting a chi-square test, no significant difference appeared in the occupational categories. The data by occupation indicated that 51.4% of the legislators agreed, 34.3% disagreed, 14.3% had no opinion; that 25% of the trustees were supportive, 66% were opposed, and 8% had no preference; 61.4% of the administrators agreed, 18.1% disagreed, and 10.4% had no opinion; 51.5% of the faculty were in favor, 31.8% disagreed, and 16.7% neither agreed nor disagreed.

Sixty-two percent agreed, 30.8% disagreed and 7.2% rendered no opinion on the statement that if public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board of trustees, the various institutions would lose their own individual identities. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was noticed. There was a trend by occupational categories, as follows: 40% of the legislators agreed, 48.5% disagreed and 11.4% neither

agreed nor disagreed; 82% of the trustees were in favor, 16% were opposed and 2% had no opinion; 65% of the administrators agreed, 26.8% disagreed and 8.2% had no opinion; 62.1% of the faculty supported the statement, 30.3% were opposed, and 7.6% rendered no opinion; the final category, "other," 26.7% agreed, 66.7% disagreed, and 6.7% neither agreed nor disagreed that if merged under one board of trustees the various institutions would lose their individual identities.

An overwhelming majority of all respondents, 79.9% disagreed, 10.6% agreed, and 9.5% had no opinion that the legislative branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions. The chi-square analysis indicates no significant difference by the occupational categories. The analysis by occupation category indicated that 31.4% of the legislators, 90% of the trustees, 86.6% of the administrators, 86.6% of the faculty and 73.4% of the category "other" disagreed that the legislative branches should have more to say in the operation of public higher education institutions.

The results from the survey indicated that 79.2% of the respondents disagreed, 10.6% agreed, and 10.2% had no preference as to the statement that the executive branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions. The chi-square analysis has revealed no significant difference of opinion in the occupational categories. The findings by occupation developed a trend indicating that 37.2% of the legislators disagreed, 28.6% had no opinion, and 34.4% agreed; 92% of the trustees disagreed, 4% neither

agreed nor disagreed, 4% agreed; 82.5% of the college administrators disagreed, 9.3% rendered no opinion, 8.3% agreed, 86.5 of the faculty disagreed, 7.5% had no opinion, 6% agreed; 80% of the category "other" were opposed, 6.7% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 13.3% were in favor that the executive branch should have more to say in the operation of institutions.

Eighteen percent of the respondents agreed, 24.1% rendered no opinion, and 57.9% disagreed that the Secretary of Education's office is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was determined. When analyzing the data by occupation, some interesting patterns were noted. Fifty-one percent of the legislators, 38% of the trustees, 71.3% of the administrators, 47.7% of the faculty, and 100% of the category "other" did not agree that the Secretary of Education's office is performing an important coordinating function.

The findings indicated that 52.8% of all occupational categories disagreed, 28% agreed, and 19.2% did not have an opinion as to the statement that the Board of Higher Education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was computed. The occupation analysis indicated that 42.9% of the legislators, 42% of the trustees, 63.9% of the administrators, 49.3% of the faculty and 60% of the category "other"

disagreed that the Board of Higher education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in the Commonwealth.

Fifty-nine percent of the respondents favored, 32% were opposed, and 8.8% rendered no opinion on the statement that one agency in the Commonwealth should coordinate all program development in public higher education. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was noted. A review by occupation indicated that 68.6% of the legislators agreed, 50% of the trustees agreed, 62.2% of the administrators favored, 55.2% of the faculty agreed, and 66.1% of the category "other" agreed that one agency should coordinate program development in public higher education.

The results of the survey indicated that 80.3% of the respondents agreed, 17.8% disagreed, and 1.9% had no opinion regarding the statement that upon receipt of the annual appropriation, and in the framework of accountability, individual institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was determined by occupational categories. There were mixed opinions when analyzing the occupational categories: 60% of the legislators disagreed, while 90% of the trustees, 91.7% of the administrators and 86.4% of the faculty supported the concept that upon receipt of annual appropriation, institutions should have the autonomy to allocate funds using the institution's discretion.

Sixty-four percent of the respondents had a negative opinion and 32.4% were in favor of the Board of Regents having institutional representation with voting privileges. A chi-square analysis was performed, and no significant difference was found. When analyzing the occupational statistics, 71% of the legislators and 59% of the faculty supported institutional representation, while 59% of the trustees and 74% of the administrators were opposed.

Sixty percent of all the survey respondents indicated that the responsibility or authority of the Board of Regents with respect to budget should be prior approval, but after approval there should be no involvement in daily management. A review of the occupational data indicated that 63% of the trustees and 69% of the administrators had the same opinion as the majority of all respondents. On the other side, the majority of legislators (57%), and faculty (47%), indicated that the Board of Regents' responsibility or authority with respect to budget should only be to coordinate all budgets and make institutional recommendations.

The chi-square test was conducted and there was no significant difference determined, although the findings do reveal a pattern worthy of note, as 56.8% of the occupational categories surveyed were of the opinion that the authority of the Board of Regents, with respect to state authorized personnel, should be a coordinating function. The next statement selected most often by respondents was

no authority over personnel, and the statement selected least was to have the Regents given full authority and absolute control over all state-authorized personnel.

Similar findings indicated that 62.2% of the respondents did not agree, 36% agreed and 1.8% had no opinion on the statement that membership on the local Board of Trustees should have institutional employee representation. A review of the data by occupation revealed that 71% of the legislators and 53% of the faculty supported employee membership on the local boards, while 79% of the trustees and 70% of the administrators were opposed to institutional employee representation on the local Board of Trustees.

The study revealed that 55.9% of the survey participants indicated that membership on the local Board of Trustees at each institution should have student representation. A review of the respondents by occupation indicated 100% of the legislators, 84% of the trustees and 53% of the faculty were in favor of student representation on local boards. There were 57% of the administrators opposed to students having a seat on the local Board of Trustees.

There were mixed opinions on the question, "Is Massachusetts public higher education better coordinated, more accountable and generally a better system due to enacted reorganization?" Of the legislators surveyed, 50% indicated "Yes" and 50% had no opinion. The Trustees surveyed indicated 74% "No," 21% "Yes," and 5% had no preference. Fifty-seven percent of the college administrators

responded "Yes" while 43% either indicated "No" or "No Opinion." Of the final category, faculty, 41% responded "Yes" and 59% responded either "No" or "No Opinion."

C. Implications

The findings of the study have substantiated that the 1980 reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts was not based on opinions and communication from people in the field of public higher education. There were significant discrepancies between the problems in public higher education, the expectations of people in the field, and the actual legislation that was signed into law by the legislative and executive branches. The following are the implications of the findings in this study:

1. The opinions in the prelegislative study revealed that the type of structure for a state like Massachusetts appears to be a coordinating board with separate segmental boards for the Universities, state colleges, and community colleges. There are many precedents, nationally, for creating semi-autonomous segments within a state, each with a unique goal, curriculum and general education requirements, that support a specialized mission. Obviously, the segmental mission must complement the overall aims of the Commonwealth, which is that no citizen of the state should be denied an opportunity for a college education.

2. The data show that the aim of reorganization appears to be more centralization of the decision-making process so that coordination will result in the politically hoped for cost savings for the Commonwealth. It is interesting to note that after reorganization there are in fact more boards, more diversity of decision and an uncertainty about centralization.
3. The findings of both the prelegislative and postlegislative surveys indicate that politicians are the real decision makers of basic policy for public higher education in Massachusetts. These political decision makers are jeopardizing the development of the Commonwealth's most important resource by interfering with the future of public colleges and universities. This can be seen for example in the legislative erosion of fiscal autonomy in public higher education. When it came to developing a governing structure for Massachusetts, the majority of the survey group except legislators were opposed to a single board. The expressed opinions were not what were put into legislation. When it came to the appointment of board members, the majority of respondents except legislators, were opposed to having the governor make appointments and favored the judicial appointment system. Once again, when the legislation was enacted, the governor was given full authority to appoint all board members, despite other opinion favoring the judicial appointment system. When it came to the opinion concerning the loss of individual

institution identity if all institutions were merged under one board, most respondents, again except legislators, were of the opinion that institutions would lose identity; legislative opinion prevailed once more, and passed into law a single board.

4. The findings on the prelegislative and postlegislative surveys uncover a strong concern for the lack of financing for public higher education and the lack of planning and coordination within the system. The postlegislative survey reveals that the Board of Regents should coordinate institutional personnel, but leave personnel management to the institution. It also indicated that the Regents should coordinate programs and make recommendations to institutions. When the legislation was enacted, it gave full authority and absolute control over personnel and program planning and institutional survival to the Regents, which is not the opinion or expectations of the survey group. When it came to the statement that institutions should have flexibility to allocate funds after appropriation without legislative or executive control, the survey participants favored this freedom. However, when legislation was enacted, it was written so the legislature controls the personnel and utility accounts and gives institutions approximately 8% of their budget to manage.
5. The findings did reveal an agreement on some general issues. For example, there should be student representation on the boards; there should be no employee representation on boards;

there should be different admission policies which will address the Commonwealth's students; that faculty and administrators are held in high esteem; and that state higher education personnel are not overpaid.

6. The opinions on the prelegislative questionnaire of the legislators surveyed revealed that they favored consolidations and closings of public higher education institutions. Using the latest survey tool as a barometer, this researcher predicts there may be consolidations and closings in the future. The opinions of the experts in the field of education and the general public will have little effect in attempting to overturn legislative action.

D. Discussion

Last year the legislature and Governor King reduced the size of the Commonwealth's public higher education system from seven administrative bodies to one. The outside section of the fiscal 1981 budget was used as the vehicle to reorganize public higher education. Even while the special commission was at work studying the whole subject, the legislature by fiat caused the reorganization. The move was defended on the grounds that it finally rationalized the hodge-podge of overlapping educational jurisdictions in the Commonwealth.

This researcher is not going to defend the duplication of effort and waste within the state's public higher education system,

and that consolidations of institutions are made necessary by declining enrollments. However, using the state budget as the reorganization tool while established commissions in the field are working on comprehensive proposals does not necessarily result in the wisest choice or a deed done in the taxpayers' best interest.

Ever since March 1, 1981, when reorganization was implemented, much that is questionable has happened:

- The appointment process of the membership to the Regents and the institutional local trustees is political, and many appointees are not knowledgeable about nor advocates for higher education.

- There was a delay in the appointment of a Chancellor and then the appointment of Paul Guzzi, without much prior experience in education, to pilot the course of reorganization in its early stage of development.

- Some of the leadership roles on the Regents' staff have been taken over by employees of the Board of Higher Education and other defunct boards whose function had been questioned prior to reorganization.

The new Regents first act was to increase tuition at all state higher education institutions, generating an estimated \$14 million dollars in additional state revenue, which does not go to the institutions, but to the state's general fund. The same new board does not support new scholarship aid to offset the impact of increased tuitions. The risk is that public education will not serve the less financially able families for whom private colleges are out of reach.

When it came to the Regents' appointment of the critical post of Chancellor, the board split on the various candidates and finally drafted a compromise candidate, John B. Duff, President of Lowell University. Dr. Duff assumed his new office on June 1 as the key position in the new Board's governing structure.

Throughout history Massachusetts has looked at reorganization as a means of solving problems. In higher education this can be seen in the Willis-Harrington Act, the former reorganization plan, and now in the current reorganization plan that was legislated in an outside section of the fiscal 1981 budget. People in and out of the field of education have many expectations with what was wrong with education, and how these problems should be resolved. This researcher realizes that everyone's opinion could not be sought, nor could everyone's expectations be met. It is quite obvious, after reviewing the legislation and comparing it with the pre-legislative opinions and expectations that many, many problems were not even systematically considered by the legislative body that was making the decision to reorganize public higher education. Many of these problems uncovered could have been more systematically addressed without going through a major restructuring of public higher education. Change for the sake of change is not a good concept, and in retrospect, it seems that is what Massachusetts has done--made change, as desired by a few important political figures and not for the betterment of the system or the Commonwealth. If carried to some of its logical conclusions the reorganization may cause major dislocations in public higher education.

This researcher feels strongly that there may never be a full recovery after such a major setback for higher education in Massachusetts. If a concerned legislature and the people in the field of education can just hold this system together for the time being, there is bound to be another major reorganization in the near future. What leads me to believe that there may be another major reorganization are the following:

1. Lack of emergence of leadership at the Board of Regents. Staff roles are not clearly defined and functioning well, and Chancellor Duff has taken a two- year leave of absence from Lowell University.
2. One of the major reasons why reorganization was put into effect was to take the power away from five segments and coordinate them under one segmental board. The effect of the action of the Regents has given the power back to the local Boards of Trustees at each institution. In effect, we now have 28 segments functioning individually, developing policies, setting fees, and just possibly changing the intent of reorganization.
3. There is a lack of understanding on the part of people in the field of higher education of what reorganization is all about, what direction they are going in, and dissatisfaction that they had no input into their destiny. The first concern may be from the students about the various fee structures established by local boards at the different institutions, the various policies at various institutions and the lack of coordination in programs.

4. Another issue will come if the Board of Regents take back the fiscal autonomy from the local Boards of Trustees. These Trustees may then go up in arms and fight with the legislature to retain their power.
5. Because the legislators hold the pursestrings, there is bound to be some consolidation of programs and some closing of institutions. This will upset some legislators, whose constituencies are affected, which in turn will encourage significant political debates on the future of public higher education in Massachusetts.
6. Another problem area will be the different collective bargaining contracts and the differing pay scales that have been established for University, state college and community college personnel.

The next time Massachusetts decides to reorganize its public higher education system, the researcher fervently hopes it will do some planning--it will look at the real issues that are affecting the system, and correct those problems in a system context. It should recognize the people in the field of higher education and utilize their expertise to develop the entire system. When reorganizing, tough decisions will have to be made, but as long as there is consideration of full data and consideration of the expertise of individuals in the field of public higher education, people affected will have less legitimate cause for dissatisfaction.

E. Recommendations

Based on the evidence uncovered in this thesis, this researcher makes the following recommendations.

1. That the statute be changed so that the Board of Regents will restrict from its membership anyone employed by any institution of higher education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (private or public sector).
2. That the statute be changed to allow college personnel to be members of local Boards of Trustees to facilitate communication.
3. That the Board of Regents establish an impartial citizens panel to recommend procedures for the consolidation and closings of institutions that will take place in the future.
4. That the statute be changed so the Board of Regents become a coordinating board with enforcement power. That there be a separate segmental governing board for the universities, state colleges and community colleges. That the local board power and authority be clearly defined.
5. The the Board of Regents be given sufficient authority to carry out their prescribed responsibilities.
6. That a screening and selection process similar to the judicial process for the members of the Board of Regents and segmental boards be established.
7. That there be a student representative on the various segmental boards and a student representative on each local board.

8. That the Commonwealth develop a centralized admission department which will make the students aware of the various programs in the public higher education segment. The admission's department should inform the students of the various financial aid programs at institutions to allow the student his choice of the best atmosphere to achieve success, without causing a hardship on the student, being unfair to the faculty, and creating a financial burden for the taxpayer.
9. That a committee of public college and University personnel be appointed to evaluate the impact or probable consequences of decisions of reorganization of public higher education and assess its effectiveness. This committee should recommend short-term changes that are needed, with an eye toward future restructuring of post-secondary education.

F. Additional Research

...
The restructuring of public higher education nationally is a relatively new frontier about which very little empirical research exists. This allows an opportunity to further the investigation of the area. The following suggestions might be made to future researchers:

1. A study could be done of the political and psychological reasons why legislators, trustees, faculty and administration responded as they did to the questions on the surveys.

2. A study could be done of various boards, their decision-making procedures, their political make-up, their assumed and real authority.
3. A study of public higher education employees' concept of reorganization or restructuring is in order to see why employees didn't get involved in a process that was affecting their lives and to see whether these employees see themselves as part of the decision-making procedure or alienated from it.
4. A study could be conducted using the same survey instruments, in states that are in the process of reorganizing their public higher education system, to determine if similar attitudes and expectations are similar or different nationally.
5. A study could be conducted to analyze the decision-making process used in the Willis-Harrington reorganization, and the process used in the 1980 reorganization to evaluate technique or lack of it.
6. A study could be done of the various post-secondary structures nationally. The factors that control these variations, and why they work or do not work for the state they are in could be studied.
7. A study could be conducted of the political attitudes toward public and private higher education in the Commonwealth and how these attitudes affect funding, flexibility and the future.
8. A study could be used for the development of a future reorganizational model that would be beneficial to the Commonwealth and more rational in planning.

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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF THE DIMENSIONS AND SCOPE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN MASSACHUSETTS AND NATIONALLY

Enrollment Data (HEGIS 1978)Total Enrollment Figures

Public Sector	165,120	45%
Independent Sector	200,854	55%
Total	365,974	100%

Total Undergraduate Enrollment

Public Sector	142,491	48%
Independent Sector	152,511	52%
Total	295,002	100%

Total Graduate Enrollment

Public Sector	16,141	25%
Independent Sector	48,343	75%
Total	64,484	100%

Full and Part Time Undergraduate Enrollment

	<u>Full Time</u>		<u>Part Time</u>	
Public	89,363	43%	53,128	62%
Independent	120,095	57%	32,416	38%
Total	209,458	100%	85,544	100%

Full and Part Time Graduate Enrollment

	<u>Full Time</u>		<u>Part Time</u>	
Public	3,176	10%	7,186	36%
Independent	30,609	90%	12,965	64%
Total	33,785	100%	20,151	100%

MIGRATION OF STUDENTS IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION INTO AND OUT OF
MASSACHUSETTS

	<u>Student Residents</u> ¹	<u>Out Migration</u>	<u>In Migration</u>	<u>Net</u>
Private Colleges/Univ.	162,777	37,873	85,885	48,012
Public Colleges/Univ.	<u>188,596</u>	<u>26,953</u>	<u>12,587</u>	<u>-14,366</u>
TOTAL	351,373	64,826	98,472	33,646

Peterson, R.J., Smith, C.R.
Migration of College students
National Center for Education Statistics
Washington, DC 1975

¹Students residing in the state who are studying
in or out of state.

Faculty Data (HEGIS 1978)Full Time Faculty And Percentage of Tenured Faculty in
The Five Public Segments

	Full Time Faculty	Tenured	Percentage
State Colleges	1654	1278	77%
Community Colleges	1179	793	67%
University of Mass.	1588	1184	75%
Amherst	1230	978	80%
Boston	358	206	58%
Lowell	399	309	77%
Southeastern Massa- chusetts University	301	212	70%

Financial Data (State Budget)State Appropriations for Maintenance and Operations By
Segment (excluding appropriations for libraries and
Student Aid*)

	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80
State Colleges	63,129,109	65,012,500	73,165,000
Community Colleges	49,025,381	49,905,460	56,257,686
Lowell	17,973,653	19,024,528	21,030,500
SMU	11,246,500	12,398,916	13,850,000
U/Mass	108,263,603	118,255,015	125,321,872
Total	249,638,246	264,596,419	289,625,058

*These figures do not include maintenance of continuing education programs which are self-supporting.

State Appropriations for Student Financial Aid

	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80
BHE-administered programs	13,363,750	14,115,000	14,625,000
All others	5,483,680	5,749,551	6,342,500

State Appropriations for Maintenance of Segmental Offices and BHE*

	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80
SCS Office	880,000	983,500	975,000
U/Mass Office	990,494	1,027,250	900,000
MBRCC Office	665,500	1,000,000	960,000
BHE Office	600,000	770,000	810,000
Total	3,135,994	3,780,750	3,645,000

*NOTE: The above figures exclude appropriations for the State College Computer Center

MASSACHUSETTS STATE BUDGET
AND HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total State Budget (In Billions)</u>	<u>Higher Education appropriation (In Millions)</u>	<u>Percent of Higher Ed.</u>
1974	\$ 2.94	\$ 204.4	7.0
1975	3.55	232.1	6.5
1976	3.62	233.6	6.5
1977	4.08	249.6	6.1
1978	4.45	269.8	6.1
1979*	5.03	289.5	5.8
1980*	5.41	313.9	5.8

Source: Executive Budget Recommendations, House #1,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Annual reports: 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980

* This represents the beginning appropriation for higher education. The rest of the appropriations include supplementary funding during the respective fiscal years.

DIFFERENTIAL RATIO OF TUITION AND FEES BETWEEN
INDEPENDENT AND PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN
MASSACHUSETTS ACADEMIC YEARS 1973/74 and 1979/80

	Academic Year <u>1973/1974</u>	Academic Year <u>1979/1980</u>
Comprehensive universities	6.2	5.3
Colleges (4 year)	6.4	5.4
Colleges (2 year)	4.9	6.9
Professional and specialized Colleges	3.9	4.1

The ratios are calculated from two sources:

- (1) Student expenses at Postsecondary Institutions 1973-74,
College scholarship Service of the College Entrance
Examination Board, NY 1973.
- (2) "Tuition and Fees at more than 1800 colleges", The
Chronicle of Higher Education, May 29, 1979.

Degrees Awarded (HEGIS 1978)Total Number of Degrees Awarded By Level

	Associate	Bachelor	Master	Doctor
Public	8,853	13,690	2,726	352
Independent	5,098	24,575	11,590	1,501
Total	13,951	38,265	14,316	1,953

Academic Disciplines Conferring Largest Number of Baccalaureate Degrees (In Rank Order)

<u>Public</u>	<u>Independent</u>
1. Education	1. Social Sciences
2. Business	2. Business
3. Social Sciences	3. Engineering
4. Psychology	4. Letters
5. Health Professions	5. Education

Academic Disciplines Conferring Largest Number of Master's Degrees (In Rank Order)

<u>Public</u>	<u>Independent</u>
1. Education	1. Business
2. Business	2. Education
3. Engineering	3. Engineering
4. Social Sciences	4. Public Affairs
5. Health Professions	5. Health Professions

U.S. POPULATION: 1975-2000*

(Millions)

<u>Age</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>2000</u>
0-4	16	20	20	18
5-17	50	45	49	53
18-64	125	142	149	160
65+	<u>22</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>31</u>
TOTAL	213	234	247	262

Median Age
(Years)

28.8	31.1	32.3	34.8
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
* "Projections of Population of the United States: 1975-2050," Current Populations Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No. 601. These projections are based on the following assumptions: (1) fertility rates will continue at the replacement level, with 2.1 children born to each woman; (2) there will be no significant increase in life expectancy and (3) net immigration will continue at present rates, approximately 400,000 annually.

EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON EARNINGS OF
FULL-TIME, YEAR-ROUND CIVILIAN
WORKERS, 25 YEARS AND OLDER**

<u>Educational Attainment</u>	<u>Median Income</u>	
	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
8 Years Elementary	\$ 5,606	\$ 9,891
4 Years High School	7,150	12,642
4 or More Years College	10,357	17,188
All Educational Levels	7,370	12,786

** "A Statistical Portrait of Women in the U.S.," Current Population Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 58, 1976.

HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENT IN
THE U.S. BY SEX AND AGE GROUP,
1967 to 1977



* New England Board of Higher Education analysis and depiction of U.S. Census Bureau data.

FEDERAL BUDGET AND HIGHER
EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total Federal Budget (In Billions)</u>	<u>Higher Education appropriation (In Millions)</u>	<u>Percent of Higher Ed.</u>
1973	\$ 246.5	\$ 1,714	.69
1974	268.4	1,901	.70
1975	324.6	2,284	.67
1976	366.5	2,174	.57
1977	411.2	2,926	.70
1978	440.0	3,597	.79
1979*	512.7	5,943	1.15

Source: Digest of Educational Statistics,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
Annuals 1975, 1976 and 1977

* President's budget request

Please note that figures represent current dollar

MASSACHUSETTS POPULATION: 1975-2000*

(Thousands)

<u>Age</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>2000</u>
0-4	433	470	496	469
5-19	1603	1331	1332	1432
20-64	3198	3629	3732	3929
65+	<u>671</u>	<u>778</u>	<u>829</u>	<u>838</u>
TOTAL	5,905	6,208	6,389	6,668

Median Age
(Years)

28.1	31.0	32.4	35.3
------	------	------	------

* ALVIN J. SANDERS
Office of State Planning
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1975
Please note that median age is calculated
on the basis of a 5 year interval.

APPENDIX B

STATES RANKED BY TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
AND TYPE OF CONTROL

STATES RANKED BY TOTAL NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS AND TYPE OF CONTROL¹⁷

California	193	Coordinating Board
New York	189	Coordinating Board
Pennsylvania	138	Coordinating Board
Texas	124	Coordinating Board
Illinois	113	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
North Carolina	112	Governing Board
Ohio	111	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Massachusetts	95	Coordinating Board
Michigan	78	Coordinating Board
Wisconsin	66	Governing Board
Virginia	66	Coordinating Board
Florida	63	Other (see Appendix C)
Missouri	59	Coordinating Board
Iowa	58	Governing Board
Tennessee	57	Coordinating Board
Georgia	57	Governing Board
Indiana	53	Coordinating Board
Minnesota	52	Coordinating Board
New Jersey	52	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Kansas	51	Governing Board
Alabama	51	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
South Carolina	50	Coordinating Board
Connecticut	45	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Washington	44	Coordinating Board
Mississippi	42	Governing Board
Maryland	42	Coordinating Board
Oklahoma	41	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Kentucky	40	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Oregon	34	Coordinating Board
Colorado	31	Coordinating Board
Louisiana	27	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Nebraska	26	Coordinating Board
West Virginia	25	Governing Board
Arkansas	25	Coordinating Board
New Hampshire	23	Coordinating Board
Vermont	21	Other (see Appendix C)
Maine	18	Governing Board
Arizona	17	Governing Board
New Mexico	16	Coordinating Board
North Dakota	15	Governing Board
South Dakota	14	Governing Board
Utah	13	Governing Board
Hawaii	13	Governing Board
Montana	11	Governing Board
Rhode Island	9	Governing Board
Idaho	9	Governing Board
Delaware	9	Other (see Appendix C)
Wyoming	8	Other (see Appendix C)
Alaska	8	Governing Board
Nevada	6	Governing Board

¹⁷ Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, p. 28.

APPENDIX C

STATES WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURES

OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES ¹⁸

Delaware	No statewide agency - 3 governing boards
Florida	State Board of Education is the governing board for all public education; prepares a consolidated budget. Under the jurisdiction of this board are the Board of Regents of the State University System and the Division of Community Colleges. Both of these have program approval powers and prepare a consolidated budget.
Vermont	No statewide agency -- two governing boards.
Wyoming	No statewide agency -- separate Community College Commission and BOT for University of Wyoming

¹⁸ Department of Postsecondary Education, Education Commission of the States, State Postsecondary Education Profiles Handbook, Denver, Colorado, 1979.

APPENDIX D

PERCENT OF FTE ENROLLMENT IN THE INDEPENDENT
SECTOR AND THE TYPE OF CONTROL STRUCTURE

States in Descending Order by Percentage of Student FTE in Independent
Institutions/Type of Governance/Coordination Structure

Massachusetts	57%	Coordinating Board
Rhode Island	53%	Governing Board
Vermont	44%	Other
New York	43%	Coordinating Board
New Hampshire	43%	Coordinating Board
Pennsylvania	41%	Coordinating Board
Connecticut	40%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Utah	38%	Governing Board
Iowa	31%	Governing Board
Missouri	30%	Coordinating Board
South Dakota	30%	Governing Board
Maine	29%	Governing Board
Illinois	28%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Indiana	26%	Coordinating Board
New Jersey	26%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Tennessee	26%	Coordinating Board
Minnesota	25%	Coordinating Board
Ohio	25%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Idaho	23%	Governing Board
North Carolina	23%	Governing Board
South Carolina	23%	Coordinating Board
Florida	20%	Other
Georgia	20%	Governing Board
Nebraska	20%	Coordinating Board
Kentucky	18%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Arkansas	16%	Coordinating Board
Delaware	15%	Other
Maryland	15%	Coordinating Board
Michigan	15%	Coordinating Board
Oklahoma	15%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Virginia	15%	Coordinating Board
West Virginia	15%	Governing Board
Alabama	14%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Louisiana	14%	Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Texas	14%	Coordinating Board
Wisconsin	14%	Governing Board
California	13%	Coordinating Board
Kansas	13%	Governing Board
Oregon	13%	Coordinating Board
Washington	12%	Coordinating Board
Mississippi	11%	Governing Board
Colorado	10%	Governing Board
Montana	10%	Governing Board
Alaska	9%	Governing Board
North Dakota	7%	Governing Board
Hawaii	6%	Governing Board
New Mexico	5%	Coordinating Board
Arizona	4%	Governing Board
Nevada	1%	Governing Board
Wyoming	0%	Other

APPENDIX E

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AS A
PERCENTAGE OF STATE GENERAL REVENUE

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE
OF STATE GENERAL REVENUE, 1974-75¹⁹

South Dakota	36.5%	Governing Board
Nebraska	32.2%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Oregon	26.5%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Oklahoma	24.8%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Idaho	23.7%	Governing Board
Indiana	22.3%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Montana	21.7%	Governing Board
Kansas	21.5%	Governing Board
Colorado	20.7%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Tennessee	20.1%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Texas	20.1%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Washington	19.3%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Wyoming	19.3%	Other
Alabama	19.0%	Advisory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Wisconsin	19.0%	Governing Board
Arizona	18.9%	Governing Board
Nevada	18.9%	Governing Board
Utah	18.9%	Governing Board
Arkansas	18.5%	Advisory Coordinating Board
West Virginia	18.5%	Governing Board
Kentucky	18.1%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Florida	18.0%	Other
Mississippi	17.9%	Governing Board
Michigan	17.8%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Iowa	17.6%	Governing Board
Virginia	17.3%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
North Carolina	16.9%	Governing Board
California	16.7%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Missouri	16.4%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
South Carolina	16.4%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Georgia	15.6%	Governing Board
Illinois	15.0%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
New Mexico	15.0%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
North Dakota	14.4%	Governing Board
Alaska	14.1%	Governing Board
Maine	14.0%	Governing Board
Maryland	13.0%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Ohio	12.4%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Vermont	12.2%	Other
Delaware	12.0%	Other

¹⁹ Data provided by Lyman Glenny and Associates, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, except for Texas, Wyoming, Alaska and New Hampshire.

²⁰ Estimated from U. S. National Center for Education Statistics and U. S. Bureau of the Census Data

Louisiana	20	11.3%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated
New Hampshire		11.3%	Advisory Coordinating Board Budget
New York		11.3%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
New Jersey		10.5%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated
Connecticut		10.2%	Regulatory Coordinating Board/Consolidated Budget
Minnesota		10.1%	Advisory Coordinating Board
Hawaii		9.9%	Governing Board
Pennsylvania		9.5%	Regulatory Coordinating Board
Rhode Island		8.4%	Governing Board
Massachusetts		8.3%	Regulatory Coordinating Board

²¹ Estimated from U. S. National Center for Education Statistics and U. S. Bureau of the Census Data.

APPENDIX F
ANALYSIS OF STATE REVENUE IN COMPARISON
TO CONTROL STRUCTURES

χ^2 QUINTILE

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	TOTAL
COORDINATING BOARD WITHOUT CONSOLIDATED BUDGET						
Observed	5	3	5	2	5	20
Expected	4	4	4	4	4	
GOVERNING BOARDS						
Observed	4	5	3	4	2	18
Expected	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	
COORDINATING BOARDS WITH CONSOLIDATED BUDGET						
Observed	1	1	1	1	1	8
Expected	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	
OTHER						
Observed	0	1	1	2	0	4
	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	
	10	10	10	10	10	50

 $\chi^2 = 9.3$

12 df

 $\chi^2 = 21.03$

ACCEPTED HYPOTHESIS - NO RELATIONSHIP IN THE ABOVE TABLE

APPENDIX G

COVER LETTER FORWARDED TO STATE LEGISLATORS, MEMBERS
OF THE SEGMENTAL BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC
COLLEGE FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION

James J. Pasquini
State House Room 473G
Boston, Massachusetts 02113

*Advisor/Special Commission to
Reorganize Higher Education
617/727-2584*

*Assistant Dean of Administrative Services
Berkshire Community College
West Street, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201
413/499-4660*

SURVEY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION ISSUES
IN MASSACHUSETTS

As the Special Commission to Reorganize Public Higher Education in Massachusetts begins its work, it is important to know how people feel about various issues affecting the present or possible future status of public higher education.

Currently I am working for Representative Frank J. Matrangola, who is Co-Chairman of this Special Commission.

Your response to the attached questionnaire will provide an overview of attitudes to the Special Commission and data that will be useful to me in completing my doctoral dissertation at the University of Massachusetts.

This questionnaire will take less than fifteen minutes of your time to complete. Your answers will be strictly confidential; you are asked not to put your name on this survey. If you would like a copy of the results send me a stamped, addressed envelope at a later date.

When you complete this survey, please return it to me in the enclosed stamped, addressed envelope. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

James J. Pasquini

APPENDIX H
THE PRELEGISLATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

A Survey of Attitudes Towards Public Higher Education Issues in Massachusetts

Think in terms of "Massachusetts Public Higher Education." Please read each statement and indicate by a checkmark whether you "strongly agree," "generally agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "generally disagree," or "strongly disagree." If you would like to make comments about any statement do so in space provided below check off boxes for that statement.

Check (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Each of the thirty institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should have its own local board of trustees with full governing authority.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The University of Massachusetts, the University of Lowell, South-eastern Massachusetts University, the fifteen community colleges and the ten state colleges are currently governed by five separate boards of trustees. Public higher education should be structured under one single board of trustees.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. All members of the boards of trustees at public institutions of higher education should be appointed by the Governor.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Public higher education should be organized into geographic regions, not into segments such as the University of Massachusetts as one segment, the University of Lowell as another segment, South-eastern University as another segment, the ten state colleges as another and the fifteen community colleges as a final segment.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Currently some members of the various public higher education boards of trustees are employed by private colleges and universities. They should be allowed to make policy for institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. There should be a screening and selection process similar to the judicial system when appointing members of the boards of trustees for institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Members of the boards of trustees should be nominated by the Governor, but confirmed by the Legislative branch.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. The University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell and South-eastern Massachusetts University should be coordinated under one board of trustees.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. If the public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board of trustees, the various institutions would lose their own individual identities.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Unions have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Students have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. The Legislative Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. The Executive Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Check (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree
14. All of the Massachusetts State Colleges should have Masters Degree granting authority.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. The University of Massachusetts should have sole authority on awarding Doctoral Degrees in public institutions in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. The Secretary of Education's office is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. The Board of Higher Education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. The central office staff of the state college system is important to the coordination of the ten state colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. The central office staff of the community college system is important to the coordination of the fifteen community colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. Public higher education has good representation or lobbying at the State House.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. Public institutions within forty miles of one another should not offer the same technical and professional programs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. One agency in the Commonwealth should coordinate all program development in public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. College administrators should be held more accountable to the board of trustees for their management decisions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Catering to local needs or localism is an important aspect to Massachusetts public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. Students who attend either the state colleges or the community colleges suffer from the fact that their institutions do not carry the prestige of the state university.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. As enrollments decline, we should reduce the size and offerings at the institutions of public higher education and not close any institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. There are eight institutions of public higher education within Route 128; this is too many for the region.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. All thirty of the institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should be given university status.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. We should develop all five public segments into one university system.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. Institutions of public higher education are functioning satisfactorily and no major changes are warranted at the present time.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. Given the fine graduate programs offered by private colleges and universities in Massachusetts, the public colleges and universities should not offer graduate programs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. There should be free tuition for Massachusetts residents at all institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. Non-residents of the commonwealth attending institutions of public higher education should be charged the full cost of tuition.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. There should be a graduated tuition charge; that is, a system such as the graduated income tax, where students pay that percentage of the tuition that their family income warrants.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Check (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree
35. Every resident in Massachusetts graduating from high school should receive a voucher to cover the cost of four years of earlier public or private higher education in Massachusetts, which would allow the student freedom of choice.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36. Given the current tuition charges in Massachusetts' institutions of public higher education, additional public funds should not be used for scholarships.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37. Upon receipt of the annual appropriation, and in the framework of accountability, individual institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38. Each institution of public higher education should have the authority and the autonomy to solicit private funds to be used at the discretion of the institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39. College faculty at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40. College presidents at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41. Administration and faculty at all thirty institutions of public higher education that perform comparable work should be at the same respective pay level.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42. The high cost of private college or university education is concurrent with the quality.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a public university than it is at a community college.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a state college than it is at a community college.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
45. The quality of teaching is better at a public university than it is at a state college.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
46. Public higher education should put less emphasis on administrators and more emphasis on faculty and student service personnel.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
47. Collective bargaining contracts have facilitated faculty responsiveness to student needs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48. Faculty tenure should be maintained even though collective bargaining contracts exist in public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49. Access to an institution of public higher education should be available to all residents of Massachusetts seeking admission, regardless of their qualifications.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50. There should be very strict admission standards established for the three public universities.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51. There should be very strict admission standards established for the ten state colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
52. The University of Massachusetts should provide the research to solve social problems.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53. Competition for students between public and private institutions is good.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



APPENDIX I

THE PRELEGISLATIVE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE

Classification Data

In order to place your attitudes into a group with others would you please also complete the following:

1.) Into what group does your age fall?

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Under 20 | <input type="checkbox"/> 28-32 | <input type="checkbox"/> 40-44 | <input type="checkbox"/> 52-56 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20-24 | <input type="checkbox"/> 32-36 | <input type="checkbox"/> 44-48 | <input type="checkbox"/> 56-60 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 24-28 | <input type="checkbox"/> 36-40 | <input type="checkbox"/> 48-52 | <input type="checkbox"/> 60 or over |

2.) Sex? ☐ Female ☐ Male

3.) Are you employed?

- | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> Full-time | <input type="checkbox"/> Part time |
| <input type="checkbox"/> No | | |

4.) Occupation?

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Legislator | <input type="checkbox"/> Faculty |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Board of Trustee | <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> College Administrator | |

5.) Did you attend or are you attending?

- | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Level Completed | | | |
| | 1st yr. | 2nd yr. | 3rd yr. | 4th yr. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private college or university | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Public college or university | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neither | <input type="checkbox"/> Graduate School | | | |

6.) Do you intend in the future to take any courses in a public institution of higher education in Massachusetts?

- ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, toward what degree with a major in what area?

7.) What was your approximate family income for the last year?

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> under \$8,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$15,001-\$18,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$24,001-\$27,000 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$8,001-\$12,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$18,001-\$21,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$27,001-\$30,000 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$12,001-\$15,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$21,001-\$24,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$30,001 or more |

8.) What was the last grade of school your father completed?

- | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grade School | <input type="checkbox"/> Some College | Level or Year | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jr. High School | <input type="checkbox"/> Completed College | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> High School | <input type="checkbox"/> Graduate School | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | | |

9.) What was the last grade of school your mother completed?

- | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grade School | <input type="checkbox"/> Some College | Level or Year | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jr. High School | <input type="checkbox"/> Completed College | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> High School | <input type="checkbox"/> Graduate School | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | | |

10.) Have you ever thought seriously about reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts before completing this questionnaire? ☐ Yes ☐ No

APPENDIX J

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (SPSS) OF THE
PRELEGISLATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR005	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE ¹	7.2 5.7	34.6 13.0	30.8 1.2	23.1 9.0	3.8 6.7	26 3.8
GENERALLY AGREE ²	22.6 14.1 4.3	19 35.8 7.2	10 18.9 3.8	9 17.0 3.4	3 5.7 1.1	53 20.1
NEITHER AGREE NO ³	4 21.1 11.6 1.5	5 25.1 10.0 1.9	5 26.1 7.2 1.9	3 15.3 4.5 1.1	2 10.5 13.3 .8	19 7.2
GENERALLY DISAGR ⁴	11 18.0 31.4 4.2	7 11.5 19.0 2.7	20 32.8 23.6 7.6	20 32.8 29.9 7.6	1 4.9 28.0 1.1	61 23.1
STRONGLY DISAGRE ⁵	6 5.7 17.1 2.1	10 3.7 23.8 1.8	54 51.4 55.7 20.5	29 27.6 43.3 11.0	6 5.7 40.0 2.1	105 39.8
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	50 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 45.77532 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0001

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR008	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE ¹	9 13.6 3.4	7 10.6 2.7	32 48.5 12.2	13 19.7 5.0	5 7.6 1.9	66 25.2
GENERALLY AGREE ²	9 12.9 25.7 3.4	6 8.6 12.0 2.3	27 38.6 28.1 10.3	21 30.0 31.8 8.3	7 10.0 46.7 2.7	70 26.7
NEITHER AGREE NO ³	5 16.1 14.3 1.9	4 12.9 8.0 1.5	10 32.3 10.4 3.8	11 35.5 16.7 4.2	1 3.2 6.7 .4	31 11.8
GENERALLY DISAGR ⁴	5 11.4 14.3 1.0	11 25.0 22.0 4.2	15 34.1 15.6 5.7	12 27.3 18.2 4.6	1 2.3 6.7 .4	64 26.8
STRONGLY DISAGRE ⁵	7 13.7 20.0 2.7	22 43.1 44.0 8.4	12 23.9 12.5 4.6	9 17.6 13.6 3.4	1 2.3 6.7 .4	51 19.5
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.4	50 19.1	96 36.6	66 25.2	15 5.7	262 100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 38.10181 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0015

The code VAR at the top of the left hand column on the tables in appendix J refer to the prelegislative survey questionnaire number.

	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRJSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR009	TOT PCT	1	2	3	4	5	
1.	7	22	41	20	4		94
STRONGLY AGREE	7.4 20.0 2.7	23.4 44.0 1.4	43.6 42.3 15.6	21.3 30.3 7.6	4.3 26.7 1.5		35.7
2.	7	19	22	21	0		69
GENERALLY AGREE	10.1 20.4 2.7	27.5 34.0 7.2	31.9 22.7 8.4	30.4 31.8 8.0	0 0 0		26.2
3.	4	5	8	5	1		19
NEITHER AGREE NO	11.4 1.5	2.0 .4	8.2 3.0	7.6 1.9	6.7 .4		7.2
4.	17	5	16	11	9		54
GENERALLY DISAGR	24.1 37.1 4.9	3.3 13.0 1.9	29.6 16.5 6.1	20.4 16.7 4.2	16.7 66.0 3.4		20.5
5.	4	3	10	9	1		27
STRONGLY DISAGRE	14.8 11.4 1.5	11.1 5.0 1.1	37.0 13.3 1.8	33.3 13.6 3.4	3.7 6.7 .4		10.3
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	50 19.0	97 36.9	66 25.1	15 5.7		263 100.0
RAM CHI SQUARE = 30.56215 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0001							

RAM CHI SQUARE = 38.56215 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0013

	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR010	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.		
STRONGLY AGREE	3 5.5 8.6 1.1	9 16.4 14.0 3.4	36 65.5 37.1 13.6	5 9.1 7.5 1.3	2 3.6 13.3 .8		55 20.8
GENERALLY AGREE	7 14.6 20.8 2.7	13 27.1 25.0 6.9	21 43.8 21.6 9.0	4 8.3 6.0 1.5	3 6.3 20.0 1.1		48 18.2
NEITHER AGREE NO	9 22.0 25.7 3.4	8 19.5 16.0 3.8	12 29.3 12.4 6.5	9 22.0 13.4 3.4	3 7.3 26.0 1.1		41 15.5
GENERALLY DISAGR	13 15.1 37.1 4.9	17 19.8 34.0 5.4	23 26.7 23.7 8.7	27 31.4 40.3 18.2	6 7.0 40.0 2.3		86 32.6
STRONGLY DISAGRE	1 8.8 8.6 1.1	1 9.8 5.0 1.1	5 14.7 5.2 1.9	22 64.7 32.8 8.3	1 2.9 6.7 .4		34 12.9
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	50 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7		264 100.0
KAM CHI SQUARE = 64.55246 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .000							

RAM CHI SQUARE = 64.55246 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

	COUNT ROW COL TOT	PCT PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRJSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR011			1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY AGREE ¹			18.2 11.4 1.5	9.1 4.8 .8	58.0 11.1 4.2	18.2 6.3 1.5	4.5 8.7 .4	22 9.3
GENERALLY AGREE ²			24.0 17.1 2.3	20.0 18.0 1.9	24.0 6.2 2.3	24.0 9.0 2.3	8.0 13.1 .8	25 9.5
NEITHER AGREE NO ³			17.8 22.9 3.0	17.8 16.0 3.0	28.1 13.4 4.9	26.1 17.9 4.5	10.9 33.3 1.9	46 17.4
GENERALLY DISAGR ⁴			9.4 31.4 4.2	19.7 46.0 8.7	43.6 52.6 19.3	22.2 38.8 9.8	5.1 40.0 2.3	117 44.3
STRONGLY DISAGRE ⁵			11.1 17.1 2.3	22.2 24.0 4.5	29.6 16.5 6.1	35.2 28.4 7.2	1.9 6.7 .4	54 20.5
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	50 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0		
RAW CHI SQUARE = 18.40927 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .3005								

RAM CHI SQUARE = 18.40927 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .3005

	COUNT		LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW
	COL	PCT	DR	TRJSTEE	ADMINIST			TOTAL
	TOT	PCT						
VAR014			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE ^{1.}	2	4	22	9	3		40	
	5.0	13.0	55.0	22.5	7.5		15.3	
	5.7	8.0	23.2	13.4	20.0			
	.8	1.5	8.4	3.4	1.1			
GENERALLY AGREE ^{2.}	6	15	31	21	4		77	
	7.8	19.5	40.3	27.3	5.2		29.4	
	17.1	19.0	32.6	31.1	26.7			
	2.3	5.7	11.8	8.0	1.5			
NEITHER AGREE NO ^{3.}	10	8	15	11	4		48	
	20.8	16.7	31.3	22.9	8.1		18.3	
	28.6	16.0	15.8	16.4	26.7			
	3.8	3.1	5.7	4.2	1.5			
GENERALLY DISAGR ^{4.}	11	13	15	19	3		61	
	18.0	21.3	24.6	31.1	4.9		23.3	
	31.4	26.0	15.8	28.4	20.0			
	4.2	3.0	5.7	7.3	1.1			
STRONGLY DISAGRE ^{5.}	6	10	12	7	1		36	
	16.7	27.8	33.3	19.4	2.8		13.7	
	17.1	21.0	12.6	18.4	6.7			
	2.3	3.8	4.6	2.7	.4			
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	95	67	15		262	
	13.4	13.1	36.3	25.6	5.7		100.0	
RAM CHI SQUARE = 20.64065 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1924								

RAM CHI SQUARE = 20.64065 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1924

VAR015	COUNT						ROW TOTAL
	LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER						
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.		
STRONGLY AGREE	8.7	13.0	22	12	2	46	
	11.4	12.0	47.8	26.1	4.3	17.6	
	1.5	2.3	23.4	17.9	13.3		
			3.4	6.6	6		
GENERALLY AGREE	13.2	10	33	16	0	68	
	25.7	14.7	48.5	23.5	0	25.1	
	3.4	21.0	35.1	23.9	0		
		1.8	12.6	6.1	0		
NEITHER AGREE NO	5	4	11	7	5	32	
	15.6	12.5	34.4	21.9	15.6	12.3	
	14.3	8.8	14.7	18.4	22.4		
	1.9	1.5	4.2	2.7	1.9		
GENERALLY DISAGR	12	14	20	18	7	71	
	16.9	19.7	28.2	25.4	9.9	27.2	
	34.3	28.0	21.8	24.9	46.7		
	4.6	5.4	7.7	6.9	2.7		
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	16	8	14	1	44	
	11.4	35.4	18.2	31.8	2.1	16.9	
	14.3	32.0	8.5	20.9	6.7		
	1.9	6.1	3.1	5.4	6.6		
COLUMN TOTAL	13.4	19.2	36.8	25.7	15	261	
					5.7	100.0	

RAW CHI SQUARE = 34.16344 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0052

	COUNT	LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW
	ROW PCT	OR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			TOTAL
VAR020	TOT PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	38.5 14.3 1.9	7.7 2.0 .4	15.4 2.1 .8	23.1 6.5 1.1	15.4 13.3 .8	13 5.0
GENERALLY AGREE	2.	30.2 45.7 6.1	14 25.4 5.4	11 20.8 11.6 6.2	8 15.1 11.9 3.1	4 7.5 26.7 1.5	53 20.3
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.	6 12.8 17.1 2.3	10 21.3 3.8	14 29.8 14.7 5.4	13 27.7 19.4 5.0	4 8.5 26.7 1.5	47 18.0
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.	6 17.1 2.3	16 32.7 6.1	37 41.1 38.3 14.2	27 38.0 40.3 18.3	4 6.4 26.7 1.5	90 34.5
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.	3.2 5.7 .8	8 15.3 3.1	31 53.4 32.6 11.9	16 27.6 23.9 6.1	1 1.7 6.7 6.6	58 22.2
COLUMN TOTAL		13.4	18.8	36.4	25.7	5.7	261
RAW CHI SQUARE =		47.88426	WITH	16	DEGREES OF FREEDOM.	SIGNIFICANCE =	.0001

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1. LEGISLAT TRUSTEE	2. BOARD OF ADMINIST	3. COLLEGE FACULTY	4. OTHER	5. TOTAL
VAR021	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
STRONGLY AGREE	32.8 22.9 3.1	16.4 8.0 1.5	24.0 6.4 2.3	24.0 9.3 2.3	4.0 6.7 .6
GENERALLY AGREE	14.6 40.0 5.4	22.9 46.0 9.4	30.2 30.9 11.1	27.1 38.8 10.3	5.2 33.3 1.9
NEITHER AGREE NO	20.7 17.1 2.3	20.7 12.0 3.3	24.1 7.4 2.7	17.2 7.5 1.3	5.2 33.3 1.9
GENERALLY DISAGR	8.5 20.0 2.7	17.3 28.0 5.4	46.4 38.3 11.8	24.7 29.9 7.7	4.9 26.7 1.5
STRONGLY DISAGRE	0 0 0	13.3 8.0 1.5	53.3 17.0 6.1	18 14.3 3.8	0 0 0
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.4	50 13.2	94 16.0	67 25.7	15 5.7
					261 100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 32.85526 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0098

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1. LEGISLAT TRUSTEE	2. BOARD OF ADMINIST	3. COLLEGE FACULTY	4. OTHER	5. TOTAL
VAR023	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
STRONGLY AGREE	7 11.9 20.3 2.7	16 27.1 32.0 6.1	20 33.9 21.3 7.7	13 22.0 19.4 5.0	3 5.1 20.0 1.1
GENERALLY AGREE	22 21.0 62.9 8.4	20 13.0 48.8 7.7	27 25.7 28.7 10.3	29 27.6 43.3 11.1	7 6.7 46.7 2.7
NEITHER AGREE NO	3 7.0 8.6 1.1	10 23.3 23.0 3.8	16 37.2 17.0 6.1	11 25.6 16.4 4.2	3 7.3 20.0 1.1
GENERALLY DISAGR	2 5.3 5.7 .8	4 10.5 8.0 1.5	21 55.3 22.3 8.0	10 26.3 14.9 3.8	1 2.6 6.7 .4
STRONGLY DISAGRE	1 6.3 2.9 .4	0 0 0 0	10 62.5 13.6 3.8	4 25.0 6.3 1.5	1 6.3 6.7 .4
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.4	50 13.2	94 16.0	67 25.7	15 5.7
					261 100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 26.89058 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0427

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR025	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	1	2	9	10	4	26
	2.9	4.0	9.5	14.9	15.4	3.9
	1	1	3.4	3.8	1.5	
GENERALLY AGREE	15	21	38	21	4	71
	31.6	30.0	28.4	22.4	20.8	27.1
	4.2	5.7	10.3	5.7	1.1	
NEITHER AGREE NO	4	6	13	9	3	35
	11.6	17.1	37.1	25.7	8.6	13.6
	1	1	13.7	13.4	20.8	
GENERALLY DISAGR	17	21	26	23	4	91
	18.7	23.1	20.6	25.3	4.6	34.7
	4.6	4.8	27.4	14.3	26.7	
	6.5	8.8	9.9	8.8	1.5	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	2	6	20	10	1	39
	5.1	15.4	51.3	25.6	2.1	14.9
	1	1	21.1	14.3	6.7	
	1	2.3	7.6	3.8	1.1	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	58	95	67	15	262
	13.4	13.1	16.3	25.6	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 21.25398 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1690

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR027	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	4	7	13	12	6	40
	10.0	17.5	32.5	30.0	10.0	15.2
	11.4	14.0	13.5	17.9	26.7	
	1.5	2.7	4.9	4.6	1.5	
GENERALLY AGREE	10	13	23	16	6	66
	15.2	19.7	34.8	24.2	6.1	25.1
	28.6	25.0	24.0	23.3	26.7	
	3.8	4.9	8.7	6.1	1.5	
NEITHER AGREE NO	10	11	24	18	6	67
	14.9	16.4	35.8	26.9	6.0	25.5
	28.6	22.0	25.0	26.9	26.7	
	3.8	4.2	9.1	6.8	1.5	
GENERALLY DISAGR	9	13	26	12	3	63
	14.3	20.6	41.3	19.0	4.8	24.0
	25.7	25.0	27.1	17.9	20.0	
	3.4	4.9	9.9	4.6	1.1	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	2	6	10	9	0	27
	7.4	22.2	37.0	33.3	0	10.3
	5.7	12.0	13.4	13.4	0	
	1	2.3	3.8	3.4	0	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	58	96	67	15	263
	13.3	13.0	36.5	25.5	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 7.58741 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .9612

VAR028	LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER						ROW TOTAL
	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT		
	ROW PCT	COL PCT	ROW PCT	COL PCT	ROW PCT		
TOT PCT	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1		
STRONGLY AGREE	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.3	0.0	3.5	
	0.0	0.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	1.1	
	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.5	0.0		
	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.4	0.0		
GENERALLY AGREE	2.2	0.0	8.8	1.3	1.3	12.6	
	16.7	0.0	66.7	8.3	8.3	6.6	
	5.7	0.0	8.3	1.5	6.7		
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4		
NEITHER AGREE NO	6.2	7.7	3.3	7.7	2.2	13.6	
	46.2	2.8	23.1	7.7	15.2	6.9	
	17.1	0.4	3.1	1.5	13.3		
	2.3	0.0	1.1	0.6	0.0		
GENERALLY DISAGR	10.1	12.2	23.1	22.2	5.6	71.0	
	14.1	16.9	32.4	31.0	5.6	27.0	
	28.6	26.0	24.0	32.8	26.7		
	3.8	6.6	8.7	8.4	1.5		
STRONGLY DISAGRE	17.1	37.7	68.8	42.2	8.0	164.0	
	18.4	22.6	36.6	25.6	4.9	62.4	
	48.6	76.0	62.5	62.7	53.3		
	6.5	16.1	22.8	16.8	3.0		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	96	67	15	263	
TOTAL	13.3	19.8	36.5	25.5	5.7	100.0	

RAM CHI SQUARE = 28.39673 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .029

RAW CHI SQUARE = 28.39673 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0293

VAR029	COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW PCT	COL PCT	OR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			
	TOT PCT		1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	1.1	16.7	0	0	12	6	2	24
		11.4	0	0	12.5	9.1	13.3	3.2
		1.5	0	0	4.6	2.3	.8	
GENERALLY AGREE	2.2	12.5	3.4	34.4	11	13	1	32
		11.4	5.0	11.5	40.6	19.7	3.1	12.2
		1.5	1.1	4.2	5.0	6.7	.4	
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.3	28.6	3.3	33.7	7	4	2	21
		17.1	6.8	7.3	19.0	6.1	9.5	8.0
		2.3	0	2.7	1.5	13.3	.8	
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.4	11	12	25	17	6		69
		15.9	17.4	36.2	26.6	5.8		26.3
		31.4	24.0	26.0	25.8	26.7		
		4.2	6.6	9.5	6.5	1.5		
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.5	10	33	41	26	6		116
		8.6	28.4	35.3	22.4	5.2		44.3
		28.6	66.0	42.7	39.4	40.0		
		3.8	12.6	15.6	9.3	2.3		
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	96	66	15		262
		13.4	19.1	36.6	25.2	5.7		100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 25.03874 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0691

	COUNT ROW COL TOT	PCT PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR030			1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY AGREE ¹	8.3	1	3.3	58.3	25.0	0	12	
	2.0	2.0	7.3	1.1	0	4.6		
	.4	.4	2.7	1.1	0			
GENERALLY AGREE ²	0	6	12.0	8	16.9	2	25	
	0	34.6	8.3	13.4	13.3	3.5		
	0	2.3	3.0	3.4	.8			
NEITHER AGREE NO ³	22.2	6	25.9	18.5	29.6	3.7	27	
	17.1	5	14.0	5.2	11.9	6.7	10.3	
	2.3	2.3	2.7	1.9	3.0	.4		
GENERALLY DISAGR ⁴	19.3	19	19.4	43.3	18.5	6.8	124	
	54.3	54	45.0	52.1	34.3	53.3	47.1	
	7.2	7.2	9.1	19.0	8.7	3.0		
STRONGLY DISAGRE ⁵	12.0	9	12	26	24	5.4	75	
	25.7	25	16.0	34.7	32.0	26.7	28.5	
	3.4	3.4	4.6	9.9	9.1	1.5		
COLUMN TOTAL	13.3	35	19.0	36.5	25.5	5.7	100.0	

RAM CHI SQUARE = 18.49573 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .2957

	COUNT		LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
	ROW TOT	PCT PCT						
VAR031			1.1	2.	3.1	4.1	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE ^{1.}	0	0	0	50.0	1	1	0	2
	0	0	0	1.0	50.3	1.5	0	.8
	0	0	0	.4	.5	.3	0	
GENERALLY AGREE ^{2.}	3	27.3	2	18.2	2	3	1	11
	8.6	8.6	6.0	3.1	4.5	6.7	6.2	
	1.1	1.1	.8	.8	1.1	.6		
NEITHER AGREE NO ^{3.}	4	57.4	1	14.3	1	0	1	7
	11.4	11.4	2.0	1.0	0	0	6.7	2.7
	1.5	1.5	.6	.4	0	.4		
GENERALLY DISAGR ^{4.}	19	34.5	12	21.8	16	4	7.3	55
	54.3	54.3	24.0	16.7	6.0	26.7	20.9	
	7.2	7.2	4.6	6.1	1.5	1.5		
STRONGLY DISAGRE ^{5.}	9	25.7	35	76	59	9	188	
	4.8	4.8	19.6	48.4	31.4	4.8	71.5	
	3.4	3.4	13.3	28.9	22.4	3.4		
COLUMN	35		58	96	67	15	263	
TOTAL	13.3		19.0	36.5	25.5	5.7	100.0	

RAM CHI SQUARE = 59.82197 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

VAR032	COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW PCT	PCT FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST				
	TOT PCT	TOT PCT	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	1	25.0	25.0	30.0	20.0	0	0	7.6
		14.3	10.0	6.3	6.0	0	0	
		1.9	1.9	2.3	1.5	0	0	
GENERALLY AGREE	2	7.7	15.2	38.4	46.2	0	0	13
		2.9	6.8	4.2	9.0	0	0	4.9
		0	0	1.9	2.3	0	0	
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	0	22.2	44.4	22.2	11.1	0	3.9
		0	6.0	4.2	1.0	6.7	0	
		0	0	1.5	0.8	0.4	0	
GENERALLY DISAGR	4	12	15	38	21	4	0	90
		13.3	16.7	42.2	23.0	4.4	0	34.2
		34.3	38.0	39.6	31.3	26.7	0	
		4.6	5.7	14.4	8.0	1.5	0	
STRONGLY DISAGR	5	17	26	44	34	10	0	131
		13.0	19.8	33.6	26.0	7.6	0	49.8
		40.6	52.0	45.8	58.7	66.7	0	
		6.5	3.9	16.7	12.9	3.8	0	
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	96	67	15	0	263
		13.3	19.8	36.5	25.5	5.7	0	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 12.08937 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .7378

VAR033	COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW PCT	PCT FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST				
	TOT PCT	TOT PCT	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	1	10.8	12	31	17	6	0	74
		22.9	16.3	41.9	23.0	8.1	0	20.1
		3.0	4.6	11.8	6.5	2.3	0	
GENERALLY AGREE	2	15	25	32	23	4	0	99
		15.2	25.3	32.3	23.2	4.0	0	37.6
		42.9	50.8	33.3	34.3	26.7	0	
		5.7	9.5	12.2	8.7	1.5	0	
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	2	1	9	8	2	0	22
		9.1	6.5	40.9	36.4	9.1	0	8.4
		5.7	2.0	9.4	11.9	13.3	0	
		0	0	3.4	3.0	0	0	
GENERALLY DISAGR	4	7	11	17	11	2	0	48
		14.6	22.9	39.4	22.9	4.2	0	18.3
		28.0	32.0	17.7	16.4	13.3	0	
		2.7	4.2	6.5	4.2	0.8	0	
STRONGLY DISAGR	5	3	1	7	8	1	0	20
		15.0	5.0	35.0	40.0	5.0	0	7.6
		8.6	2.0	7.3	11.9	6.7	0	
		1.1	0.4	2.7	3.0	0.4	0	
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	96	67	15	0	263
		13.3	19.8	36.5	25.5	5.7	0	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 14.47702 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .5632

	COUNT ROW COL TOT	PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR034								
1. STRONGLY AGREE	7	25.9	23.8	25.9	14.8	3.7	10.4	
	20.0	2.7	3.1	2.7	1.5	.4		
2. GENERALLY AGREE	12	34.3	21.9	28.1	28.1	3.2	24.6	
	4.6	5.4	28.0	19.4	26.9	13.3		
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	5	20.0	9.3	25.0	33.3	12.3	9.2	
	14.3	1.9	4.0	6.9	11.9	20.0		
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	7	9.7	22.16	33.3	29.5	5.6	27.7	
	20.0	2.7	32.0	25.0	31.3	26.7		
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	5.5	13.7	52.1	21.9	6.0	28.1	
	14.3	1.5	20.0	40.9	23.9	33.0		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	100.0	50	93	67	15	260	
			13.5	19.3	35.0	25.0	5.0	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 28.11858 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0306

	COUNT ROW COL TOT	PCT PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR035								
1. STRONGLY AGREE	2	18.2	18.2	63.6	0	0	11	
	5.7	6.1	7.4	2.7	0	0	6.2	
2. GENERALLY AGREE	6	33.3	8.3	33.3	25.3	0	12	
	14.3	1.5	2.0	6.2	4.5	0	6.6	
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	5	20.0	20.0	24.6	20.0	8.0	25	
	14.3	1.9	10.2	6.3	10.4	13.3	9.6	
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	6	7.1	25.9	34.1	29.4	3.5	45	
	17.1	2.3	44.9	30.5	37.3	20.0	32.6	
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	18	14.1	14.0	38.3	25.0	7.0	128	
	51.4	6.9	38.0	51.6	47.8	66.7	49.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	100.0	49	95	67	15	261	
			13.4	18.0	36.4	25.7	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 21.36535 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1649

		LEGISLATIVE BOARD OF COLLEGE TRUSTEE ADMINIST					OTHER	ROW TOTAL	
COUNT		ROW PCT	COL PCT	TOT PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
VAR036		COL PCT	TOT PCT						
STRONGLY AGREE		19.0 11.4 1.5	8.0 0.0 0.0	11.1 11.3 4.2	14.3 4.9 1.1	14.3 20.0 1.1	21.0 8.8		
GENERALLY AGREE		11.0 11.4 1.5	17.6 12.0 2.1	16.1 16.3 6.1	14.7 7.5 1.2	8.8 20.0 1.1	34.0 12.9		
NEITHER AGREE NO		18.0 5.7 .8	25.0 10.0 1.9	35.0 7.2 2.7	20.4 8.8 1.5	10.0 13.3 .8	20.0 7.6		
GENERALLY DISAGRE		16.7 48.6 6.4	18.6 20.0 5.3	32.0 34.0 12.5	34.0 52.2 13.3	3.9 26.7 1.5	103.0 33.0		
STRONGLY DISAGRE		9.3 22.9 3.0	29.1 50.0 3.5	34.9 30.9 11.4	23.3 29.9 7.6	3.5 20.0 1.1	86.0 32.6		
COLUMN TOTAL		35 13.3	58 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0		
RAM CHI SQUARE =		27.51000	WITH	16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM,	SIGNIFICANCE =	.36			

VAR038	COUNT		LEGISLATIVE BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW PCT	COL PCT	3R	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			
	TOT PCT		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	5.7 20.0 2.7	23 46.0 9.7	58 59.0 22.1	32 48.5 12.2	3 20.0 1.1	123 46.8	
GENERALLY AGREE	2.	12.4 36.3 4.6	21 21.6 8.0	32 33.0 12.2	23 23.7 8.7	9 9.3 3.4	97 36.9	
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.	3 8.6 1.1	0 0 0	7 16.7 2.1	5 6.7 2.5	2 13.3 4.8	12 4.6	
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.	9 37.5 25.7 3.4	6 25.0 12.0 2.3	6 16.7 4.1 1.5	5 20.8 7.6 1.9	0 0 0 0	24 9.1	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.	57.1 11.4 1.5	0 0 0	14.3 1.0 .4	14.3 1.5 .4	14.3 6.7 .4	7 2.7	
COLUMN TOTAL		35 13.3	58 19.0	97 36.9	66 25.1	15 5.7	263 100.0	

RAM CHI SQUARE = 51.82436 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1	LEGISLAT		BOARD OF		COLLEGE		FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
		FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST						
VAR039		1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1				
1. STRONGLY AGREE		0	1	1	0	3				2
		0	2.0	58.0	1.0	0				
		0	.4	.4	0	0				
2. GENERALLY AGREE		33.3	22.2	44.4	3	0				3.4
		8.6	6.8	6.1	0	0				
		1.1	.8	1.5	0	0				
3. NEITHER AGREE NO		24.0	26.0	29.0	2	6				25
		17.1	12.0	7.2	3.0	16.0				9.5
		2.3	2.3	2.7	0	26.7				
4. GENERALLY DISAGR		19	26	37	9	6				97
		19.6	28.8	38.1	9.3	6.2				36.7
		7.2	9.8	14.0	3.4	2.3				
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE		7	15	48	56	5				131
		5.3	11.5	36.6	42.7	3.8				49.6
		20.0	30.0	49.5	83.6	33.3				
		2.7	5.7	18.2	21.2	1.9				
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	97	67	15				264
		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7				100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 60.96843 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1	LEGISLAT		BOARD OF		COLLEGE		FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
		FOR	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST						
VAR040		1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1				
1. STRONGLY AGREE		0	2	7	9	2				16
		0	12.5	18.8	56.3	12.5				6.1
		0	6.8	3.1	13.4	13.3				
			.8	1.1	3.4	.8				
2. GENERALLY AGREE		25.7	17.1	25.7	22.9	3				35
		25.7	12.0	3.4	11.9	8.6				13.3
		1.4	2.3	1.4	3.0	1.1				
3. NEITHER AGREE NO		10	6	13	11	6				42
		23.8	9.5	31.0	26.2	9.5				16.0
		3.8	1.5	4.9	4.2	1.5				
4. GENERALLY DISAGR		10	22	35	16	3				86
		11.5	25.6	40.7	18.6	3.5				32.7
		28.6	44.0	36.5	23.9	20.0				
		3.8	8.4	13.3	6.1	1.1				
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE		6	16	16	23	3				84
		7.1	13.0	42.9	27.4	3.6				31.9
		17.1	32.0	37.5	34.3	20.0				
		2.3	6.1	13.7	8.7	1.1				
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	96	67	15				263
		13.3	13.0	36.5	25.5	5.7				100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 32.84632 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0077

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1	2	3	4	5	ROW TOTAL
VAR041	1.7	2.1	3.1	4.1	9.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	3	8	33	28	3	75
	4.0	13.7	44.0	37.1	4.0	28.4
	8.6	16.0	34.0	41.8	20.0	
	1.1	3.0	12.5	10.6	1.1	
2. GENERALLY AGREE	18	22	44	18	8	102
	16.8	20.6	41.1	16.8	6.7	40.5
	31.4	46.0	65.6	26.9	33.1	
	6.8	8.3	16.7	6.8	1.9	
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	7	3	7	6	3	26
	26.9	11.5	26.9	23.1	11.5	9.8
	28.0	6.0	7.2	9.0	20.0	
	2.7	1.1	3.7	2.1	1.1	
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	7	13	9	10	2	41
	17.1	31.7	22.0	24.4	6.9	15.5
	28.0	28.8	3.1	14.9	13.1	
	2.7	6.9	3.4	3.8	.8	
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	0	6	6	5	2	15
	0	26.7	26.7	32.7	13.2	5.7
	0	8.0	6.1	7.5	13.1	
	0	1.9	1.5	1.9	.8	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	97	67	15	264
	13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 36.24038 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0027

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	1	2	3	4	5	ROW TOTAL
VAR042	1.7	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	0	0	50.0	50.0	0	2
	0	0	1.0	1.5	0	.8
	0	0	.4	.4	0	
2. GENERALLY AGREE	7	9	6	6	1	29
	24.1	31.0	21.7	28.7	3.4	11.0
	28.0	18.0	6.3	9.0	6.7	
	2.7	3.4	2.1	2.1	.4	
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	10	13	10	7	3	43
	23.3	33.2	23.3	16.3	7.0	16.3
	28.6	26.0	13.4	10.4	20.0	
	3.8	6.9	3.8	2.7	1.1	
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	18	14	38	23	4	97
	18.6	14.4	39.2	23.7	6.1	36.9
	51.4	29.0	39.6	34.3	26.7	
	6.8	5.3	14.4	8.7	1.5	
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	0	14	41	30	7	92
	0	15.2	44.6	32.6	7.6	35.0
	0	28.8	42.7	44.8	46.7	
	0	5.3	15.6	11.4	2.7	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	96	67	15	263
	13.3	19.0	36.5	25.5	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 39.87336 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0011

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR043	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY AGREE	0	2	4	3	1	10
	0	20.0	40.0	30.0	10.0	10.0
	0	4.0	8.1	6.5	2.7	13.4
	0	.8	1.5	1.1	.4	
GENERALLY AGREE	5	12	10	6	2	35
	14.3	36.3	28.6	17.1	5.7	13.4
	14.7	26.0	18.3	9.1	13.3	
	1.9	4.6	3.8	2.3	.8	
NEITHER AGREE NO	14	16	3	13	5	51
	27.5	31.6	9.9	25.9	9.8	19.5
	41.2	32.0	3.1	19.7	33.3	
	5.1	1.1	1.1	5.0	1.9	
GENERALLY DISAGR	12	15	31	15	0	73
	16.4	20.5	42.5	20.5	0	27.9
	35.2	30.8	32.0	22.7	0	
	4.6	5.7	11.8	5.7	0	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	3	5	49	29	7	93
	3.2	5.6	52.7	31.2	7.5	35.5
	8.8	10.8	58.5	43.9	46.7	
	1.1	1.9	18.7	11.1	2.7	
COLUMN TOTAL	34	50	97	66	15	262
	13.0	19.1	37.0	25.2	5.7	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 64.83976 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT FOR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR044	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY AGREE	0	1	4	2	1	8
	0	12.5	50.0	25.0	12.5	3.0
	0	2.0	6.1	3.0	6.7	
	0	.4	1.5	.8	.6	
GENERALLY AGREE	4	11	9	4	2	30
	13.1	36.7	38.0	13.1	6.2	11.4
	11.4	22.0	9.3	6.1	13.3	
	1.5	4.2	3.4	1.5	.8	
NEITHER AGREE NO	15	19	8	18	6	58
	25.9	32.8	13.8	17.2	10.3	22.1
	42.9	38.0	8.2	15.2	40.0	
	5.7	7.2	3.0	3.8	2.3	
GENERALLY DISAGR	12	12	27	28	0	71
	16.9	15.9	38.0	28.2	0	27.0
	34.3	24.0	27.8	30.3	0	
	4.6	4.6	10.3	7.6	0	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	4	7	49	30	6	96
	4.2	7.3	51.6	31.3	6.3	36.5
	11.4	14.0	50.5	45.5	40.0	
	1.5	2.7	18.6	11.4	2.3	
COLUMN TOTAL	35	50	97	66	15	263
	13.3	19.8	36.9	25.1	5.7	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 58.78420 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT	ROW TOT	PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR045								
1. STRONGLY AGREE	0	0	0	5	2	5	0	13
	0	0	0	10.0	2.1	9.1	0	4.9
2. GENERALLY AGREE	6	6	11	7	9	1	36	
	17.6	17.6	32.4	20.6	26.5	2.9	12.9	
	2.3	2.3	6.2	2.7	3.4	.4		
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	13	13	20	20	12	8	73	
	37.1	37.1	40.8	20.6	18.2	53.1	27.8	
	6.9	6.9	7.6	7.6	4.6	3.0		
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	13	13	11	19	15	3	70	
	37.1	37.1	22.0	41.4	21.4	4.3	26.6	
	6.6	6.6	6.2	11.0	5.7	1.1		
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	5	3	39	26	3	73	
	11.4	11.4	6.0	53.4	32.9	4.1	27.8	
	1.5	1.5	1.1	14.8	9.1	1.1		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	35	50	97	66	15	263	
	13.3	13.3	19.0	36.9	25.1	5.7	100.0	

RAW CHI SQUARE = 40.46315 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT	ROW TOT	PCT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR046								
1. STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	0	6	31	1	59	
	22.0	22.0	13.6	10.2	52.5	1.7	22.4	
	6.9	6.9	15.0	6.2	49.0	6.7		
2. GENERALLY AGREE	16	16	18	15	20	5	76	
	45.7	45.7	36.8	20.3	37.3	6.8	28.1	
	6.1	6.1	6.8	5.7	7.6	33.3		
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	5	5	10	24	7	6	52	
	14.3	14.3	19.2	46.2	13.5	11.5	19.8	
	1.9	1.9	3.8	24.7	18.6	4.0		
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	1	1	12	33	2	2	50	
	2.9	2.9	24.8	36.0	3.0	4.0	19.0	
	1.4	1.4	4.6	12.5	.8	13.3		
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	0	0	2	19	6	1	28	
	0	0	7.1	67.9	21.4	3.6	10.6	
	0	0	4.0	19.6	9.1	6.7		
	0	0	.8	7.2	2.3	4.4		
COLUMN TOTAL	35	35	50	97	66	15	263	
	13.3	13.3	19.0	36.9	25.1	5.7	100.0	

RAW CHI SQUARE = 93.08595 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
ROW	PCT	LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	
COL	PCT	TRUSTEE	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			
TOT	PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR047							
1.		0	0	28.2	71.5	0	7
STRONGLY AGREE		0	0	2.1	7.5	0	2.7
		0	0	.8	1.9	0	
2.		13.6	22.7	13.6	50.8	0	22
GENERALLY AGREE		8.6	18.2	3.1	16.4	0	8.4
		1.1	1.9	1.1	6.2	0	
3.		31.1	11.1	13.3	35.6	4	45
NEITHER AGREE NO		48.0	10.2	6.2	23.9	26.7	17.1
		5.3	1.9	2.1	6.1	1.5	
4.		12	25	27	19	7	90
GENERALLY DISAGR		13.3	27.8	30.8	21.1	7.8	36.2
		14.3	51.0	27.8	28.4	46.7	
		4.6	9.5	10.3	7.2	2.7	
5.		6	14	59	16	4	99
STRONGLY DISAGR		17.1	29.6	60.8	23.9	26.7	37.6
		2.3	5.3	22.4	6.1	1.5	
COLUMN TOTAL		38	49	97	67	15	263
		13.3	18.6	36.9	25.5	5.7	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 69.11241 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
ROW	PCT	LEGISLAT	BOARD OF	COLLEGE	FACULTY	OTHER	
COL	PCT	TRUSTEE	TRUSTEE	ADMINIST			
TOT	PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
VAR048							
1.		3	4	12	27	0	46
STRONGLY AGREE		6.5	9.7	26.1	58.7	0	17.4
		8.6	8.0	12.4	18.1	0	
		1.1	1.5	4.5	10.2	0	
2.		10	14	18	16	3	61
GENERALLY AGREE		16.4	21.0	23.5	26.2	4.0	23.1
		28.6	28.0	18.6	23.9	20.0	
		3.8	5.3	6.8	6.1	1.1	
3.		8	4	10	9	2	13
NEITHER AGREE NO		24.2	12.1	30.3	27.3	6.1	12.5
		22.9	8.0	18.3	13.4	13.3	
		3.0	1.5	3.8	3.4	.8	
4.		10	15	22	5	8	60
GENERALLY DISAGR		16.7	25.0	36.7	8.3	13.3	22.7
		28.6	38.0	22.7	7.5	53.3	
		3.8	3.7	8.3	1.9	3.0	
5.		4	13	35	10	2	64
STRONGLY DISAGR		6.3	28.3	54.7	15.6	3.1	24.2
		11.4	26.8	36.1	14.9	1.3	
		1.5	6.9	13.3	3.8	.8	
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	97	67	15	264
		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 68.35819 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

VAR049	COUNT	LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW
	ROW PCT	TRUSTEE ADMINIST					TOTAL
	COL PCT						
	TOT PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
1.							
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	1	7	16	13	2	39
	2.9	17.9	44.0	33.3	8.1		14.8
	.4	2.7	6.1	4.9	.8		
2.							
GENERALLY AGREE	2.	7	6	22	13	5	53
	13.2	11.3	41.5	24.5	9.6		28.1
	20.9	12.0	22.7	19.6	33.3		
	2.7	2.3	8.3	6.9	1.9		
3.							
NEITHER AGREE NO	3.	1	2	2	5	1	11
	9.1	18.2	18.2	45.5	9.1		6.2
	2.9	6.0	2.1	7.5	6.7		
	.4	.8	.8	1.9	.7		
4.							
GENERALLY DISAGR	4.	19	19	27	22	2	89
	21.3	21.3	39.3	24.7	2.3		33.7
	54.3	38.0	27.8	32.8	13.3		
	7.2	7.2	18.2	8.3	.8		
5.							
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5.	7	16	30	16	5	72
	9.7	22.2	41.9	19.6	6.9		27.3
	20.0	32.0	38.9	20.9	33.3		
	2.7	6.1	11.4	5.3	1.9		
COLUMN TOTAL		35	58	97	67	15	264
TOTAL		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	100.0

RAM CHI SQUARE = 21.29216 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1679

RAM CHI SQUARE = 21.29216 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1676

VAR050	COUNT	LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW
	ROW PCT	OR TRUSTEE ADMINIST					TOTAL
	TOT PCT	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	5	14	5	0	27
		11.1	19.5	51.9	18.5	0	10.2
		8.6	10.8	16.4	7.5	0	
		1.1	1.9	5.3	1.9	0	
GENERALLY AGREE	2	20	19	37	27	6	109
		18.3	17.4	33.9	24.8	5.5	41.3
		57.1	38.0	38.1	40.3	40.0	
		7.6	7.2	14.6	10.2	2.3	
NEITHER AGREE NO	3	5	2	7	15	1	30
		16.7	6.7	23.3	58.0	3.3	11.6
		14.3	6.0	7.2	22.6	6.7	
		1.9	.8	2.7	5.7	.4	
GENERALLY DISAGRE	4	7	21	24	14	7	73
		9.6	28.8	12.0	19.2	9.6	27.7
		20.8	42.8	24.7	20.9	46.7	
		2.7	8.0	9.1	5.3	2.7	
STRONGLY DISAGRE	5	0	3	15	6	1	25
		0	12.0	68.0	24.0	4.0	9.5
		0	5.0	15.5	9.0	6.7	
		0	1.1	5.7	2.3	.4	
COLUMN TOTAL		35	58	97	67	15	264
		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	100.0
24M CHI SQUARE = 12.88841 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0063							

RAM CHI SQUARE = 33.58843 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0063

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR051	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	15.4 5.7	39.5 17.8	30.8 14.1	15.2 3.0	3 0	13 4.9
2. GENERALLY AGREE	19.0 6.1	19.8 5.1	35.7 11.4	20.2 6.4	6.0 1.9	84 31.8
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	11.0 2.7	13.0 1.9	18.0 6.8	19 7.2	1 0	58 18.9
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	10.4 3.8	23.7 8.3	35.5 12.5	21.5 7.6	8.6 3.0	93 35.2
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	0 0	8.3 4.0	12.0 5.5	9 3.4	1 6.7	24 9.1
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	58 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 26.38844 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .0031

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	LEGISLAT OR	BOARD OF TRUSTEE	COLLEGE ADMINIST	FACULTY	OTHER	ROW TOTAL
VAR052	1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
1. STRONGLY AGREE	12.2 1.9	19.5 3.0	41.5 6.4	26.8 4.2	0 0	41 15.5
2. GENERALLY AGREE	13.8 6.4	13.8 6.4	41.5 20.5	23.6 11.8	6 2.3	123 46.6
3. NEITHER AGREE NO	14.3 3.0	21.4 4.5	28.6 6.1	23.2 4.9	12.5 4.7	56 21.2
4. GENERALLY DISAGR	12.3 0.6	25.0 12.0	16.7 4.1	37.5 13.4	2 13.3	24 9.1
5. STRONGLY DISAGRE	10.0 0.8	35.0 2.7	30.0 2.3	25.0 1.9	3 0	20 7.6
COLUMN TOTAL	35 13.3	58 18.9	97 36.7	67 25.4	15 5.7	264 100.0

RAW CHI SQUARE = 21.39276 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .1639

VAR053	COUNT		LEGISLAT BOARD OF COLLEGE FACULTY OTHER					ROW TOTAL
	ROW	PCT	TRUSTEE		ADMINIST		TOTAL	
	COL	PCT	1.I	2.I	3.I	4.I		
1.	STRONGLY AGREE	4.7	11.4	28.0	15.5	17.9	33.3	17.4
2.	GENERALLY AGREE	13.0	22.6	37.7	23.3	33.3	55.3	
3.	NEITHER AGREE NO	13.2	5.3	44.7	26.3	10.5	14.4	
4.	GENERALLY DISAGR	20.0	15.0	28.0	32.0	4.0	9.5	
5.	STRONGLY DISAGRE	22.2	11.1	33.3	33.3	0.0	1.4	
COLUMN TOTAL		35	50	97	67	15	264	
TOTAL		13.3	18.9	36.7	25.4	5.7	103.0	

RAW CHI_SQUARE = 15.59505 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .4815

RAM CHI_SQUARE = 15.59585 WITH 16 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = .4815

APPENDIX K

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS BY RESPONSE (IN PERCENTAGES)
AND SUMMARY OF CLASSIFICATION DATA

A Survey of Attitudes Towards Public Higher Education Issues In Massachusetts

Think in terms of "Massachusetts Public Higher Education." Please read each statement and indicate by a checkmark whether you "strongly agree," "generally agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "generally disagree," or "strongly disagree." If you would like to make comments about any statement do so in space provided below check off boxes for that statement.

Check (✓) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
1. Each of the thirty institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should have its own local board of trustees with full governing authority.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 16.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 43.2	
2. The University of Massachusetts, the University of Lowell, South-eastern Massachusetts University, the fifteen community colleges and the ten state colleges are currently governed by five separate boards of trustees. Public higher education should be structured under one single board of trustees.	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.6	.4
3. All members of the boards of trustees at public institutions of higher education should be appointed by the Governor.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 31.4	.4
4. Public higher education should be organized into geographic regions, not into segments such as the University of Massachusetts as one segment, the University of Lowell as another segment, South-eastern University as another segment, the ten state colleges as another and the fifteen community colleges as a final segment.	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 30.7	.8
5. Currently some members of the various public higher education boards of trustees are employed by private colleges and universities. They should be allowed to make policy for institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 39.8	
6. There should be a screening and selection process similar to the judicial system when appointing members of the boards of trustees for institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 38.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 5.3	.8
7. Members of the boards of trustees should be nominated by the Governor, but confirmed by the Legislative branch.	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.2	
8. The University of Massachusetts, University of Lowell and South-eastern Massachusetts University should be coordinated under one board of trustees.	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 16.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 19.3	.8
9. If the public universities, state colleges and community colleges were merged under one board of trustees, the various institutions would lose their own individual identities.	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	.4
10. Unions have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.9	
11. Students have too much to say about the daily management of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 44.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.5	
12. The Legislative Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 6.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 47.3	
13. The Executive Branch should have more say in the operation of public higher education institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/> 1.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 43.9	

Check (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
14. All of the Massachusetts State Colleges should have Masters Degree granting authority.	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 29.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 13.6	.8
15. The University of Massachusetts should have sole authority on awarding Doctoral Degrees in public institutions in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 16.7	1.1
16. The Secretary of Education's office is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 31.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.8	1.1
17. The Board of Higher Education is performing an important function in the coordination of public higher education in Massachusetts.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 28.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.9	1.1
18. The central office staff of the state college system is important to the coordination of the ten state colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 37.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 13.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 6.4	1.1
19. The central office staff of the community college system is important to the coordination of the fifteen community colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 37.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.4	.4
20. Public higher education has good representation or lobbying at the State House.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 34.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.0	1.1
21. Public institutions within forty miles of one another should not offer the same technical and professional programs.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 36.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 30.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.4	1.1
22. One agency in the Commonwealth should coordinate all program development in public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 40.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 21.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.6	.8
23. College administrators should be held more accountable to the board of trustees for their management decisions.	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 39.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 16.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 6.1	1.1
24. Catering to local needs or localism is an important aspect to Massachusetts public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 37.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 47.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 6.4	<input type="checkbox"/> .4	1.5
25. Students who attend either the state colleges or the community colleges suffer from the fact that their institutions do not carry the prestige of the state university.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 13.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 34.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.8	.8
26. As enrollments decline, we should reduce the size and offerings at the institutions of public higher education and not close any institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 19.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 40.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.0	1.5
27. There are eight institutions of public higher education within Route 128; this is too many for the region.	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	.4
28. All thirty of the institutions of public higher education in Massachusetts should be given university status.	<input type="checkbox"/> 1.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 62.1	.4
29. We should develop all five public segments into one university system.	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 43.9	.8
30. Institutions of public higher education are functioning satisfactorily and no major changes are warranted at the present time.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 47.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 28.4	.4
31. Given the fine graduate programs offered by private colleges and universities in Massachusetts, the public colleges and universities should not offer graduate programs.	<input type="checkbox"/> .8	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 2.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 71.2	.4
32. There should be free tuition for Massachusetts residents at all institutions of public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 34.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 49.6	.4
33. Non-residents of the commonwealth attending institutions of public higher education should be charged the full cost of tuition.	<input type="checkbox"/> 28.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 37.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	.4
34. There should be a graduated tuition charge; that is, a system such as the graduated income tax, where students pay that percentage of the tuition that their family income warrants.	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.7	1.5

Check (✓) Appropriate Box	Strongly Agree	Generally Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Generally Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
35. Every resident in Massachusetts graduating from high school should receive a voucher to cover the cost of four years of earlier public or private higher education in Massachusetts, which would allow the student freedom of choice.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 48.5	1.1
36. Given the current tuition charges in Massachusetts' institutions of public higher education, additional public funds should not be used for scholarships.	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 39.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.6	
37. Upon receipt of the annual appropriation, and in the framework of accountability, individual institutions should have the autonomy to allocate their funds without legislative or executive control.	<input type="checkbox"/> 44.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 1.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.2	.4
38. Each institution of public higher education should have the authority and the autonomy to solicit private funds to be used at the discretion of the institutions.	<input type="checkbox"/> 46.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 36.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2.7	.4
39. College faculty at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.	<input type="checkbox"/> .8	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 36.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 49.6	
40. College presidents at institutions of public higher education are paid too much.	<input type="checkbox"/> 6.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 13.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 32.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 31.8	.4
41. Administration and faculty at all thirty institutions of public higher education that perform comparable work should be at the same respective pay level.	<input type="checkbox"/> 28.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 40.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 5.7	
42. The high cost of private college or university education is concurrent with the quality.	<input type="checkbox"/> .8	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 16.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 36.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 34.8	.4
43. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a public university than it is at a community college.	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 13.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 19.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.2	.8
44. The quality of teaching during the first two years is better at a state college than it is at a community college.	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 36.4	.4
45. The quality of teaching is better at a public university than it is at a state college.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.7	.4
46. Public higher education should put less emphasis on administrators and more emphasis on faculty and student service personnel.	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 28.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 19.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.6	
47. Collective bargaining contracts have facilitated faculty responsiveness to student needs.	<input type="checkbox"/> 2.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.0	<input type="checkbox"/> 34.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 37.5	.4
48. Faculty tenure should be maintained even though collective bargaining contracts exist in public higher education.	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 23.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 12.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 22.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 24.2	
49. Access to an institution of public higher education should be available to all residents of Massachusetts seeking admission, regardless of their qualifications.	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 33.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.3	
50. There should be very strict admission standards established for the three public universities.	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 41.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 11.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 27.7	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	
51. There should be very strict admission standards established for the ten state colleges.	<input type="checkbox"/> 4.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 31.8	<input type="checkbox"/> 18.9	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	
52. The University of Massachusetts should provide the research to solve social problems.	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 46.6	<input type="checkbox"/> 21.2	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.1	<input type="checkbox"/> 7.6	
53. Competition for students between public and private institutions is good.	<input type="checkbox"/> 17.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 55.3	<input type="checkbox"/> 14.4	<input type="checkbox"/> 9.5	<input type="checkbox"/> 3.4	

APPENDIX K (Con't)

Classification Data

1. AGE GROUP:

Under 32	35
32 - 36	23
37 - 40	28
41 - 44	34
45 - 48	33
49 - 52	39
53 - 56	34
57 - 60	12
61 or over	26
Total	264

2. SEX:

Male	177
Female	85
No Response	2
Total	264

3. EMPLOYED:

Full Time	255
Part Time	2
No	6
No Response	1
Total	264

4. OCCUPATION:

Legislator	35
Board of Trustee	50
College Administrator	97
Faculty	67
Other	15
Total	264

5. COLLEGE ATTENDED

Private College or University	126
Public College or University	105
Neither	21
No Response	12
Total	264

APPENDIX K (Con't)

6. DO YOU INTEND TO TAKE ANY COURSES
IN A PUBLIC INSTITUTION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION IN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE
FUTURE

Yes	117
No	135
No Response	<u>12</u>
Total	264

7. INCOME:

\$12,001 - \$15,000	8
\$15,001 - \$18,000	15
\$18,001 - \$21,000	17
\$21,001 - \$24,000	38
\$24,001 - \$27,000	34
\$27,001 - \$30,000	21
\$30,001 - or more	127
No Response	<u>4</u>
Total	264

8. LAST GRADE OF SCHOOL FATHER
COMPLETED:

Grade School	61
Jr. High School	31
High School	66
Some College	27
Completed College	27
Graduate School	42
No Response	<u>10</u>
Total	264

9. LAST GRADE OF SCHOOL MOTHER
COMPLETED:

Grade School	44
Jr. High School	33
High School	98
Some College	39
Completed College	30
Graduate School	11
No Response	<u>9</u>
Total	264

10. REORGANIZATION:

Yes	245
No	<u>19</u>
Total	264

APPENDIX L
THE POST LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What should be the geographic distribution of the Board of Regents?

- ☐ a. a representative from each county
- ☐ b. a representative from the city or town in which the institution is located
- ☐ c. a regional geographic distribution which will result in a board that is smaller than is currently legislated
- ☐ d. should remain as currently legislated
- ☐ e. no opinion

Comments:

2. Should the membership of the Board of Regents have institutional representation (i.e. president, faculty member, etc.) with voting privileges?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No opinion

Comments:

3. What should be the responsibility or authority of the Board of Regents with respect to the budget?

- ☐ a. full authority and absolute control
- ☐ b. prior approval over all budgets but no involvement in daily management
- ☐ c. coordinating of all budgets and making institutional recommendations
- ☐ d. no authority over budget process
- ☐ e. no opinion

Comments:

4. What should the authority of the Board of Regents be with respect to program approval or discontinuation?

- ☐ a. full authority and absolute control
- ☐ b. prior approval for program planning or discontinuation
- ☐ c. coordinating all programs and making recommendations to institutions
- ☐ d. no authority over program planning or discontinuation
- ☐ e. no opinion

Comments:

5. What should the authority of the Board of Regents be with respect to state-authorized personnel?

- ☐ a. full authority and absolute control
- ☐ b. prior approval over all personnel changes
- ☐ c. coordinating personnel procedures
- ☐ d. no authority over personnel
- ☐ e. no opinion

Comments:

6. What should the responsibility or authority of the local Board of Trustees be with respect to the budget?

- ☐ a. full authority and absolute control
- ☐ b. prior approval over all budgets but no involvement in daily management
- ☐ c. coordinating all budgets and making institutional recommendations
- ☐ d. no authority over budget process
- ☐ e. no opinion

Comments:

7. What should be the geographic distribution of membership of the local Board of Trustees?

- ☐ a. a representative from each city or town in the county in which the institution is located
- ☐ b. a regional geographic distribution which will result in a Board that is smaller than that currently legislated
- ☐ c. it should remain as currently legislated
- ☐ d. no opinion

Comments:

8. Should the membership on the local Board of Trustees have institutional employee representation?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No opinion

Comments:

9. Should the membership on the local Board of Trustees have institutional student representation?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No opinion

Comments:

10. One Board with decision-making power for all of public higher education in Massachusetts is a good concept.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No opinion

Comments:

11. The current legislation calls for a salary of \$54,000 for the chancellor. This should attract a candidate of:

☐ a. very high caliber
☐ b. superior caliber
☐ c. adequate quality
☐ d. inadequate quality
☐ e. unqualified
☐ f. no opinion

Comments:

12. Massachusetts public higher education will be better coordinated, more accountable, and generally a better system due to reorganization.

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ No opinion

Comments:

13. Do the legislative branches still have too much influence in the governance and control of public higher education?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ No opinion

Comments:

14. Does the executive branch still have too much influence in the governance and control of public higher education?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ No opinion

Comments:

My Occupation?

☐ Legislator
☐ Board of Trustees (old segmental board)
☐ College administrator
☐ Faculty
☐ Other

APPENDIX M
COVER LETTER FOR POST LEGISLATIVE
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

JAMES J. PASQUINI
Berkshire Community College
West Street
Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201
(413) 499-4660

A FOLLOW-UP SURVEY ON REORGANIZATION OF MASSACHUSETTS
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION


Your response to the attached questionnaire related to reorganization of Public Higher Education in Massachusetts will be useful to me in completing my doctoral dissertation at the University of Massachusetts, and paramount to focus on problems for possible legislative revision.

Your answers will be strictly confidential; you are asked not to put your name on this survey.

When responding, think in terms of the recently enacted reorganization legislation of Massachusetts Public Higher Education. Please read each question and indicate your answer by checking the appropriate box. If you would like to make comments about any question do so in the space provided below that question.

When you complete this survey, please return it to me in the enclosed, stamped, addressed envelope. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,



James J. Pasquini
Asst. Dean of Administrative
Services

Enclosure

/f

APPENDIX N

RESPONDENTS COMMENTS ON EACH QUESTION OF THE POST
LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE SEPARATED
INTO OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

APPENDIX N

STATEMENT 1

Comments:

Legislators: There is no need to change the geographic distribution of the Board of Regents. The effectiveness of the board depends on the individuals selected.

The composition of the BOR's is representative of a wide spectrum of constituencies and needs little or no change at this time.

It must be seen how they perform before I can make a judgement as to the membership relative to geographic distribution.

Size is not the important factor; good decisions and accountability are.

Almost any structure but the one legislated would become unwieldy.

Geography should not necessarily be a major determinative factor in Regent selection.

Geographic representation should have been considered.

Trustees: The Governor's appointees have a vested interest in the private sector. There must be more public representation.

Increasing the membership would slow down the decision-making process.

Statement 1 (continued)

Trustees: Geographic distribution is less important than individual commitment to public higher education, but you don't want everyone from within Route 128.

The entire state must be represented on the BOR's.

The current board does not represent the public, only high technology and business.

It should be as currently legislated, but some effort should be made to reduce the high technology emphasis on the board.

Administrators: All counties should have representation on the BOR.

The membership of the BOR should be selected from the cities where the institutions are located.

Keep size the same, but spread out membership to other regions, not just Boston.

Quality of membership more important than distribution.

Members selected who are familiar with the entire state and the institutions.

If the legislators wanted to be helpful, they would have included geographic requirements in the present legislation.

Regional geographic is the fairest representation.

Faculty: There should be regional distribution, but keep the membership at its current size.

Statement 1 (continued)

Faculty: Should have educators from the public institutions on
the BOR.

Don't understand current legislation.

STATEMENT 2

Comments:

Legislators: Vested interest would interfere with the decision process.

Yes, there should be representation, but not a president.

Trustees: Absolutely not.

There should be representation, but only allowed to have one member voting.

With a president on the Regents, the board would lose its effectiveness.

Administrators: In advisory capacity only.

There should be a representative from the Presidents' Council who is an ex officio member.

Employees who are affected should have representation on the Regents.

Yes. Presidents.

Presidents only, with no voting privileges.

Yes. This is the only way institutional opinions and views are articulated.

Should have a representation from faculty and administration at each meeting as advisors.

No way, there should be as little contact with the Regents as possible.

Statement 2 (Continued)

Administrators: In the form of advisory committees only.

Conflict of interest would be bad.

Faculty: There should be at least one faculty member added to the BOR's.

Faculty or administrator, but not presidents.

The restriction of no public higher education employees eliminate a very important perspective.

At least the largest group of employees should have representation; the faculty.

STATEMENT 3

Comments:

Legislators: Regents must have full authority to enable it to carry out its role and responsibility.

One agency must have complete control to keep system in an orderly fashion.

To be successful and turn the public higher education system around, the Regents must have more power than any previous board.

Trustees: The nitty-gritty budget problems should be delegated to responsible staff personnel.

They must have full control.

But institutions must be accountable to the Board of Regents.

Administrators: If the state had formula funding there would be no problems in the budgetary process.

I believe that each individual college is best suited to distribute allocated funds.

Local campuses need flexibility.

BOR must have fiscal autonomy in order to work.

The budget function should be decentralized.

The Regents should have approval over only exceptional requests.

Statement 3 (continued)

Faculty: Keep the BOR out of the budget process so that institutions
 can respond to changing student needs.

The Regents will not recognize the specific needs of each
institution, and provide the funding necessary to permit the
attainment of the individual missions.

Too much power in the hands of one board is dangerous.

STATEMENT 4

Comments:

Legislators: The new board should take a look at every program throughout the state.

Coordination of programs is an important role of the new board.

The Regents will not be successful unless they have autonomy insofar as program approval or discontinuation is concerned.

Trustees: Giving the Regents this authority will only create unnecessary delay.

They must have approval over programs.

Administrators: Power in discontinuation only.

Institutions should set their own priorities in programs.

Only if the Regents step in and discontinue programs will higher education duplication ever be corrected.

Final authority must lie with each college. Board should only recommend.

My experiences lead me to conclude that there is a great deal of duplication throughout the state.

Yes, coordination!

Some institutional decisions have caused problems for the rest of us. Clearly need to be overseen.

Statement 4 (continued)

Faculty: Program approval should not be tied up in red tape, but controlled by the staff at the Regents.

STATEMENT 5

Comments:

Legislators: Should not be involved with the personnel management of the institutions.

Trustees: The Regents should step in to see how poorly the presidents are treating the employees.

Full authority is the only way to keep control of the budget.

Administrators: Personnel matters should be delegated to institutional Boards of Trustees.

There should be no direct authority over personnel.

Give each president the personnel discretionary power, and if he doesn't use it wisely, fire him.

Have the same power that the previous segmental board had. That seems to work quite well.

If the union contracts are with the State, Regents should be involved only to that extent. Avoid another bureaucracy.

Faculty: No comment.

STATEMENT 6

Comments:

Legislators: The local board must and should hold the institutional leadership very accountable.

Fiscal matters kept at home will give institutions the needed flexibility.

Trustees: Complete budget responsibility and authority.

The Board should have the same power as a local school committee.

Institutions should be accountable to local board in carrying out budget recommendations.

Administrators: Local Trustees can be more knowledgeable about local needs and more responsible to them than the Regents.

Best authority should be in institution.

The best thing that could happen is to get authority out of Boston and to local boards.

I doubt the legislature will give up fiscal power.

Faculty: The State will lose complete control.

Let the college staff handle budgets and management;
local boards should just develop policy.

STATEMENT 7

Comments:

Legislators: The boards' quality depends on its members, not their location.

Remain the same. Give them time to see if they can do the job.

There must be more student representation on the local Board of Trustees.

Trustees should be locally elected in a county election.

Trustees: Geographic, to me, seems less important than personal qualifications.

The Board should be increased to twice its current size.

More important to have people from different backgrounds and skills.

Administrators: This is the best part of the legislation. Do not change it.

Get the best people, regardless of their hometown.

A slightly larger board (11-13), but city and town representation is not essential because issues are not in that manner.

Same as Regents: Quality first, then distribution.

Give them a chance, since it's too new to challenge.

Statement 7 (continued)

Administrators: Representation would not have to be from every city and town in the county, but should represent every area of the county.

Faculty: A representative from each city or town is excellent, provided that the number of members do not get so large that a decision is never made.

More student voices.

I feel that all members of the local boards should have a college education; high school degrees are not enough.

STATEMENT 8

Comments:

- Legislators: As advisors only; no voting rights.
- Trustees: No, they will interfere with policy decisions.
- At least one, no more than two.
- No, only as advisory committee.
- Administrators: An administrator who understands the entire situation.
- Yes, but not the President or any dean.
- This would be a conflict of interest.
- One faculty and one administrator.
- No membership; just the opportunity to supply input.
- They get that through unions.
- Faculty: The employees are affected by decisions. There should be representation on the local board of Trustees from the nonacademic personnel and faculty.
- Who knows more about the institution than employees?
- The Board should be made up from the ranks of experienced academics and academic administrators.

STATEMENT 9

Comments:

Legislators: The students should elect a representative, not have the Governor appoint one.

Students should be allowed to cast one advisory vote.

Trustees: They must have some method for input. For this reason I would support student representation.

With no vote.

Advisory only.

Administrators: Trustees should not be comprised of special interest groups.

No, but the Trustees' membership should have more than one graduate of the institution.

No, but have some avenue for input.

Politically, student representation is a strong possibility.

Yes, one!

Conflict of interest.

Not needed

How has it worked in other places where it has been tried?

If OK, then "yes."

Yes, only if non-voting.

STATEMENT 10

Comments:

Legislators: One board will be able to set needs and priorities.

Hopefully, a single board will present a better budget for the system.

I have mixed feelings; the process was very disruptive.

Yes, coordinating power only.

Trustees: I do not believe that one board for all of public higher education is a good plan.

One board will result in inadequate supervision of the institutions.

The problems that segmental boards had will pale to insignificance in comparison to the problems that the state will have in that a single board will never be able to adequately govern the complex and different "single systems": To govern requires some knowledge of different philosophies and student populations. Governance requires a tolerance for ambiguity, but not negligence through an absence of understanding. Familiarity does not breed contempt, but knowledge, relevant decisions and accountability.

Can't work — institutions have different objectives.

Statement 10 (continued)

Administrators: It is OK as long as they don't act as college administrators and only set policy.

Under a one-board concept, community colleges will find it difficult to relate to local needs.

The previous segmental boards did not have such a good track record. The new Regents must establish better public relations.

As long as they know what they are doing.

Must have good leadership to see that the central office functions operate to support institutions, not handicap them.

I'm not sure. There are as many advantages as disadvantages to every arrangement.

The various institutions are too diverse for one board.

Have not had enough time to observe the operation.

Concept, yes.

It ignores the individual needs of community colleges, State colleges and Universities.

If the proper authority for running the institutions is delegated to the local boards.

It is too early to determine, given the attitude of Massachusetts politics.

Statement 10 (continued)

Administrators: So long as they have authority over the private and not just the public sector.

Faculty: The Regents will be a stronger advocate for all of Massachusetts Public Higher Education.

Yes, or a policy and long-range planning commission.

Have to wait and see.

STATEMENT 11

Comments:

Legislators: Salary is insufficient.

Trustees: With this salary, the Chancellor would have to be in the pocket of the legislative leadership.

Administrators: It is all right for the short time, but it must be increased.

Depends on salary ranges of similar education systems across the country.

Poor, unless fringe benefits are very generous.

A good candidate may be selected in spite of the salary.

Depends on interest and challenge.

Big bucks bring quality! You get what you pay for!

Arrangement to give President Duff more than \$54,000 suggests job not adequately funded.

Salary must be competitive with other states.

Typical Massachusetts penuriousness -- pound-wise, penny cheap!

Faculty: It is not a terribly competitive salary for such a monumental task!

\$75,000 minimum!

STATEMENT 12

Comments:

Legislators: Too early to be seen, especially regarding accountability.

This will be like other reorganization proposals, which will not result in a better system.

Trustees: I feel that the Board of Regents too far removed from campuses to understand and make good decisions.

The whole new system needs reexamination.

Are you kidding!!!

Only if more representatives from the public sector are placed on the Regents.

Administrators: Hate to be pessimistic, but I don't see how!

Perhaps the potential is there, but actualizing the concept may fall considerably short of potential.

Too early to determine.

Give them two years and then review their accomplishments.

...
In philosophy, but recent appointment of Chancellor will probably make this difficult.

It's our only hope right now.

It has yet to be seen how decisions are made.

It has potential!

Statement 12 (Continued)

Administrators: It could be, but not with this particular composition, and the animosity between the Board of Regents and the Legislature.

Time will tell -- Massachusetts can have no system that will work, due to its heritage and history.

Highly dubious, given the history of the Commonwealth.

If allowed to act with authority.

Faculty: I'll have to wait and see.

It depends, if politics are kept out of the system.

I doubt if this Board as appointed has the ability!

Hopefully! I suspect better coordination, but not necessarily any more accountability.

It will get nowhere until better funding is available.

Too early to determine how political.

...

...

STATEMENT 13

Comments:

Legislators: Elected officials need to be involved in this process.

I think the ones who allocate the funds should have all the authority.

Trustees: The Senate and House Ways and Means Chairmen ought to stop trying to run education in this state. They have power, like to use it over more highly educated men and women, which ends up in chaos for all.

He who holds the purse strings, rules.

As long as they use the budget to determine policy, the Regents will not be successful.

Administrators: Higher Education seems to be their favorite whipping boy.

The legislative branches have had full control; they should maintain some control, the amount to be dependent on the Regents actions and abilities.

They are the only sane voices.

Faculty: Politics and education don't mix.

STATEMENT 14

Comments

Legislators: As the statute is written, the legislative branch still has budgetary powers. If that were changed I would say there would be no balance, and then too much executive power.

Through appointments process, executive has enormous control - - - !

Trustees: I am a strong supporter of lay leadership in education. This legislation gave complete power in the selection of Regents and Trustees to one Governor.

Administrators: Just look at the membership of the Regents!

Elected officials are held accountable.

All Board members are gubernatorial appointees.

Faculty: No comment.

